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REGIONAL POLICY DIALOGUE

Public Policy Management and
Transparency Network

Report on the Situation
of the Civil Service
in the Caribbean

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Editors

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Cover: Shell-shaped pendant belonging to the Quimbaya prehispanic Society.
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2) Poverty and Social Protection Networks;
3) Education and Human Resources Training;
4) Macroeconomic and Financial Policy;
5) Public Policy and Transparency;
6) Natural Disasters Management;
7) Environment; and
8) Science, Technology and Innovation Network.
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The State is the primary instrument for organizing and regulating public activity as well as interactions between groups and individuals. The search for wealth and prosperity permanently modifies the structural conditions in which the State relates to its citizens and how individuals relate to each other and the world. As the nature of relationships changes, the State has to reinvent itself and accommodate its functions to these contextual changes. If there is one single, clear feature of the State, it is its dynamic nature, permanently adapting to the changing social, economic, political, and technological circumstances in which it works, and forced to “constantly re-evaluate what it does and how it does it” (Stiglitz 1997; Tanzi 1997).

It is along these lines that Woodrow Wilson (1887) acknowledged that “it is the object of administrative study to discover, firstly, what government can properly and successfully do, and secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of money or of energy.” Nevertheless, it is precisely in defining what to do and how to do it that controversies arise. Behind the notion of bureaucracy is the belief that the State can better perform its functions—and thus that society will be best served—through the creation of a permanent organization managed by civil servants who are hired and promoted on the basis of merit and competence. How efficient these organizations are will, to a degree, determine the quality of public policies and, hence, their stability, adaptability, implementation, and enforcement, the degree of public regard-ness, and its efficiency (Stein et al., 2006).

While recognizing that “governments can no longer manage social issues alone” (United Nations Foundation 2003:2), one of the central policy objectives of governments still remains the improvement of public services. It is along these lines that during the last decades, there has been a progressive redistribution of roles and responsibilities among governments, the private sector, and the civil society. This reallocation of roles among different players is the result of two simultaneous movements towards “privatizing government,” while at the same time parts of the private sector and non-profit organizations have been “governmentalized” (Kettl 2002). In this context, the State is widely accepted to be primarily responsible for setting the framework in which this redistribution operates. Thereof, regulation becomes a fundamental tool in increasingly “mixed management strategies,” where responsibilities between the public and the private are becoming more unclear and delivery more heavily depends on the respect and enforcement of contracts (Dent et al. 2007:3).

Together with a redefinition of the role played by government and the State, public service management has also moved from the traditional hierarchical, rigid bureaucratic model
towards less monopolistic, more decentralized, less permanent, and more flexible, client-focus government models that have a progressive separation between design and implementation functions in policy-making.

Ideas about changing government gained momentum during the 1980s and 1990s, flagged by new administrations, particularly in Great Britain, New Zealand, and the United States, and partly as a response to the growing gap between “doing business in the private sector” and “doing so in the public sector” that took place over the second half of the twentieth century (Kamarck 2007:1). These reform processes came to a large extent as a response to the following two parallel movements: constraining public budgets, and increasingly evident citizens’ concerns about the quality of public services. Both movements combined put a strong pressure on politicians for change. As a result, new governance models represent a progressive alignment of public sector practices with private sector principles such as customer satisfaction, efficiency and performance, as guides for institutional operating and organizing.¹

In this regard, the trends followed by Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) countries have been increasingly influenced by many of the new parameters triggering the wave of institutional reforms discussed above.

During the 1950s and 1960s, LAC experienced a strong economic growth which had as principal agent an active State in terms of industrial policies and investments in infrastructure, health, and education. However, by the decade of the 1970s, it became increasingly evident that both the State and the economic models suffered from serious problems of competitiveness and efficiency. Excessively dirigiste, these development strategies assumed an overly ambitious role for the State, going far beyond its effective capacity, and in turn undermining its performance in the delivery of core functions (Snowdon 2001:47, citing World Bank 1997). In reaction to this, the 1970s and 1980s saw a growing skepticism develop towards the expanding role of government, and the debate about market failure versus government failure started to intensify. As a result, over the last decade and a half, countries in the region moved towards the implementation of orthodox policies of fiscal discipline and the resizing of the State.

In addition to proposing active economic and business development policies, States in the Region also have to face important social demands, with 40 percent of the population living below the poverty line. Addressing these demands entails rendering first-quality, efficient and effective services that reach those who most need them, which, in turn, creates continuous pressure over public budgets. This situation has become even more apparent with the trade and financial liberalizations which have in turn reduced the maneuvering capacity of the State (Barreix et al. 2005). The liberalization of domestic prices has resulted in greater transparency, impeding lowering costs of some basic services without subsidizing, and having a related impact on the fiscal balance. A lack of flexibility in trade, and monetary and exchange policies, increases the pressure over the fiscal policy, which, as a result, becomes the main instrument of economic policy.

The policies of fiscal discipline and resizing of the State, while very successful in bringing needed macroeconomic stability to the region, have in some cases resulted in a weakening of its institutional capacity, with a corollary negative impact on public investment and the delivery of basic services and social protection systems. This does not mean, however, that the services rendered by the public administration will be improved simply by increasing budgetary resources. It can be argued that both the failure of some development policies in which the State was the primary actor and the weakness of the executive power vis-à-vis other stakeholders are a consequence of the weaknesses of bureaucra-

¹ For a review see Kamarck, 2007.
cy (Echebarría 2006a). These State deficiencies are not exclusively due to budgetary restrictions but also to structural factors regarding organizational capacity and efficiency that are significantly affecting government performance. In turn, overall government performance reflects on citizens’ satisfaction with public services, confidence, and perceived sense of value of public institutions.

**THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT MODELS**

There have been different attempts to classify new strategies used by governments to operate and fulfill their functions and responsibilities towards their citizens more efficiently. In modernizing governments, very often practice precedes theory, or as Guy Peters puts it: “except for the market model these alternatives have not been articulated in a comprehensive form; they have appeared more clearly in government documents than in the academic literature” (2001:13). Given that they are more the result of practicing ‘the business of government’ than thinking about it from a theoretical perspective, the boundaries between different government management models can sometimes be unclear. Even if they are presented as management models, in practice governments use or discard them in an opportunistic manner, according to needs.

Table 1 tries to summarize the most relevant of these alternatives in a comprehensive manner according to important features of public sector governance, such as the managerial methods and financial arrangements, the production schemes and purchasing techniques, the way policy-making is structured, performance criteria, or accountability mechanisms. Always having the traditional or bureaucratic model as a reference, two lines have been added to the table that respectively present the main criticism that each of the new models has of the former, and, in turn, their potential shortcomings.

The traditional bureaucratic or hierarchical model (Column 1) owes much of its conceptualization to the work of Max Weber, who identifies as some of its distinguishing factors a clear division of labor among different agencies and public servants, the existence of stable and linear career paths, continuity and institutional permanence, and a vertical and hierarchical distribution of authority and centralized decision-making. In this model, there is no separation of functions between policy design and implementation. The State and its bureaucratic apparatus make policy and deliver services. Accountability processes seem to be rather straightforward, provided that the existing mechanisms function accordingly: citizens elect their representatives who, in turn, make policy decisions and put them in operation; if citizens are satisfied with the way social problems have been dealt with and with the services provided, they will reward governments at the next election period; otherwise, they will sanction the incumbent government by voting for any of the opposition parties.

After the bureaucratic model, the next columns refer to Guy Peters’ work, in which he organizes the different reform trends into four groups that he denominates as the “market model,” the “participatory State,” the “flexible government,” and the “deregulated government” (Columns 2 to 5).

The first and most elaborate type is the *market model* (Column 2), which builds on the hypothesis that private sector managerial methods are superior to those of the traditional public sector. With some variations, this model has been presented under different names: entrepreneurial government or entrepreneurial public management, reinvented government (Osborne and Gaebler 1993, Gingrich 2005, Kamarck 2007);
### TABLE 1. MAIN FEATURES OF DIFFERENT MODELS OF PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Bureaucratic model</th>
<th>Market model</th>
<th>Participatory model</th>
<th>Flexible government model</th>
<th>Deregulated government model</th>
<th>Governing by network</th>
<th>Governing by market</th>
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<tr>
<td>Managerial method</td>
<td>Hierarchical model</td>
<td>Private sector model: competition</td>
<td>Less hierarchical processes; creation of participatory channels</td>
<td>Uprooted organizations. Mutating structures</td>
<td>Unleashing of rules: public servants as risk takers</td>
<td>Mutating structure responding to configurations of actors involved in a policy problem</td>
<td>No government apparatus required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Rigid hierarchy rules and payment schemes</td>
<td>Reward to merit and performance</td>
<td>Flatter personnel schemes</td>
<td>Flexible, adapted to needs. Fixed-term contracts</td>
<td>Hierarchical personnel structures</td>
<td>Shift in managers’ responsibility: from administering people and programs to organizing resources</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial management</td>
<td>Traditional budgeting</td>
<td>Budgeting for results. Creation of internal markets</td>
<td>Budget as a result of consultation</td>
<td>No incrementalist: Budget as a result of actual needs</td>
<td>Budgeting for results</td>
<td>Budgeting according to needs</td>
<td>No public resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production schemes</td>
<td>Providers = purchasers</td>
<td>Separation between providers and purchasers</td>
<td>Increased participation of producers</td>
<td>Exchangeable schemes adapted to needs</td>
<td>Subjected to managers decisions</td>
<td>Government is not always a service provider but a generator of public value</td>
<td>Government is not a service provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchasing techniques</td>
<td>Internal and centralized</td>
<td>Competitive: contracting out, market testing, etc</td>
<td>Internal bargaining</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Subjected to managers decisions</td>
<td>Identification of actors with greater value added for each service</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>Policy design and policy implementation integrated</td>
<td>Policy design separated from policy implementation. Decentralization of functions</td>
<td>Separation of functions. Bottom-up. Decentralized decision-making</td>
<td>Separation of functions. Experimentation</td>
<td>Separation of functions. Stronger role to bureaucracy in policymaking</td>
<td>Separation of functions. Most of the time the government is not a provider</td>
<td>Government only designs policy, does not implement it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance criteria</td>
<td>Public value</td>
<td>Cost and efficiency</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Innovation and efficiency</td>
<td>Adaptation</td>
<td>Public value</td>
<td>Public purpose</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Government responds to citizens</td>
<td>Government responds to signals coming from market</td>
<td>Government responds to collective signals from citizens</td>
<td>Government responds to contextual stimuli</td>
<td>Government responds for policy outputs: more activists, less accountable. Ex post controls</td>
<td>Government responds for policy outputs</td>
<td>Government responds for policy design</td>
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(continued on next page)
### TABLE 1. MAIN FEATURES OF DIFFERENT MODELS OF PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models of Public Sector Governance</th>
<th>Bureaucratic</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Participatory</th>
<th>Flexible government</th>
<th>Deregulated government</th>
<th>Governing</th>
<th>Governing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of the public</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>Customers</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>Customers</td>
<td>Downgraded citizen</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>Customers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main criticism to the bureaucratic model</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Monopoly</td>
<td>Top-down management</td>
<td>Permanence. Excessive costs. Policy rigidity</td>
<td>Internal regulations</td>
<td>Partial replacement of bureaucracy: government often delegates implementation</td>
<td>Government should not implement policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other names/ references</td>
<td>Hierarchical model</td>
<td>Entrepreneurial government (Osborne &amp; Gaebler, 1993; Gingrich 2005). Government by contract (Schick 1998). Reinvented government (Kamarck 2007)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Kamarck 2007</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s elaboration.

or governing by contract (Schick 1998). The baseline for judging public services delivery is cost: “government should be judged on the basis of how cheaply it delivers public services. Even more fundamentally, the market model asks what things should be public in the first place” (Peters 2001:46). Traditional public administrations are considered to provide insufficient incentives for good performance, because, among other reasons, their goods and services are unpriced and results are not rewarded; they have the monopoly on information; and their structures are too complex, hierarchical, large and rigid to effectively respond to external stimuli. In relative terms, markets are seen as a more efficient mechanism for allocating resources within

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3 Government by contract functions through formal agreements, where the purchaser of goods and services is the government, and the suppliers are the agencies and entities in charge of delivery. The system promotes competition among suppliers. Policy-making functions and service delivery are decoupled. Just as with contracts, the dues are spelled out and specified: “when the budget is tabled in Parliament, each department publishes a departmental forecast report that, among other things, specifies the outputs it will produce in the next financial year” (Schick 1998:125).
society. The market model proposes to replace the rigid payment schemes with merit principles through which people are rewarded according to performance; competition becomes the basis for allocating resources and budgeting, with a separation between the providers of services (ex. an enterprise), the purchasers of those services (government), and the customers (citizens). This marketization implies that techniques like contracting out or market testing are employed to identify “who will do the job better and cheaper.” Leaving aside the “transitional costs for government” that any transition to a new model implies (Peters 2001:49), the quoted author mentions other potential downsides of the market model, among which there is an excessive decentralization of functions to a number of “private sector-like” agencies making autonomous decisions, with subsequent problems in terms of coordination and control; there is also the fact that citizens lose some of their status by becoming “customers” if governing is “reduced to the level of mere economic action” (Peters 2001:45). Finally, identifying the channels for and direction of accountability is also difficult.

The second model discussed by Peters is the participatory State (Column 3), which portrays a government with more collective mechanisms to channel citizens’ preferences, and, therefore, an enhanced participation that goes beyond voting. The main criticism of the public sector is its hierarchical style of management and centralized decision-making. This second model proposes a system in which there is a greater deal of consultation procedures, and employees and consumers are more involved in the decisions taken by the organization. Breaking away from hierarchy implies making organizations more horizontal and creating new structures and participatory channels. Yet, the implications of this model affect the processes more than the structure. Some aspects and recommendations of reform are shared with the market approach, like the idea of protecting the rights of the consumers of public services, in this case, through participation and involvement in the decisions. However, the underlying objectives are different. Rather than stressing competition, the object of decentralization is to change the holders and mechanisms of control. Problems in this model are likely to be related to coordination between agencies and policy programs, and consistency among the policies. Participation may also endanger the needed flexibility among leadership to negotiate by increasing the bargaining costs through collective decisions and consultations.

Flexible government (Column 4) is a third model in which the State’s capacity of response is the most important feature. Government has to be structured in a way that allows for rapid adaptation to changing external conditions and produces immediate responses to new challenges. This model can be considered to be the most at odds with traditional public sector management strategies. It criticizes the low efficiency of the public sector on basically two grounds: its permanence and institutionalization that tend to produce a certain degree of immobility, rigidities, and excessive costs, and the tendency of traditional bureaucracies to perpetuate themselves, where the subject of concern becomes the survival strategies and self-perpetuating structures instead of the original purpose of the organization. To escape from this, the flexible government has to be capable of “uprooting organizations.” This has implications for the way employment is approached. Against permanent employment, flexible government implies moving to part-time and fixed-term contracts. It also implies a process in which government is constantly terminating obsolete organizations and creating new ones. In budgetary terms, it entails escaping from incrementalism. This model gives a premium to experimentation, where decisions and policies are approached in a more modest way; the government is explicit about the risks involved. However, possible shortcomings are that the creation of external agencies very often falls into the same traps of traditional organizations, by tending, in turn, to perpetuate themselves. As already seen in other models, here there is also a potential
problem of fragmentation in addition to a lack of coordination and control. Also the temporary nature of institutions can have an effect on the level of commitment of public employees, and make government organizations more fragile. There is also a further issue having to do with the level of fairness that this type of system will produce. Indeed, the most disadvantaged tend to have more difficulties to access certain institutions. Undoubtedly, for certain groups, it takes more than good intentions and good will to benefit from public services, among other things because the costs of access to information are too high.

The fourth and last model discussed by Peters is the deregulated government (Column 5). It posits that by reducing constraints and internal red tape government will be more efficient. Both, the deregulation and the market approach are complementary. Clearly, new managerialism cannot be achieved if managers are constrained by the rigidity of the different sets of rules that regulate the personnel, the budget, or the procurement processes. The main flaw this model reveals in the traditional public sector is its internal regulations that limit its performance. As it is the case with the flexible government model, one of the foreseen shortcomings of the deregulated government is risk, given that the likelihood for error increases as internal controls decrease, as well as a possible bias in the distribution of benefits. Central evaluation agencies focus more on policy and results than on accounts, and ex ante controls are replaced by ex post controls. This system, however, shares with the bureaucratic model its emphasis on authority as the sole recourse to some degree of internal control. Managers become the source of institutional inspiration and are given more freedom for policy-making, following the principle that “the public interest can be served through a more activist, and perhaps a less accountable, government” (Peters 2001:111).

Other works have also revolved around new organizational forms and strategies increasingly used by governments to function and deliver services more efficiently. Along these lines, Stephen Goldsmith and William D. Eggers (2004) dedicate a few hundred pages to what they refer to as governing by network (Column 6). They consider all third-party service delivery models, including contracts between government agencies, commercialization, public-private partnerships, outsourcing, concession arrangements, and privatization, as different types and “a central component of the trend toward networked governing” (Goldsmith & Eggers 2004:10). This model clearly shares some common characteristics with some of the previous ones, particularly the market and flexible models. However, instead of respectively stressing competition or the need to permanently uproot organizations, governing by network focuses on the importance of selecting the right configuration of actors for each policy problem. This model points to the existing contradiction between the structures of authority and action. Whereas in traditional bureaucracies authority is vertically structured, public action takes place along horizontal lines. Government executives no longer have to focus on managing human resources. On the contrary, they have to manage the myriad of actors involved in policy-making and implementation to produce public value. Government is not so much a provider of public services as an organizer and facilitator of relationships.

Finally, the last column of Table 2 represents what Elaine Kamarck has called government by market, which, despite the apparent similarity in terms, is significantly different from the market model presented in column 2. Government by market implies the complete absence of the State in the provision of the service and involves no public resources: “the government uses state power to create a market that fulfills a public purpose, and by definition that kind of market would not exist in the private sector. […] government by market is so well disguised that most people are not even aware that it is government in its operation” (Kamarck, 2007:17–18). As opposed to other models of government, Kamarck argues that government by market is
the most efficient of all when it comes to changing people’s behavior on a massive scale. This model is to some extent close to the governing by network model in that it uses other players to create public value. Yet, government by market is a much more opportunistic and less generalizable as a form of government than any of the others.

In short, new models of public sector management have questioned traditional bureaucracies in four major accounts: their hierarchical, monopolistic, rigid, and overly regulated ways of doing business. Beneath these criticisms lies the issue of performance, with an assumed lack of governmental efficacy, efficiency, flexibility and capacity of innovation, to deal with—now more than ever—new and changing circumstances. In response to these perceived state failures, a number of new strategies to deal with government business has emerged. Yet, it is important to bear in mind that, sometimes, instead of immediately discarding “the virtues of stability and permanence,” one must consider that “long-standing organizational structures can help to guide policy choices,” the challenge being to find the “mechanisms for identifying and discarding the overly mature policies while retaining the effective ones” (Peters 2001:80).

New models of public sector management have in common an increasing presence of external actors in governmental processes, under the form of markets, agencies, not-for-profit and civil society organizations, private sector enterprises, or simply citizens included as individuals having a right to participate, if not in the decisions, at least in the implementation of policies. This innovation has important implications for public management, since government is in some cases less of a provider and more of an organizer of different suppliers and quality-controller of services. However, “government cannot through partnerships avoid its ultimate responsibility to the public for both the quality of a service and whether it is justly delivered” (Goldsmith & Eggers 2004:21–22).

ARE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT MODELS SUITED FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?

Both in developed and developing countries, States have been increasingly confronted with situations in which some of the old commitments to welfare state services and social protection systems were not viable as they were performed due to restrictions on public budgets and the subsequent cost of opportunity for governments. Without necessarily having to give up basic citizens’ rights to access decent services, these constraints have progressively forced governments to innovate and experiment with new and cost-reducing forms of state organization and management.

One of the major public sector implications of new arrangements is a progressive alignment with private sector practices. However, as for any institutional reform, this might imply some trade-offs. Sometimes changes can have unforeseen costs, both financial and institutional, if risk is not properly addressed and the corresponding mitigating mechanisms are not anticipated. Breaking away from traditional bureaucratic values such as institutional permanence may endanger important public administration values such as impartiality and independence of public officials, with the risk of making them more subjected to political capture. At the same time, permanence is also linked to institutional memory, which in turn helps prevent incurring the costs of repeating the same errors.

Extremely relevant for a book on the situation of the civil service systems in the Caribbean is the debate generated around the issue of whether or not developing countries should first have classical hierarchical bureaucracies before moving on to new public management models (Schick 1998; Bresser-Pereira 2007). To date there is no last word on this issue, as scholars and practitioners involved in this debate have been changing their positions over the years.

Discouraging developing countries from engaging in government reforms in line with those advanced in countries like New Zealand, Alan
Schick pointed out that with the existing high levels of informality in the market economy and in the public sector overall (influencing, for instance, the budget process or the way civil servants are hired), new public management reforms will inevitably lead to corruption and greater inefficiencies: “no country should move directly from an informal public sector to one in which managers are accorded enormous discretion to hire and spend as they see fit” (Schick 1998:129). He argues that some progression in the logic of changes is needed: where there have to be, first, effective external controls, before moving on to internal controls; and, second, politicians and officials “must be able to control inputs before they are called upon to control outputs; they must be able to account for cash before they are asked to account for cost; they must abide by uniform rules before they are authorized to make their own rules; they must operate in integrated, centralized departments before being authorized to go it alone in autonomous agencies” (Schick 1998:130).

Against the hypothesis that developing countries need to complete a traditional civil service reform before moving on to new public management schemes, Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira argues that there is no need for sequencing both types of reforms; they can be done simultaneously particularly in middle-income developing countries (2007). The issue, he argues, is that developing countries should not uncritically adopt public management models exported by developed countries: it is fundamental to always develop some sense of ownership.

Increasingly, governments make a clear separation between decision-making and implementation functions. A citizen entering an office asking for a traditional public service—both in developed and in developing countries—will be surprised to discover who the real provider is and, overall, how the system operates. The State has modestly come to accept that it no longer has the capacity and resources to implement certain services as it used to. Together with the myriad of alliances with different actors from the private sector and not-for-profit and civil society organizations in general, other important innovations have also been introduced, such as information and technology. Governments have fewer incentives to operate “by the book.” On the contrary, the reality of governing is progressively demanding more tailor-made formulas specially designed for each policy problem.

However—and this is particularly true for countries in which institutions need to be consolidated—the more pro-active a State is, the more openness, transparency, and accountability are needed to avoid State capture (Staab 2003). This dilemma is explained by Vito Tanzi as follows: “the very countries that would seem to have the greatest need for an expanded public sector role may be the same ones where the public sector is least prepared to play that role efficiently. Therefore, when policymakers of these countries attempt to play a large role, they end up damaging economic activity” (Tanzi 1997:3). The same applies when flexibility and deregulation are part of the managing rules: the higher the degree of discretion of public officials, the more control mechanisms are needed to avoid state failures. Only when there is a clear allocation of responsibilities can the parties be held accountable. Blurred and diluted responsibilities among different actors and institutions will make it very hard for citizens to identify and democratically sanction. When nobody can be clearly identified and blamed for public dissatisfaction, it is the general political trust that will pay the consequences (Kumlin, forthcoming).

Coming back to the debate on “simultaneity” versus “sequencing,” it seems that, in practice, what many developing countries are implementing today is some kind of a hybrid system, which cannot be identified with any particular model. Recent practice in the region has shown a tendency to move away from the logics of universal panaceas and exportable models to focus on more pragmatic decisions (Santiso 2006). Better and over-reaching institutions have facilitated the implementation of gradual reforms well adjusted to each reality.
Resuming the initial discussion, it is not a question of identifying what the State must do but of determining what the State can do and how it can be done, i.e. what is in the realm of the possible given the circumstances. Thus, the problem does not lie in choosing the best model but in creating the institutional mechanisms required so that the country concerned may reduce its risk when making decisions and in taking the necessary measures so that it is able to properly react with any unpredictable situation that may occur. It is precisely in these circumstances when public institutions and, therefore, the quality of their employees, have a role to play.

LAC is currently in a positive cycle with a rise in commodity prices, significant inflows in remittances, and economic growth clearly above recent trends with an increasing rate of almost 5% per year since mid-2003. LAC countries have progressively been integrated to the world economy, which has in turn been reflected in greater access to international capital markets, and decreased financial country risk and lower spreads. Enhanced economic management has translated in low inflation rates and decreasing levels of public debt. All of the above, in addition to the relative success of certain institutional reforms, has resulted in more solid economies and significant advances in average social indicators.

For this very reason, the region has to take advantage of this period to enhance its risk management, and prepare for anti-cyclic phases. This calls not only for pragmatic management, but also for improved planning and forecasting capacities. To develop these skills, the State should strengthen its public institutions by staffing them with qualified personnel through management systems that ensure efficient hiring, promotion, and a retention processes.

**OUTLINE OF THE BOOK**

As a sequel of the book published by Koldo Echebarria for Latin American countries (2006b), this report describes the access and career management systems applied to public employment in four Caribbean countries (Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago).

The assessments or diagnoses were conducted in eighteen Latin American countries and four Caribbean countries between April 2002 and December 2004 on the basis of the analytical framework elaborated by Francisco Longo. In December 2003, the Network agreed to devise a short form of the analytical framework, which helped accelerate the diagnoses by country carried out during 2004.

In May 2006, the first part of the results were published for the following Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. This edition includes Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.

As in the previous version, the document is organized in three parts: the methodological approach, the institutional assessments by country, and the comparative analysis.

**Part I. Methodological approach.** The first part of this report presents the analytical framework designed to provide insight into the status of the civil service system in each country by using common criteria. This tool is flexible enough to allow for the variations that may reflect the diversity found in all countries.

In order to assess different human resources management (HRM) systems, seven subsystems have been identified (Planning, Work Organization, Employment, Performance Management, Compensation, Development, and Human Relations), from which indices and indicators have been derived to quantify the data for comparative purposes. Even if there is some degree of consensus as to the need for empirical evidence, its gathering encounters important methodological issues that limit the robustness and further acceptance of the results obtained. Undoubtedly, generating data involves simplifying
complex realities through numerical valuations. Yet, these efforts are needed in order to feed information back into reform processes already in place and guide new choices. One of the objectives of this work is precisely to contribute to that exercise.

Part II. Institutional assessments by country. Part II contains the institutional assessments of the civil service systems in the four countries selected: Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.

The institutional assessments are structured as follows:

1. **Executive summary**, which provides a quick overview of the information produced in the assessment and is further developed in the subsequent sections.
2. **Analysis of subsystems**, which describe the seven functions that a HRM system should perform according to the analytical framework.
3. **Indicators and indices**, which are quantifications of the qualitative analyses per country in terms of merit, efficiency, structural consistency, functional capacity, and integrating capacity of the civil service.
4. **Conclusions**, which elaborates on the identified strengths and weaknesses of each system, presenting the main findings of the assessments.
5. **Recommendations**, which includes suggestions for the areas that should be prioritized in order to improve civil service performance in the country concerned.
6. **Summary Table**, which briefly reproduces the main results of each country assessment.

Following the logic behind the analysis by HRM subsystems specified in the analytical framework, the assessments enable the analysts to identify the area in which the cause of a possible dysfunction or inefficiency lies, to work on the interrelation between each set of factors, and to identify possible courses of action.

**Part III. Comparative analysis.** Part III compares the results obtained in the case studies described in Part II. This analysis serves as an input to assess the degree of relative development of each subsystem in each country, and enables to compare it not only with its Caribbean counterparts but with the results obtained in the previous report for Latin America (Echebarria 2006b). Through this comparative analysis, the specific trends of each national context can be observed in the light of the evolution of the civil service systems in other countries.

The report also contains five appendices at the end, which provide the raw data and basic information from which the assessments were made.

**LIST OF REFERENCES**


PART I

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
I. OVERVIEW

Purpose

The purpose of this document, requested by the Inter-American Development Bank, is to present an analytical framework that may serve as a common frame of reference to assess national Civil Service (CS) systems in countries located within the Bank’s scope of action.

Goals and Characteristics of this Chapter

This document pursues three goals:

a) Facilitate the task of analysts of national CS systems by serving as a reference for comparison purposes as well as by providing methodological guidelines for their work.

b) Encourage the use of a common approach in their diagnoses, thus facilitating the comparative analysis of their conclusions by their target readers.

c) Provide measuring tools, such as indices, that may enable analysts to make comparative assessments of some dimensions of the different countries under study.

Scope

The document is intended to serve as an analytical frame rather than as an instruction manual. Therefore, it is not aimed at standardizing the behavior of analysts to conform to a predetermined methodological pattern of content, sequence, and details. The powerful influence of contextual factors, inherent in the examination of different national situations, advises against this approach. Furthermore, our object of analysis is not a single organization but an entire political-administrative system made up of networks of organizations, which imposes the need to draw comparative conclusions with a high degree of generalization.

Consequently, our overall aim is to construct a common analytical language that should facilitate a shared approach, without, however, replacing the auditors’ own judgment to adapt it to different situations and reach their own conclusions.

Basic Characteristics of the Diagnostic Assessments

The diagnostic assessments are expected to include the following:
a) A common approach for comparison purposes based on the theoretical model of the CS system presented and developed in this chapter.
b) A rigorous analytical methodology based on the collection of data that should support the conclusions drawn.

**Structure of the Chapter**

This chapter is organized as follows:

- Section II describes as clearly as possible the objective scope of the diagnoses conducted, specifying the meaning of “Civil Service” in its broad and restricted senses for the purposes of this work.
- Section III presents a global and systemic reference framework or model for public employment and human resources management to be used for comparing the analyses on different national situations.
- Section IV, the largest section, provides more accurate guidelines to conduct the diagnostic analyses. It specifies, as much as it is deemed suitable, the content and method of analysis of the different subsystems which make up the whole model described in the previous section.

The following are also included as annexes:

a) A glossary of the terms used;
b) A section devoted to describing the peculiarities of Employment and HR Management systems within the public sector in order to frame the proposed model within a political-administrative context;
c) A description of the proposed quantitative indicators used to account for certain aspects of the diagnoses;
d) The list of indices and sub-indices proposed for the final stage of the diagnoses, as well as the methodology used for their construction;
e) A full checklist of critical points, including the valuation scale and guidelines for weighing each one of them, as well as their relation with the indices and sub-indices provided;
f) An overall scheme for the content of the final report.

Bibliographical references are also included at the end.

**II. SCOPE OF THE DIAGNOSES CONDUCTED**

This section is intended to accurately delimit the object of analysis, for which purpose the scope of the Civil Service concept is defined.

**What We Mean by Civil Service**

In its broadest sense, Civil Service (CS) is to be understood as the system of public employment and human resources management in the public organizations of a given country.

In a more restricted sense, CS shall refer to a system that incorporates specific institutional arrangements—either similar to or different from those that characterize ordinary employment—in order to ensure the provision of professional public services.

Based on this two-fold definition, we can focus on some elements that will help define the concept more accurately.

**Elements and Goals of a CS System**

The CS is made up of a set of institutional bodies through which public employment and the

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1 The HRM theoretical model presented in section III is based on the approaches used by the Human Resources Management Department at ESADE, developed and adapted to the public sector by its Instituto de Dirección y Gestión Pública. In particular, the author thanks prof. Ricard Serlavós for his contributions, from which he has adopted the basic approach described herein.
people who are part of it are coordinated and managed. These arrangements include written or informal rules, structures, cultural patterns, explicit or implicit policies, a wide range of processes, practices and activities aimed at ensuring the proper management of human resources within the framework of a professional and effective public administration for the sake of the general interest.

In the public sphere, the purpose of the Employment and Human Resources Management systems is to make effectiveness and efficiency goals compatible with the requirements of equal opportunities, merit, and neutrality that characterize professional administrations in democratic contexts.

**A CS System is More Than a Regulatory Framework**

CS systems are governed or influenced, to a greater or lesser extent, by a specific legal framework, but they should not be confused with it. On the one hand, because in practice regulations are very likely to be breached repeatedly. On the other hand, because the margin left for interpreting rules is sometimes so ample that different, even opposed practices may be enclosed within the same legal framework.

What basically identifies a CS system and is therefore the object of this analysis is a set of practices involved in the actual operation of the national political-administrative system under analysis, regardless of the correlation between that operation and the regulatory framework in force. The analysis of the latter, i.e. the regulatory framework, is an important component of the overall analysis, but it is not to be taken as covering the full purpose pursued.

**A CS System Can Include More than One Type of Employment Relation**

Defining CS as a public employment management system entails adopting a comprehensive view of CS, in which different types of employment relations, either close to or different from the ordinary labor regime, may fit. The Civil Service thus defined may accommodate employment relations based on appointments or contracts, regulated by public or private law, whose disputes are settled before special judicial bodies or in the trial courts.

Therefore, the uniformity or diversity of a country’s regulations, structures, and policies on public employment and human resources management does not determine or restrict the scope of the diagnostic assessment, but simply expresses the existence of various national CS models, a diversity that will be duly reflected in the papers.

**One or More Administration Levels**

The scope of each diagnostic assessment will evidently be the one laid down in its own terms of reference. The complexity and difficulty of the task will depend on the extent and diversity of the institutional scope analyzed. Without prejudice to this, this analytical framework can be effectively applied to the CS in a restricted sense, i.e. the central government, or in a broad sense, covering sub-national governments as well.

**III. THE REFERENCE FRAMEWORK OR MODEL**

**III.1. Introduction**

One of the basic objectives of this paper is to define a reference framework to guide the analysis. This section aims at defining the scope of this framework and identifying the proposed model.

**On What Basis Should a Framework be Constructed?**

As stated in the introduction, the method proposed involves using a common reference framework to carry out the diagnostic assessments. But what reference framework should be
used by analysts concerned with employment and human resources management in public systems?

An apparently simple answer might be the generally accepted rules and principles developed by experts in the fields involved. The problem is that the complexity of these subjects makes it impossible to have a standardized or generally accepted theoretical pattern, i.e. a set of clear, undisputed principles. Even in the private sector management, there are various approaches, differing in relevant aspects, which compete with one another. This is even more complex in the field of public sector management where new variables appear on stage, adding further complexity and giving rise to multiple perspectives.

**A Model Must Be Chosen**

Yet, it is necessary to choose one out of all the existing reference frameworks—it has to be relevant, understandable, easy to use, and adaptable to the scope and scale of the diagnostic assessments to be performed. Analysts in this field cannot have a model as accurate as, for example, the accounting plan of a financial auditor, but they can rely on a human resources management model (see glossary), chosen out of the various ones available.

**The HRM Model Proposed**

The HRM model presented below offers, in our opinion, the following advantages:

a) Its broad approach can accommodate different perspectives and multiple disciplines without necessarily excluding any point of view.
b) It is an updated model that incorporates the most modern views on HRM.
c) It adapts to the macro-scale of analysis that, as mentioned before, characterizes institutional diagnoses for which it serves as reference.
d) Although originally designed for private sector management, it has been widened and adapted to the public sector, as well as tested successfully in teaching and consultancy.

**III.2. An Integrated Model of Employment and Human Resources Management System**

Below is the theoretical reference model in its broadest dimension, together with its foundations, strategic value, and the situational factors to be considered.

**HRM Acts as a Link Between the Strategy and Human Resources**

Figure 1 is a first and general, panoramic view of the basic elements of the theoretical model proposed. HRM is presented as an integrated management system, the basic purpose of which is to align the people to the strategy (see glossary) of an organization or of a multi-organizational system, in order to achieve the desired results, consistent with the goals pursued.

The desired results depend—to the extent appropriate for each case—on the human resources involved, in two different ways:

a) Results depend on the degree of adjustment of the quantitative and qualitative size (or dimension) of the human resources to the objectives pursued.
b) Results are a consequence of the behavior observed by the staff members in their workplace.

HRM will have an impact on both variables. Therefore, any assessment of a HRM system must be associated with such impacts, provided they are positive and give rise to actual results.

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2 From now onwards and for simplicity purposes, the word “organization” shall also encompass, unless otherwise specified, a multi-organizational institutional system, whose Civil Service area is under analysis.
**HRM as a Strategic Value System**

Strategic coherence is a key feature of the model. This means that the quality of HRM—in terms of each one of its policies or practices and in terms of the management system as a whole—cannot be judged independently of the organization’s strategy (mission, priorities, and objectives). HRM adds value only if it is in line with the organization’s priorities and objectives.

The macro-scale in which the institutional diagnoses of CS systems take place will force us to address the issue of strategic coherence in a relatively different way from the one that would be applicable if it were a single organization. On the one hand, the strategic statements will be more general and ambiguous (save for some few exceptions, such as those related to the fiscal policy), thus demanding a greater effort of interpretation. On the other hand, the strategic statements will tend to be less explicit, forcing analysts to make implicit preferences and orientations more explicit.

**Influential Contextual Factors to Be Considered**

The set of personnel policies and practices *(see glossary)* known as HRM does not constitute the only source of impact on the two variables already mentioned (size and behavior). The weight of other influential contextual factors—identifiable either inside or outside the organization—should also be taken into account.

These contextual factors have a direct or indirect impact on the people and their conduct by influencing the design and implementation of...
HRM policies and practices or even on the strategic goals of the organization.

Factors Related to the Internal Context

As far as the internal context of the organization is concerned, there are many factors to be considered, namely: its internal political situation, its economic context, the technology used, its work systems, the sociological profile of its staff, its leadership style, etc. One or the other factor will be deemed more or less relevant or influential, depending on each case. At any rate, two factors are considered mandatory for analysis, given their direct or indirect relevance for human behavior: the organizational structure and culture.

The organizational structure (see glossary) is an important source of influence. The degree of standardized behavior resulting from rules or job descriptions, the hierarchical pyramid, the planning systems and types of controls in place, and the degree of centralization/decentralization in the decision-making process are some of the structural data relevant for HR management.

The organizational culture (see glossary) is another factor of extraordinary importance. Frequently, the mental models and values prevailing in an organizational context may account for the human behavior as well as for HRM policies and practices.

Factors Related to the External Context

Influential factors outside the organization are also numerous. Among others are the socio-political and economic situation, the technological advances, the expectations of public service users, opinion leaders, the mass media, etc. Two other external factors are important for HRM and should therefore be included in the analysis—i.e. the regulations or legal framework in force and the labor market.

The legal framework in force is a powerful element of the external context, since its influence, by typically imposing restrictions on the HR system, cannot be disputed. In the public sector, rules are even more important given their wider scope and greater intensity. Some of the specific features and restrictions inherent to HRM in the public sector derive precisely from the legal framework.

The labor market is of the greatest importance for the design and implementation of HRM policies and practices. As will be shown, the labor market has a powerful influential role to play in areas such as human resources recruitment or compensation policies.

The Utility of this Model for Diagnostic Purposes: Defining Problems Correctly Is Crucial

The general, panoramic picture presented so far provides some useful elements for the diagnosis of HRM systems, especially to analyze the causes of problems, an issue that will be touched upon again in section IV.2. Specifically, it can be used as a map to locate the origin or root cause of identified dysfunctions.

Thus, a dysfunction in a HRM system (for example, a person who is poorly adjusted to his or her job position, an excessively rigid mobility or promotion scheme, or compensation inequities) may simply result from an ill-designed personnel policy or unsuitable HRM practices, but also from lack of strategic clarity in the organization, inaccurate or incoherent HR strategies, structural design imbalances, legal restrictions, a reduced labor market, predominant mental attitudes or cultural patterns, or from any other factor of the internal or external context.

Detecting the root cause of the problem (or its root causes, since there is often more than one) is essential in order to “hit the nail on the head,” i.e. to make the diagnosis point to the correct solutions. Otherwise, to cite just one example: if we proposed the introduction of a legal reform to solve a problem that is predominantly cultural in nature, the dysfunction would be likely to remain unchanged.
III. Basic Subsystems that Make Up the Model

This section enlarges on the proposed model, presenting the main HRM components or subsystems. This systematization is important, as will be further seen in section IV, because these elements constitute the main areas of analysis, while giving shape to the diagnostic assessments.

HRM Involves Several Subsystems

Let us return to Figure 1 and imagine that a zoom lens focusing on the central circle of the diagram comes so close to it that we can see its content in detail. If this were done, we would find Figure 2 displayed.

Figure 2 presents HR management as an integrated system that can be broken down in different components, all of which are subsystems of the former and are connected and interrelated as the arrows so indicate.

The Need for a HR Strategy

The upper part of Figure 2 shows again the strategic component. While Figure 1 presents the organizational strategy, Figure 2 shows a byproduct or secondary component of such strategy, namely: the human resources strategy. We may define the latter as a set of basic priorities or goals guiding HRM policies and practices for the benefit of the organizational strategy.

Having a more or less explicit and formalized strategy of human resources is essential in order to:
a) Attain what was previously called “the strategic coherence of a HRM system;” in other words, to make personnel policies and practices consistent with the organization’s priorities.

b) Add meaning and value to HRM policies and practices, which would otherwise tend to restrict themselves to merely administering human resources, i.e. a routine, almost automatic activity devoted to preserving the status quo and completely deprived of drive.

c) Facilitate the innovation of HRM policies and practices.

The Seven Basic Subsystems

Figure 2 shows the HRM system divided into seven interconnected subsystems, vertically organized in three levels:

HR Planning is in the upper level, thus being the “front door” or first step into any integrated HRM system and helping to design consistent policies for all the other subsystems connected to it.

In the mid-level there are five subsystems, organized in four blocks according to a logical sequence:

First is Work Organization, which anticipates and specifies the tasks to be performed as well as the profile of the people, qualified to carry them out.

Second, Employment or Staffing Management, which includes the processes whereby people are recruited, move within, and leave the organization.

The third block is Performance Management, which is concerned with planning, stimulating and evaluating the staff’s contribution to work.

The last component is made up of the Compensation Management, which refers to the compensation received by staff members for their contribution to work, and the Staff Development Management, which involves individual and group training and development.

Finally, at the bottom or lower level, we find the Human and Social Relations Management, which is connected to all the other subsystems.

There are three essential requirements for HRM policies and practices to be smoothly implemented in any organization as an integrated system capable of adding value and working towards the objectives of the organization concerned:

All the subsystems must be in place

1. All the previously listed subsystems need to be in place, i.e. there should be a minimum number of consistent personnel policies and practices that may lead us to rationally infer that they have been designed and are being implemented. For example, if there is no formalized performance evaluation in place, promotion and career processes cannot rely on such basic inputs to be properly implemented. The tendency, therefore, will be to promote staff members on an arbitrary basis, on grounds of seniority or purely formal merit.

Subsystems must be interconnected, as shown

2. Furthermore, HRM subsystems must work together, interconnected as indicated by the arrows in Figure 2 and as will be explained later in more detail. Let us give an example: if job descriptions and profiles were not properly interconnected with recruitment processes (i.e. if each subsystem operated in an isolated manner), it would be very difficult to match the best qualified people with their best suited tasks.

Strategic coherence is mandatory

3. Finally, all these subsystems must constitute the implementation of a HR strategy that should result from and be consistent with
the organizational strategy. As already explained, no personnel policies or practices can be assessed without considering this basic coherence. By way of example, if a variable compensation policy based on performance rewards staff for achieving goals that are not clear organizational priorities—although in a technically correct manner—personnel behavior will deviate and the organization will be damaged.

V. METHODOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION

The work method proposed is based on the model described in the previous section and consists in identifying and analyzing HRM policies and practices observed in the national CS concerned. This methodology follows the sequence of the subsystems as described above.

This section includes a series of content guidelines and recommendations that will help direct the analysis of each subsystem, as well as some methodological guidelines to clarify the process.

IV.1. Content Guidelines:

   Analysis of HRM Subsystems

For each of the seven subsystems to be analyzed according to the model described, in the framework of a CS assessment, the following items are included:

a) The basic object or purpose of each subsystem.
b) The identification of other subsystems related to it and the meaning of that relation.
c) The processes and practices involved.
d) The critical points to be considered by auditors when analyzing each subsystem. These critical points will be presented under each subsystem as factual statements, which jointly taken define a correct HRM and therefore serve as references to determine the extent to which they are actually complied with in practice. Hence, these statements describe the optimum situation against which the reality will be assessed. Appendix 6 enumerates all the critical points in a checklist.

e) Specific considerations that are deemed useful for the analysis of the subsystem under analysis.

IV.1. Human Resource Planning

A) Objective

HR Planning (HRP) enables an organization to evaluate its qualitative and quantitative needs of human resources for the short, medium, and long term, in order to confront identified needs with its existing capacities and to identify any actions that need to be undertaken to bridge the gap.

HRP is the subsystem that contributes to ensuring strategic coherence in all HRM policies and practices by linking them with organizational priorities. Therefore, it may be regarded as the “front door” in any integrated HRM system.

B) Relation with Other Subsystems

Given the explanation above, HRP has to be necessarily related to all the other HRM subsystems. This relationship is crucial to ensuring that
personnel policies and practices respond to previously set priorities and objectives and are not merely inertial or reactive behaviors.

These interconnections will be preferably verified by auditors in each of the different sub-systems, when trying to answer to the following question:

- *To what extent do HRM policies, decisions, and practices in this concrete area respond to consciously pre-established goals within a HRP process?*

**C) Processes**

In the HRP subsystem, we can distinguish the following processes:

a) The *analysis of gross HR necessities*, consisting in evaluating quantitatively (how many people, how long) and qualitatively (what skills – see glossary) the human resources required to perform which tasks and when.

b) The *analysis of the current and future availability of resources* in order to predict the future situation in the area under analysis if no corrections are introduced to the vegetative evolution of existing resources.

c) The *analysis of net HR necessities* by comparing the two previous items, which will result in either an excess or a deficit.

d) The planning of corrective measures involves identifying and anticipating actions that should be undertaken to deal with the net necessities detected and that may affect any of the HRM subsystems.

**D) Critical Points**

The following key issues cannot be disregarded by analysts when assessing a HRP system:

**Existence and Integrity of the System**

- *The processes comprising a HRP system are adequately developed.*

**Strategic Coherence**

- *HR planning decisions usually derive from the organization’s strategic priorities and guidelines. There is a close match between them.*
- *HRP mechanisms in place make personnel practices adaptable to changes in the organization’s strategy.*

**Basic Information**

- *Personnel information systems provide knowledge on the quantitative and qualitative availability of existing and expected HR in different organizational situations and units.*

**Effectiveness**

- *The HRP policies and instruments in place favor optimization and facilitate a suitable distribution of resources and workload among the units.*
- *The organization is neither overstaffed nor understaffed.*
- *Labor costs in the public sector are within reasonable parameters, compatible with the country’s economy.*
- *Staff members are redistributed whenever necessary.*
- *The technical skills of the staff are in line with the knowledge society. The weight of qualified personnel is significant.*

**Administration**

- *HRP plans are monitored and updated when necessary to adjust to changing strategies or situations.*
- *Line managers are acquainted with HRP plans and are involved in their design and follow-up.*

**E) Specific Considerations**

- *Two levels can be conceptually distinguished in the analysis of HRP: a) the examination of HR planning tools, mechanisms, and decisions, and b) the evaluation of their operativity, by verifying their impact on the different HRM policies, practices, and decisions. This does not mean that a predetermined sequence is imposed, but rather that*
each analyst must organize his or her own sequence and take into account that the full HRP picture will not be completed until all the subsystems in the model are analyzed.

• In the administrative or functional areas of the public sector, one can very often find decisions of an inertial or reactive nature, along with others where considerable planning tools have been used as a result of the firm adoption of strategic priorities. The auditor should take this into account so as not to make the mistake of taking the part for the whole.

• Very often, the development of HRP is related (not causally) to the development of HR information systems. A good starting point in the analysis of this subsystem is to explore the quality of these information systems.

• In the absence of any elaborate or specific tool, it should be borne in mind that all budgets contain elements of personnel planning. An analysis of the budgeting process as well as of the mechanisms for and decisions on their implementation and control seems essential for a successful assessment of this subsystem.

• For the analysis of this subsystem, the use of some quantitative indicators, such as civil service staff numbers, the fiscal weight of public employment and levels of technical skills, is highly advisable.

### IV.1.2. Work Organization

**A) Objective**

The Work Organization subsystem comprises the HRM policies and practices that define the characteristics of and conditions for performing the tasks concerned, and the requirements to be met by the people hired to carry them out.

**B) Relations with Other Subsystems**

In an integrated HRM system, the Work Organization is associated with Planning, which provides the necessary input (at least in mid- and long-term planning; instead, when planning is made for the short term, the existing work organization usually acts as an independent variable, hardly modifiable by the planning process).

Work Organization is mainly interconnected with the Employment Management subsystem. A good design of job and profile descriptions is like a prerequisite to ensuring the proper management of staff recruitment and selection, favoring an optimum matching between the needs of the organization and the labor market (including both the external and internal labor markets).

**C) Processes**

In the Work Organization subsystem, there are two different processes that must be considered:

a) **The design of jobs**, which involves describing the activities, functions, responsibilities, and goals assigned to each position by the organization, all of which form the framework in which the job holder will have to contribute to and achieve the expected results.
Job design entails that important choices have to be made with regard to the following:

- The degree of horizontal and vertical specialization (see glossary) of the position concerned.
- The degree of formalized behavior established for the position (i.e. the standardized behavior expected from the job holder).

b) **The definition of the profile** (see glossary) of the job holder, which involves identifying the basic skills required for the position.

D) **Critical Points**

Existence and Integrity of the Subsystem

- The processes that comprise this Work Organization system are adequately developed.

Technical Quality and Flexibility of Job Design

- Job designs follow management criteria rather than legal considerations or collective agreements. The legal framework or labor agreements only provide a general frame within which the work is organized and managed according to the needs of the organization.
- Jobs are described accurately, so that the chain of responsibilities is clear. Employees know what they are accountable for and why their contribution is rewarded.
- Job descriptions are not as exhaustively detailed as to preclude proper adaptation to changing or unexpected circumstances.
- Job design tends to enrich or enlarge the jobs both horizontally and vertically in order to produce gains in job quality and encourage employee motivation without serious losses in productivity or coordination (see “specialization” in the glossary).
- The classification and hierarchy of positions respond to sound criteria and are adjusted to each organization.

Quality of Profiles Definitions

- Qualification or skills profiles of job holders go beyond degrees, expertise, or formal merit and identify other competencies (see glossary).
- Skills profiles are defined prior to the technical studies conducted by experts.
- Profiles include the competencies deemed key for the successful performance of each job holder.
- Task requirements are generally consistent with the elements that make up the position profiles.

Administration

- Job designs and profile definitions are reviewed on a regular basis to adapt them to the evolution of the tasks and their new requirements.
- Line managers have a crucial role in the job design and profile definitions that concern them.

E) **Specific Considerations**

- Job descriptions may be found in a great number of public organizations. It is necessary to evaluate whether these job descriptions are part of a global system (however decentralized their administration might be) or are mere isolated practices.
- Moreover, the fact that jobs are described does not mean that such descriptions are actually being used. Evidence of their actual use will have to be obtained.
- In order to evaluate whether skills profiles are effectively used, the Employment Management subsystem will need to be analyzed. By focusing specifically on recruitment and selection practices, valuable information on their use and effectiveness will be obtained.
- In this field, no document or official statement from relevant central organizations—although required by the analyst—can ever replace the substantiated information and opinions that are given by line managers, who are the main actors in the use of these Work Organization tools.
IV.1.3. Employment or Staffing Management

A) Objective

This HRM subsystem involves personnel policies and practices concerned with managing the processes by which people enter, move within and leave the organization. It is a complex subsystem, within which some of the most important areas of HRM have to be analyzed.

B) Relations with Other Subsystems

The Employment Management subsystem involves linking the people to the tasks assigned to them throughout their career. Therefore, it is mainly connected with the Work Organization subsystem. The job and profile design constitutes the foundation for a correct operation of this HRM subsystem. In addition, the Performance Management subsystem is an excellent source of information for all decisions that have an impact on the mobility in or termination from the organization.

C) Processes

In this subsystem, three main management areas can be identified:

a) The hiring management, which includes the policies and practices related to the access of people to the vacant positions (this may involve new hires in the organization), within which three processes can be identified:

- Recruitment, which includes HRM policies and practices concerned with looking for and attracting candidates to fill vacant positions.

- Selection, which involves choosing and using accurate instruments to make a correct selection and a proper decision on the position to be assigned to the selected candidate.

- Induction, comprising policies and practices designed to welcome new employees and accompany them in their first steps in their new position and work environment.

b) Mobility management, which relates to the movement of people between positions in the organization. A distinction can be made between:

- Functional mobility, which only means a change of task, and

- Geographic mobility, which also includes a change in the place of work, involving a change of place of residence.

c) Separation management, which includes HRM policies and practices related to the termination of employment due to performance or disciplinary problems, or on account of economic, organizational or technological reasons. Disciplinary policies and practices, even when not involving serious misconduct or amounting to dismissal, are included under this item.
D) Critical Points

Access Based on Equal Opportunity and Merit

- Recruitment to fill vacant positions is open, both in fact and in law, to all candidates who meet the requirements laid down. These requirements are established on the basis of the candidates’ qualifications, which are technically and not arbitrarily evaluated.
- There are procedures and mechanisms throughout the hiring process to avoid arbitrariness, politicization, cronyism or patronage practices.
- Only a reasonably limited number of positions are filled with people appointed as a result of political mechanisms.
- There are mechanisms in place to guarantee the principles of equality and non-discrimination, intended to eliminate any disadvantage based on sex, race, culture, or origin, to gain access to or be promoted in the public sector.

Recruitment Quality

- The methods used for the search, communication, and attraction of candidates normally result in an adequate number of eligible applicants for the positions to be filled.

Selection Quality

- Selection is based on the profiles of competencies (see glossary) prepared for the applicants to the vacant positions.
- The selection instruments used normally suit the previously defined profiles, and their design is based on technically validated effectiveness criteria applicable to the identification of professional skills.
- Selection committees or bodies are formed on the basis of the professionalism and expertise of its members, who select the best candidates using their independent judgment.
- Hiring decisions are based on technically proven merit and professional skills.

Induction Quality

- There are adequate procedures in place to welcome employees, facilitate their entry into the organization and their first steps in the new position and work environment, and such procedures are correctly implemented. Furthermore, employees are provided with guidelines on the core principles and behavior they must be acquainted with at the time of entry.
- There are adequate procedures in place (such as trial periods) to ensure that the selection of candidates is correct and that corrective measures are adopted, if appropriate.

Mobility

- The functional and geographic mobility mechanisms adopted enable the organization to be flexible enough to respond to staff redistribution needs.

Absenteeism

- Absenteeism rates are, normally, acceptable.

Discipline

- The disciplinary actions taken allow the organization to correct employees’ behavior in a fast, effective and exemplary manner.

Separation

- There are no dismissals or terminations of professional, non-political positions resulting from change of government.
- Employees can be dismissed due to gross negligence or low performance, founded on objective facts.
- Employment contracts may be terminated due to technical, economic, or organizational reasons, grounded on objective facts that impose the need for layoffs.
- There is no excessive staff turnover in any department or sector.

E) Specific Considerations

In the Employment or Staffing Management field more than in any other CS area, it is fundamen-
tal to draw a distinction between the regulatory framework and actual practice. Some pictures drawn by regulations are very often denied by reality. As stated before, the analyst should basically focus on the latter.

The scale of the analysis undertaken will force the analyst or auditor to diversify his or her sources of information. Documentary analysis will demand collecting large samples of evidence (databases, requests, selection instruments, etc.) as well as gathering a wide range of informants (central agencies, managers, employees, members of selection committees) from different sectors of the organization.

It is worth remembering that the use of quantitative indicators for measuring the rate of political designations, absenteeism, and staff turnover is valuable.

The analyst should explore and verify whether consultancy or other alternative mechanisms are used for personnel hiring purposes.

**IV.1.4. Performance Management**

**A) Objective**

The Performance Management subsystem is aimed at influencing the workforce performance so that it is in line with the organization’s priorities and kept as high as possible, enhancing the employees’ contribution to the organization’s objectives and facilitating the gathering of information that will help improve the HRM decision-making process in different areas.

**B) Relation with Other Subsystems**

Performance Management plays a central role in any HRM integrated system, as can be inferred from the figure. Given its influence on the operation of the system as a whole, the analyst should particularly focus on its connections with the Compensation and Staff Development Management subsystems.

It is connected with the former when the Compensation Management subsystem incorporates variable compensations tied to performance, a trend strongly followed by many CS systems everywhere despite the criticisms about its actual operation.

Its link with the Staff Development Management subsystem is two-fold:

- It provides essential input for promotion and career development processes, which would otherwise have to rely on seniority and formal merits, with the consequent loss in excellence; and
- It helps detect training needs in the workforce—a basic tool for the design of effective development policies.

**C) Processes**

Performance Management can be seen as a cycle made up of several stages:

a) **Performance planning**: this stage includes establishing performance standards consistent with the strategy and objectives of the organization, the efficient communication of such expectations to the employees, and the
success in the adoption of these standards by the workers along with their commitment to adapting their own efforts to achieve the performance standards set forth.

b) **Active follow-up**: this involves observing and supporting employees’ performance throughout the entire management cycle.

c) **Performance evaluation**: in this stage, performance standards and goals are compared with the results. As mentioned before, this can be tied to other HRM policies or practices.

d) **Feedback to employees**: this involves informing employees and establishing performance improvement plans, which should be connected with the planning stage of the following cycle.

**D) Critical Points**

**Planning and Follow-up**

- Top management usually defines standards of expected performance, consistent with the organization’s priorities and strategy. Consequently, employees are very well aware of what aspects of their contribution will be specifically valued in a given period.
- Performance objectives are set forth within the framework of improvement plans resulting from the previous management cycle.
- Performance objectives are communicated to the employees in a way that their involvement and commitment are encouraged.
- Throughout the management cycle top managers actively follow, observe, and support performance improvement efforts by providing resources or removing obstacles where necessary.

**Evaluation**

- People’s performance is evaluated by the organization according to the expected standards.
- Evaluation criteria and practices enable the organization to efficiently distinguish differences in performance among employees.

- Performance evaluation criteria are regarded as reliable and objective by those responsible for their implementation.

**Administration:**

- Line managers who are responsible for work units at different hierarchical levels play a leading role in the performance management of the employees under their supervision.

**E) Specific Considerations**

Below are some considerations related to the Performance Management subsystem that the CS analyst should take into account:

- In every organization there are elements of performance management, although they may be only informal practices based on intuitive assessments. For this subsystem to be deemed operational, a minimum degree of formalization is required.
- The existence of a formalized system (for example, a mandatory procedure for defining objectives, holding interviews, and administering performance evaluations, plus questionnaires and other printed documents) does not mean per se that all the relevant elements of this HRM field (probably the most difficult one) are being implemented. Very often the system becomes a mere bureaucratic formality.
- Some of the weaknesses usually observed in Performance Management systems are the following:
  - the lack of commitment from the top managers who are expected to play a proactive role in the management of the system; shortage of time and insufficient training in the effective use of management instruments;
  - the tendency to evaluate peers uniformly in order to avoid interpersonal conflict;
• the lack of technical reliability and objectivity of the instruments used for measurement.

IV.1.5. Compensation Management

A) Objective

This subsystem entails the management of all types of monetary (i.e. wage or non-wage) and non-monetary benefits offered by the organization to its employees to reward them for their contribution to achieving the organization’s objectives.

B) Relations with Other Subsystems

It is mostly connected with two already described subsystems:

• The Work Organization, and more specifically, job design, constitutes the basis for the design of wage structures.
• The Performance Management, particularly, the performance evaluation element, provides essential information to:

  • Apply, where appropriate, variable payments based on performance; and
  • Devise mechanisms related to non-monetary recognition.

C) Processes

a) Salary Structure Design:

In most organizations, the design of a fixed or basic compensation structure starts with the job design. To achieve internal and external wage equity (see glossary), the following processes should take place:

• The assessment of positions, whereby each job is weighed against and in line with its relative contribution to the results of the organization and relevant salary benchmarks in the market.
  • The classification of jobs in salary bands or levels consistent with the assessment mentioned above and facilitating a suitable wage progression and sound compensation management.

The variable compensation structure design involves choosing what to reward (performance, profit sharing, overall results, etc.), the beneficiaries (either the individual or the group), and the spread of the salary band.

b) Extra-salary Benefits

The use of non-monetary compensations (e.g. life or accident insurance, aids and loans, supplemental pension plan contributions, etc.) imposes the need to define policies that enable the organization to tie them to an overall pay strategy.

c) Design of Progressive Mechanisms

This involves designing compensation policies in two areas:

• Global progress, i.e. choosing whether to tie increases to actual or forecasted inflation, results, etc., and
• The individual’s development, i.e. choosing whether to tie increases to seniority, length of service, performance, etc.

d) Salary Administration

This entails defining policies concerned with the degree of centralization or decentralization of the decisions on workers’ compensations and with the degree of transparency of the salaries.

e) Non-monetary Recognition

This includes any policy or instrument defined and adopted by the organization to recognize and reward achievements, without causing any impact on wages.

D) Critical Points

Existence of a Compensation Strategy

• The wage structure and compensation policies derive from a set of priorities and objectives linked to the organization’s strategy rather than to inertial practices or reactive responses to claims and labor conflicts.

Internal Equity

• In general, the people in the organization have the perception that their compensations are consistent with their contribution.
• People feel that the compensation received by other employees is equitable vis-à-vis their own salaries.
• Job classifications translated to salary levels contribute to a flexible progression based on performance and training.
• The wage scale is reasonable. Vertical differences in salary respond to the different nature of the positions.
• There is some balance between the staff compensation in the organization and the salaries earned by equivalent employees in different sections and areas of the public service.

External Equilibrium

• The compensation structure is adequate to attract, motivate, and retain skilled employees in the different types of positions required by the organization.
• Salary costs at every level are not excessively high vis-à-vis those prevailing in the market.

Effectiveness of Compensation Policies

• The compensation policies adopted promote effort, improved individual and group performance, as well as learning and skills development.

Administration

• Decisions on salary administration are adopted in accordance with pre-established criteria and in line with the structural design parameters laid down by the organization.
• No arbitrary practice, rent-seeking, or political patronage is detected in salary decisions.
• The HR information system has all the updated information on compensation that is required for the correct management of the salary system.

Other Benefits

• Non-wage benefits given are cost-effective.
• The pension plan for public employees meets their social security needs, is financially sound, does not create exclusive privileges vis-à-vis other social groups, and does not represent an excessive burden on the economy.
• Useful policies and instruments are in place for the non-monetary recognition of achievements.

E) Specific Considerations

• As in the analysis of other subsystems, it is important to distinguish between formal or theoretical devises and real practice. Compensation is what the employee actually gets, regardless of any regulation in force. Any informal or irregular wage structure should be reported.
• Job assessments are decisive elements in the analysis of compensation systems. Without a properly updated assessment instrument, it is very difficult to verify whether compensation policies are suitable or not.
• In analyzing this subsystem it is advisable to use quantitative indicators related to CS incentives.
• A problem frequently observed in the public sector is that wage scales are considerably tighter than in the private sector. Usually this brings about problems of internal and external equity in the compensation structure. The opposite situation may also take place, revealing other dysfunctions. Furthermore, an excessive horizontal decompression of salaries may be detrimental to a merit-based system.

IV.1.6. Development Management

A) Objective

Development Management policies and practices aim at stimulating the professional development of the staff members according to their potential, encouraging learning and defining career paths that should match the organization’s needs with the individual profile.

B) Relations with Other Subsystems

The Development Management subsystem is related primarily to three other ones, namely:

Employment Management: together they define and coordinate the movement of people in the organization.

Performance Management: from the Performance Management this subsystem receives essential input to define training needs and promotion opportunities.

Compensation Management: this subsystem must be coordinated with the compensation policies in force, particularly with the wage progressive mechanisms that are linked to the career plans.

C) Processes

Development Management includes two basic areas of HRM policies:

a) Career and promotion policies, which articulate the processes whereby people make progress based on their contribution and on the rewards granted by the organization in recognition.

b) Training policies, aimed at ensuring the individual and collective learning required to attain organizational objectives, at developing competencies among employees, and at stimulating their professional progress.

D) Critical Points

Effectiveness of Promotion Policies

• In general, people perceive that their reasonable expectations of promotion are satisfied in the organization.
• There are career and succession plans that harmonize individual expectations with the foreseeable needs of the organization.
Career Design Quality

- Promotion criteria and mechanisms are based on performance, potential for growth, and skills development.
- The organization manages the progress made by its human resources with flexibility—i.e. without too many formal barriers or restrictions.
- There are formulas other than the strictly hierarchical career—e.g. horizontal careers or change of positions—based on the recognition of professional excellence, without necessarily granting more authority to the individual.

Training Quality

- Employees receive adequate training from the organization to supplement their initial training, adapt them to changing tasks, solve poor performance, and support their professional growth.
- Training activities support collective learning, thus strengthening advances in the organization’s capacity to deal with problems and respond effectively.
- Training activities effectively support innovation and cultural change processes.

Training Management

- Training is based on a reliable diagnosis of needs.
- Investments in training are made through plans resulting from the diagnosis of needs and are designed to support clear organizational priorities.
- Training is evaluated in terms of the satisfaction produced on trainees together with the result-cost ratio and its impact on the employees’ performance.

E) Specific Considerations

- Promotion and career policies coupled with recruitment and selection policies are highly sensitive to any violation of the principle of merit. Promotion based on performance and qualifications rather than on political or personal contact or on any arbitrary circumstance is the basic requirement to be met by any CS system.
- Very often, particularly in the public sector, organizations identify career with promotion. When this is the case, the need to satisfy promotion expectations and promotion demands leads to an artificial “inflation” of structures, having damaging consequence from many angles. The design of horizontal, non-hierarchical careers is intended to address this problem.
- It is worth remembering that it is in the field of career development where CS reformers have endeavored to add flexibility, as explained in Appendix 2.
- There is ample consensus among specialists on the crucial value of training in modern HRM. It should be kept in mind, however, that for a training system to meet expectations it must be designed to serve the organizational strategy rather than constituting a mere catalogue of training courses managed by the employees themselves on the basis of their own preferences and personal interests.
- Many times, as training activities do not usually encounter resistance of any kind, they become a policy used to deal with any staff-related problem, even when this might not be the best suited instrument. It should be borne in mind that training alone cannot make up the deficits in “tougher” HRM areas, such as performance or compensation management.
- To avoid these problems, it is advisable to develop suitable instruments to evaluate training investments, despite their inherent difficulties.

IV.1.7. Human and Social Relations Management

A) Objective

This HRM subsystem is concerned with the management of the relations between the organization and its employees regarding personnel policies and practices when these acquire, in a given context, a collective dimension.
This dimension is reached when the counterpart to the top management is not an individual employee or a specific unit or work group, as in any ordinary labor relation, but the whole staff, or one or more groups of employees joined by their work or professional identity that goes beyond a specific work functional area.

B) Relations with Other Subsystems

As can be inferred from its location on the diagram, the Human and Social Relations Management subsystem is connected with all HRM subsystems. In fact, collective relations may develop in any of the other areas of people management.

The fact that the topics in the collective relations of a given CS system affect some issues more than others (compensation policies more than payroll policies) will help define the collective relations model, which the analyst will have to confront and analyze in his or her diagnostic work.

C) Processes

Of all the classifications available used to systematize this particularly broad field, we decided to divide it into three management areas:

a) The management of the organizational climate (see glossary), which comprises the communication policies and practices, both upwards and downwards, as well as a wide range of personnel policies oriented to maintaining and improving the employees’ perception of their own satisfaction.

b) The management of labor relations, which includes collective bargaining—wherever this is an established practice—in order to determine wages and working conditions as well as all the relation between the organization’s management and any staff representative, for example trade unions, guilds, associations, etc. Labor relations will also extend to all representative bodies in institutional contexts, having delegates chosen by vote, wherever they exist.

c) The management of social policies, among which those related to occupational health and safety are the most important ones, comprises a set of policies and practices aimed at granting collective benefits and assistance to needy staff members or groups.

D) Critical Points

Work Climate

• The organization is concerned with evaluating the work environment or climate on a regular basis by resorting to reliable instruments.

• Climate evaluations are taken into account at the time of reviewing and improving HRM policies and practices in force.

Communication Effectiveness

• The organization makes frequent use of different mechanisms to learn about the employees’ initiatives, requests, suggestions, information, and opinions.
In general, all-level management decisions as well as all types of relevant information fed by top managers flow easily and fluently in the organization and reach every stakeholder in due time and manner.

The organization has specific communication channels to reinforce the staff’s sense of belonging and involvement in the global project.

Labor Relations Balance and Quality

Each party plays his or her role, without stepping beyond it, and these roles are reciprocally recognized by the other party.

In general, power is reasonably balanced between management and staff. Negotiations between the parties usually reflect this balance.

Labor relations usually and preferably choose the path of negotiation and consensus rather than confrontation or dispute.

Intermediated labor relations—i.e. those carried out by representatives—do not exclude direct or personal relations between management and employees where appropriate.

Labor Conflict Management

Labor conflict is not intense, in number, impact or in the radicality of the methods used.

There are effective mechanisms in place to manage and settle labor conflicts.

Social Policies Management

Occupational health and safety practices are satisfactory.

There are adequate social security policies and benefits for employees that do not exceed those that are characteristic in the environment in which the organization operates. Furthermore, the benefits are appreciated by staff members.

E) Specific Considerations

When examining this HRM area, it is advisable to consider the following issues:

The staff in most organizations perceives that internal communication is highly deficient. People usually describe very different situations by using almost the same words. Therefore, when analyzing this field it is crucial to confront people’s opinions with as many objective data sources as possible.

In the public sector, labor relations are usually extremely reactive, in other words, they are neglected until a conflict takes place or demands are made, leaving the initiative in the hands of labor representatives. This absence of labor strategy makes public organizations particularly vulnerable to conflict and prone to adopt short-term solutions, thus weakening their negotiating power.

This lack of proactivity is even worse when the managers’ leadership in representation and decision-making issues is assumed by the organizations’ political management, which is characteristic of politicized labor relations models, in which political parties have a strong influence on unions. As we have seen, some countries actually tend to go in the opposite direction, advocating the increase of professionalism in this area.

As indicated before, when analyzing this subsystem, it is advisable to use a quantitative indicator to measure labor conflict.

It is interesting to explore if there is any mediation or arbitration arrangements in CS systems for the settlement of labor disputes.

In some countries (such as Spain), substantial regulatory ambiguity is detected when trying to determine the civil servants’ working conditions. The increasing number and importance of collective bargaining agreements does not eliminate but rather coexists with the unilaterally established rules on working conditions issued by the public authority, thus leading to contradictory practices and considerable confusion. The degree of regulatory clarity in each national context is an issue worth analyzing.

Social security benefits and policies targeted at employees in the public sector must be de-
signed so as to avoid inconsistencies or contradictions with fiscal policy considerations, i.e. privileges for public sector employees that are denied to other workers or public services users.

IV.1.8. The Organization of the Human Resources Function

The description of each subsystem forming part of the HRM is not complete unless we analyze the mechanisms used for the management of the system, particularly the distribution of personnel decisions among the different responsible parties.

Scope of the HR Function Analysis

The institutional diagnosis of the organization of the Human Resources function in the context of the CS system must analyze two fundamental dimensions of the organizational design, namely: a) how unified or fragmented are HRM responsibilities, and b) how centrally or not are personnel decisions made.

Critical Points in the Organization of the HR Function

The following extremes may be deemed critical points:

- Whether managers are in general empowered and autonomous enough to deal with the personnel assigned to the units under their supervision. If this were not so, in which cases are they?
- Whether managers are suitably trained to perform this task;
- Whether managers are aware of and assume their responsibilities as human resources managers; if so, to what extent; and
- Whether the central services responsible for the CS system are perceived, by the rest of the organization as adding value and contributing to the attainment of common goals; if so, to what extent.

IV.2. GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

As stated in the introduction, this document does not purport to be an instruction manual. The scale of the analysis and its intrinsic complexity will oblige analysts to adapt this work method to the situation under analysis. Without prejudice to this, this section presents a set of general guidelines intended to shape a common methodological basis with the minimum requirements necessary to fulfill two purposes:

a) To make the best possible use of the proposed model, and
b) To ensure that the analyses of the different national contexts follow a common pattern, so that comparative studies are made easier.

To this end, the analysis of the national CS systems has been systematically divided into four areas. Although this arrangement follows a logical rather than a chronological work order due to the fact that the time sequence should be decided by the analyst according to his or her own criterion and the circumstances inherent to each case, it seems reasonable to anticipate that all the areas mentioned will have to be covered in the analysis if the desired goals are to be achieved. The report sample model in Appendix 5 follows these methodological guidelines.

IV.2.1. Background and Institutional Context

Background

This first part aims at gathering evidence about the relevant characteristics of the institutional framework in which the CS system has operated and still operates. It will be necessary, then, to briefly summarize a core historical background of the national political-administrative system and CS evolution. For this review, analysts can resort to valuable material already published.

Legal Framework

At this initial stage, it is advisable to carry out a preliminary examination of the regulatory
framework within which the CS operates. This will provide an overview of the regulatory model, as well as a first impression of its main features: What are the areas of public employment covered by the regulatory framework? Which ones are not covered by any regulation? Are there different regulations enforced for different administrative sectors? Are top managers governed by or subject to another regulatory system? Are CS regulations comprehensive enough? Or are there HRM areas left without any regulation? Are regulations applied to different areas enforced with different degrees of strictness?

This preliminary analysis of the legal framework in force will provide a first approach to the reality being analyzed. Later, this approach will have to be compared with the actual operation of the CS in order to verify whether in practice it holds true, or is violated or neglected.

Other Contextual Elements

Different elements of the CS institutional context can be relevant in this phase. The analysis may include, without being limited to, the following:

a) The country’s socio-economic situation, focusing on the present status of and future trends in the labor market.
b) Priorities in governmental policies.
c) Budgetary policies and future trends.
d) The reforms being introduced to the political-administrative system, public management, or specifically the CS, or even any announcement of a reform to be made, though not yet underway.
e) Predominant social perceptions of the public system.

Analysts should take into account, however, that the IDB has basic data on the institutional context of the countries concerned. Hence, reports should describe civil service systems as briefly as necessary to gain better insight into the actual systems in force.

IV.2.2. A Functional Analysis of the Civil Service as a HRM System

This is the central part of the diagnostic assessment and consists in the detailed analysis of the CS system as an employment or staffing system and as a human resources management system.

Analysis by Subsystems

The content of section IV.1 of this document, in which the seven basic subsystems that make up the proposed HRM model are described, can be used as a reference framework.

Specifically, we suggest analyzing the national CS system by assessing how it works in relation to each of the subsystems mentioned and by gathering evidence on:

a) The existence and integrity of each of the HRM areas and processes, and the fulfillment of their basic purposes.
b) Their major connections with the other HRM subsystems.
c) The way each subsystem behaves in relation to the critical points, which enable the analyst to prove its effectiveness and quality. Appendix 6 includes a checklist of all the critical points described.

The analysis by subsystems should include a description of the organization of the HR function, within the scope laid down in IV.1.8.

The Use of Quantitative Indicators

Appendix 3 describes seven quantitative indicators designed to support the empirical basis of the assessment. These indicators serve two purposes:

a) On one hand, the use of indicators suited for the subsystem and country under analysis will provide quantitative measures of intrinsic value for comparison purposes. Furthermore, the use of indicators devised by the
World Bank and the OECD will facilitate comparative analysis with countries outside the region.

b) On the other hand, the information conveyed by these indicators will contribute to further analyze some critical points in the various subsystems.

The indicators listed in Appendix 3 are not limiting, since analysts may incorporate other quantitative indicators deemed relevant and useful for the purposes of their work.

**Comparison with other CS Systems Assessments**

To complete the CS functional analysis, it is advisable to compare the conclusions drawn so far with the dysfunctions and common CS system reforms proposed under the OECD, as detailed in Appendix 2. This comparison may help complete, enlarge or clarify some of the evidence or data revealed by the research work, and remind of any other field requiring further examination.

**Sources of Information**

In this phase, the analyst should combine sources of various types:

a) **Documentary sources**, which include:

- *Rules* of different types: laws, regulations, guidelines, collective bargaining agreements.
- *Management instruments* of a general nature, such as staffing plans, budgets, list of staff members, pay scales, job descriptions.
- *Sample of instruments used*, such as recruitment or promotion notices, performance evaluation reports, negotiation records, disciplinary actions.
- *Databases*, like age pyramids, mobility, training, vegetative evolution, absenteeism and staff turnover tables.

b) **Informants’ Opinions**, including those by:

- *Central government leaders*, either political or executive managers, responsible for the operation of the CS system.
- *Technical experts* in the different HRM areas of government.
- *Line managers* from the public administration, managers of various hierarchical levels from different types of organizations, encompassing the widest possible diversity of public sector agencies, degrees of autonomy and sector-specific characteristics.

(The analyst should take special care in learning what consulted managers think about sensitive personnel-related areas, such as health and education, and about other more specific issues, such as justice, police, etc.)

- *External experts* from the academic, professional or other sectors, with profound knowledge and reliable opinions about the CS.
- *Unions, associations or guilds* of employees, especially for the analysis of labor relations.

**Data-Gathering Instruments**

Gathering information from these sources requires the use of various instruments, adapted in each case to the source and nature of the expected information. Among these instruments, the following can be mentioned:

- **Interviews**: open or semi-guided, to an individual or a group, interviews are a frequently used vehicle to get to know the interviewees’ opinions and check the viability of other sources of information.
Panels of experts, organized to share qualitative information and harmonize opinions on highly complex or controversial issues.

Diagnostic techniques, like “brain storming,” the nominal group technique or others, focused on analyzing specific matters.

Questionnaires and surveys on certain topics and distributed to a significant number of representative and relevant informants.

### IV.2.3. Proposed Indices

**What is Meant by the Indices?**

Indices are measuring tools to quantify the assessment to be conducted. Their purpose is to focus on a set of core dimensions and assign them a score or value in order to facilitate comparative studies. Indices will reflect the analysts’ expert judgment on the critical points subject to evaluation. Any additional research instrument employed should be deemed complementary and secondary to the analysts’ appraisal.

To this end, the indices for this assessment work are listed in Appendix 4. They specify and define five dimensions of the CS systems under analysis (efficiency, merit, structural consistency, functional capacity and integrating capacity). Two of them will be built upon sub-indices, following the method specified in the appendix.

**How to Calculate the Indices?**

The indices will be worked out by analyzing the critical points pursuant to the scheme described below.

**a) Scoring the Critical Points**

- Every critical point in each subsystem analyzed will be given a score from 0 to 5—5 represents the score closest to the ideal situation as conveyed in the statements that serve as basis for the analysis, while 0 is the farthest from the ideal. The empty space in Appendix 6 checklist has been left to this effect.

**b) Weighing the Critical Points**

- In Appendix 6 checklist, each critical point is identified with a letter (A, B or C) that indicates the weight assigned to it in the index (or sub-index) to which it relates. For weighing purposes, the scores given in the previous step should be multiplied by 3 if the critical point concerned has been weighed with an A, by 2 in the case of a B, and by 1 if a C.

**c) Grouping by indices or sub-indices**

- The values calculated following the two previous steps should be grouped by indices (or sub-indices, where appropriate), as indicated in Appendix 4. This is also indicated in the Appendix 6 checklist.

**d) Valuing indices**

Once the values have been grouped by indices (or sub-indices, where appropriate), they need to be given a valuation, following the instructions in Appendix 4.

**Consultation Instruments: Expert Panels**

To facilitate the task of scoring critical points, the analyst may seek third parties’ opinions. In this case, neither individual interviews nor surveys are recommended. When consultation is deemed necessary, a panel of experts should be summoned. In such circumstances, the following is highly recommended:

- Consultation with the panel should be limited to the critical points about which the analyst has the most doubts or the panel of experts may add the greatest value. The description of critical points should be restricted and adapted to such criteria.
- Experts can be chosen from as wide a background as those described in the “Informants’ Opinions” section. Ideally, panel members
should be representative of all possible backgrounds. What makes an expert a qualified informant is his or her profound and vast knowledge of the civil service system.

- Panels of 3 to 7 experts are recommended. When necessary, more than one panel can be summoned.
- The meeting may last from 3 to 4 hours depending on the number of critical points subject to consultation. Below is a model agenda for this purpose:
  a) Presentation of the meeting, its participants, and the objective pursued.
  b) A brief presentation of the conceptual framework from which the critical points result. To this end, the subsystems diagram presented in this document should be used.
  c) Comments and explanations.
  d) A joint review of the critical points on which experts are being consulted: each point will be discussed during the previously established time period and scored by consensus. Voting should be used only where necessary.
  e) Results, final remarks and conclusions.

IV.2.4. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions: Focus on the Most Relevant Aspects

In this final part of his or her work, the CS system analyst will be in a position to briefly assess the context analyzed and draw some conclusions. These conclusions should focus on the key elements for the diagnosis as well as on any area that might be deemed decisive for the potential improvement of the system under analysis.

What to Change

Even though the main objective of this work is not to make recommendations on any change or reform, it seems only natural to think that the time and effort devoted by analysts to their work will have qualified them to have some substantiated opinions on the changes that could be introduced in the CS system concerned.

For this reason, it will be deemed useful that their report should include their recommendations to reform or streamline the system. Their analysis of the HR subsystems and of the mechanisms for their organization will serve as the foundations to account for their recommendations.

Analysis of Causal Areas

The analyst can use the reference model described in section III.2 to explore the causes of the problems detected, as suggested below:

Figure 1 above presents different areas with which we can relate, on an exclusive or inclusive basis, the evidence gathered, the conclusions drawn, and the recommendations made.

- Organizational strategy (see glossary): This is the first area mentioned. Some of the dimensions it involves are clarity, coherence, political support and continuity; the accuracy with which it is communicated to the organization as a whole; the leadership that supports it; the extent to which it is an explicit and endorsed Human Resources strategy.
- The HRM system: The origin of a problem is very likely to be in this system because: either it has been incorrectly devised or it is not working properly; the strategic value of HR management is underestimated; only personnel administration schemes are in place; there are problems in policy design, innovation and modernization; the managerial or technical expertise within the organization is insufficient.
- Factors related to the internal context: The degree in which the organizational structure (see glossary) favors or hampers the work of the CS; the inertia or resistance to change re-
sulting from the predominant organizational culture (see glossary); the degree of internal conflict; the budgetary or technological situation, etc.

- **Factors related to the external context:** In particular, the legal framework and its degree of adjustment for effective HR management; the labor market and its trends; other factors, such as the social culture, people’s opinions on the public system, expectations from and preferences about the public administration, etc.

**How to Make the Recommendations?**

For recommendations to be of quality, they should meet some of the characteristics below:

- Recommendations should be directly related with the diagnosis, at the level of both the subsystems and the causal areas.
- They should be relevant for correcting important CS system dysfunctions.
- Their contents should be both concrete and clear. It is advisable to develop few but accurate and easily understandable recommendations targeted at people not knowledgeable in this issue.

- Analysts should also suggest how to implement their recommendations (management of change) and describe how these relate to the analysis of the institutional situation.

**IV.2.5. Formalization of the Assessment**

**Final Report**

In Appendix 5 there is a sample report to show how to formalize the diagnostic assessment, following the methodological guidelines specified in the analytical framework.

**Additional Documentation**

Any complementary evidence, statement, illustration or appraisal that may contribute to the understanding and rationale of the diagnosis should be included as documentary appendices, though not strictly forming part of the main document. This serves the purpose of standardizing the form of the different reports, thus facilitating their reading.
APPENDIX 1

GLOSSARY

Competencies

The concept of competencies or skills adopted is that of Boyatzis (1982), who defines it as an underlying characteristic of the person that leads to or causes effective or superior performance.

All research works on competencies and on their influence on people’s behavior at their workplace started with McLelland’s studies, which aimed at identifying real success factors at work through empirical research. Today, HRM experts have reached remarkably strong consensus about how restricted the mere concept of expertise or know-how is to predict success. The competency-based approach involves a broader and more comprehensive view, according to which other characteristics besides expertise are required to anticipate how competent an employee will be. These other characteristics are:

- Interpersonal skills
- Learning and behavioral capacities
- Self-concept or perception of oneself translated into attitudes and values
- Motives or drivers that select and determine behavior
- Character or personality traits

Management by competencies involves a certain approach to HRM. While competencies are a key variable to account for people’s behavior at work, HRM should take them into account and try to have an impact on them by introducing policies and practices that concern all relevant subsystems and become evident when planning staff qualitative needs, defining skills profiles, selecting people, evaluating performance, defining staff development policies, and even when rewarding employees.

HRM Policies and Practices

When we speak of “a policy in a given management area,” we mean the conscious and reasoned intention to act in a certain and consistent way, so long as such policy is not reviewed. Thus, HRM policies can be understood as the set of general criteria and ways of doing things that guide the decisions related to the management of people in a particular organizational context.

HRM practices involve the decisions adopted and activities developed in this field that very often, though not always, entail the application of HRM policies.

HRM policies may be explicit and formalized in writing, making it easier for the analyst to recognize them, but inconsistencies between the adopted and proclaimed policy and the practices actually detected are likely to be found in the organization under analysis, and this should be taken into account.

Policies may not be formalized in writing nor made explicit in any way, but they do indeed exist. In such cases, analysts will recognize the existence of a HRM policy when the repetition of a specific practice in a given context, over an extended period of time, may reasonably lead them to infer a given criterion and a goal behind its implementation.

Model

A model is an instrument devised by a scholar to study a complex reality in order to describe and gain insight into it and its components. It is, then, a specific approach to a complex reality, among others.

A model is less than a hypothesis, because it does not purport to be a truth to be put to test. It is also less than a paradigm, which generally refers to an explanatory framework accepted and
adopted by all or most members of the scientific community. This does not hold true for models. Therefore, models are basically justified because they serve for explanatory and analytical purposes. They are not meant to be the only possible explanation of a complex reality, but to contribute to its understanding.

**Organizational Climate**

In a classic work, Litwin and Stringer (1968:66) define “climate” as the *sum of perceptions of individuals working in an organization*. This collective spirit or shared perception has repercussions in the employees’ behavior; hence its interest to the HRM.

Organizational climate is usually surveyed using questionnaires that evaluate employees’ views based on a series of dimensions. The measurement of the climate helps to improve HRM policies and practices in the areas where deficiencies are detected.

Weinert (1985:176) identifies five main components or dimensions in the organizational climate, all of which constitute the common denominator of the different measuring instruments proposed:

a) the individuals’ autonomy or freedom to make decisions about their work;
b) the degree of clarity with which methods and objectives have been organized and conveyed by the person in charge;
c) the compensation and reward system, and the way it is tied to actual and perceived performance;
d) the attention, support, interest and “warmth” given by managers to their direct reports; and
e) cooperation and capacity to settle conflicts.

As can be easily observed, these elements are mostly related to the vertical relationship between managers and subordinates, and are therefore particularly relevant to be analyzed and incorporated in HR policies and practices.

**Organizational Culture**

We have adopted the approach by Schein (1999:29), whereby culture is defined as a *pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned throughout its history*. This author establishes three levels of approach to the organizational culture:

1. Artifacts, or visual organizational structures and processes (relational or dress codes, conflict resolution mechanisms, schedules, meetings, communications, rites, social events, etc.)
2. Espoused values (philosophies, goals, explicit rules, etc.)
3. Basic underlying assumptions (taken for granted beliefs, thoughts and feelings).

Only when we arrive at the third level can we grasp, in its whole essence, the organizational culture, since it is here that we find cultural (intangible) elements that act as true engines of human behavior in the organization. Moreover, there are usually many inconsistencies between levels 2 and 3 that reflect the gap between explicit perceptions and informal but actually assumed values.

**Organizational Structure**

We understand, like Mintzberg (1984:26), that the structure of an organization is *the set of forms in which it divides its labor into distinct tasks and then achieves coordination among them*. Division and coordination of labor, or in the words of Lawrence and Lorsch (1973) “differentiation and integration,” are the poles between which structural design operates.

We systematize the parameters of an organizational structure design by distinguishing, like the Canadian author, four sequences:
a) *Design of positions*, which implies conferring them with a certain degree of specialization and behavior formalization, as well as defining the preparation and socialization required of their holders.

b) *Design of superstructure*, which establishes the criteria for grouping positions into units under a single, hierarchical control, as well as the unit size or span of control of the unit manager.

c) *Design of lateral linkages*, which defines the type of planning and control systems, as well as the liaison devices required to contain lateral or cross-sectional interdependencies.

d) *Design of decision-making system*, which sets forth the degree of horizontal or vertical centralization or decentralization of decisions to be made.

All the options opened up by the design of the organizational structure are highly relevant for HRM as situational factors, the consequences of which impact on almost all its subsystems.

**Competency or Skills Profiles**

A competency profile is a selection of basic competencies (see glossary for this word) that guarantee that the candidate is qualified for a given job. We may call it a “blueprint” of the ideal job holder.

Having a good profile of the ideal job holder is key to ensuring a correct management of hiring processes, as well as the proper operation of other HRM areas, such as evaluation and development policies as they are intended to enhance employees’ most relevant skills.

Good profiles, applied particularly to the recruitment and selection processes, should only specify a few skills deemed crucial for successful performance. These requirements will enable the organization to contact the labor market with some reasonable expectation of success, to design effective hiring processes at reasonable costs, and to have a set of highly accurate predictors pointing to the desired results.

**Specialization**

Positions can be specialized (Mintzberg, 1984:99 and ff.) in two dimensions. Firstly, their breadth or scope (how many different tasks are performed in each position and how wide or narrow these tasks are). In one extreme, the employee is a sort of jack-of-all-trades; in the other, he or she repeats the same task over and over again. Secondly, the depth of or control over the task actually performed. In one extreme, the employee is limited to following precise instructions; in the opposite one, he or she performs and controls every aspect of the activity. The first dimension is the horizontal specialization of the position, while the second is known as vertical specialization. Their opposite pairs are known as “horizontal and vertical job enlargement.”

According to the empirical evidence drawn from many cases, the grounds in favor of specialization (the horizontal specialization of an expert performing a limited task or the vertical specialization of an employee performing tasks subject to strict external control) are the gains in productivity and coordination). The arguments against specialization are demotivation due to routine, rigidity in view of changes and loss in the quality of the work done, especially in highly qualified environments. “Job enrichment” techniques, created to deal with this excess of specialization, are based on enlarging the position both horizontally and/or vertically.

Following the same line, the term “empowerment” has recently been coined to refer to job enlargement processes in the vertical dimension.

Job designers should take into account and balance, in each case, the specialization/extension binomial depending on the relevant contingency factors involved, among which the technology used and the job environment characteristics are decisive.
**Strategy**

The term “strategy” in the text is used in the broadest sense of all the uses normally attributed to it in the theory of management. It means the set of basic or priority objectives of an organization (Note: as already stated, organization is to be understood as the multi-organizational institutional system or complex whose CS system is being audited).

This broad notion of strategy includes:

a) The organization’s mission or raison d’etre
b) Its lines of action or priorities
c) Its operational objectives

The term is used to refer to both explicit statements, however formalized, as well as implicit preferences of leaders, so commonly found in the public sector, provided they can be reasonably detected with the tools used in the analysis.

As it was previously indicated, the macro-scale analysis inherent to CS system audits will force analysts to make highly generalized and ambiguous strategic definitions, which will in turn increase the interpretative dimension in their work.

**Wage Equity**

“Wage equity” refers to the quality of a compensation structure, consisting of a two-fold balance:

a) On one hand, a balance between what each employee contributes to and receives from the organization, also taking into account how this contribution/compensation balance works for different employees and groups of employees.
b) On the other hand, a balance between the salaries paid by the organization and those offered in relevant job markets of reference.

In the first case, we talk about internal equity in the wage structure. A suitable HRM aims at being perceived as equitable and fair by employees.

In the second case, we talk about external equity, which includes wage competitiveness and efficiency issues.

A wage system is competitive when it enables the organization to recruit and retain the employees it requires. The recruitment and staff turnover rates are a measure of wage competitiveness. A wage or pay system is said to be efficient when the organization is competitive at a cost not higher than that in the markets of reference.

The tension between internal and external equity is a typical HRM problem that takes place mainly when the increase in the market value of some specialties, professions or skills profiles—regardless of the causes—forces the organization to raise the salaries of some employees beyond the internal valuation of their positions, measured with strictly internal criteria, with the purpose of preventing a loss in wage competitiveness. This tension normally evolves into a loss of transparency in wage management systems.
APPENDIX 2

PECULARITIES OF PUBLIC SYSTEMS

This Appendix includes some considerations that, even if they do not purport to modify our employment and human resources management model, help to frame it within the context of political-administrative systems. Firstly, we make reference to different CS models; secondly, we enumerate the dysfunctions most frequently identified by experts in public HRM systems, and finally the main trends in CS system reforms are described. Although these considerations are largely based on the experiences and analyses conducted within the OECD, we believe that they could be applied to a wider scope.

CIVIL SERVICE MODELS

Different CS Models

Each country has its own set of institutional arrangements for the employment and human resources management in the public sector, which we have designated as CS. This heterogeneous reality can be, however, ordered and systematized by classifying existing arrangements to fit some basic models.

Based on a previous work (Longo 2001b, 7 and ff.), which may help gain a better insight into the criteria used, CS models are classified according to four central criteria or factors.

CS Models Concerning Employment Access Systems

With regard to the various systems in place to access public employment, CS models differ in the type of mechanisms chosen to guarantee the principle of merit against arbitrariness, politicization and nepotism. From this perspective, three basic models can be identified, that are named after the archetypical countries that best represent them:

Some countries follow the French model, which focuses on selection instruments (such as competitions), thus creating a system of predominantly formal guarantees.

The German model is also highly formalized and is designed to ensure theoretical and practical training, pointing to a long learning process.

The British model, more flexible in its methods, emphasizes the professionalism and independence of the bodies in charge of staff recruitment and selection.

CS Models Concerning Career Organization

Two CS models can be identified according to the type of career organization used (and implicitly, to the relation established with the labor market):

Position-based systems are organized according to the organization’s short-term staffing needs. Recruitment takes place in order to fill a particular vacancy or position rather than look for someone qualified to fulfill different tasks. It is normally an open system, in which any position can be occupied by external applicants, even though in some cases different conditions may be laid down for in-house or outsourced candidates.

Career-based systems have a hierarchical public job design, whereby employees recruited at any certain level may progress through grades until they arrive at the highest level they can reach. Therefore, career-based systems assume that there are certain positions reserved to external recruitment, while the highest-ranking positions are filled with internally promoted staff members.
CS Models Concerning Public Employees’ Rights

A more relevant and useful distinction between different CS systems is that related to the rights recognized and granted to workers concerning two particularly significant issues:

On the one hand, all CS systems grant tenure rights that protect, to a greater or lesser extent, public employees from arbitrary dismissals. However, some systems only allow dismissal on disciplinary grounds, while others have regulated labor contract termination to incorporate dismissal due to organizational, technical or economic reasons.

Another important distinction concerns collective rights. There are some CS systems that recognize the right to strike and collective bargaining for all public employees, while others deny these rights to some public employees or all of them, for reasons of public interest.

Current political-administrative systems have a tendency towards complexity and fragmentation, which in turn triggers opposite responses—i.e. towards diversification in order to adapt to a complex environment, and towards integration, in order to maintain global cohesion and control. CS systems do not escape these tensions. Based on which response is given in each case above, the following systems will be deduced:

Integrated systems, in which the figure of the public employer appears to be highly centralized; and

Fragmented systems, in which decentralized personnel decision-making processes prevail.

Dysfunctions Frequently Detected in Public HRM Systems

Merit and Flexibility as Key References

The most relevant dysfunctions or disorders of CS systems typically concern two major thematic areas:

On the one hand, dysfunctions may consist in violations to the principle of merit, which must be preserved and incorporated in all HRM subsystems for public administrations to be regarded as professional, which is ultimately the purpose or raison d’être of CS systems.

On the other hand, they may result from excessive rigidity, caused by abuses or distortions of the system of guarantees paradoxically designed to preserve the principle of merit.

It is important to note that neither of these dysfunctions excludes the other, but quite the opposite. Merit and flexibility are key to ensuring an adequate operation of public HRM systems. Conversely, rigidity and the violation of the merit principle tend to feed one another, giving rise to a vicious circle, and coexist in some CS sectors, thus reinforcing each other.

Dysfunctions Related to the Merit Principle

When personnel decisions are made in any of the subsystems described on bases other than people’s qualifications and merits, the quality of the entire system deteriorates.

The merit principle can be violated due to a great number of reasons. The use of the public administration by political parties as if it were their own property is the most frequent reason and usually the root of most arbitrariness and political patronage practices.

In addition, these violations may affect any HRM subsystem: from nepotistic recruitment to the arbitrary application of compensation or promotion systems to benefit loyal employees, to the detriment of the best qualified.

Dysfunctions Related to Flexibility Issues

The existence of a great number of rigid elements can be clearly disclosed in a diagnostic assessment of CS systems. Below there is a description of such disorders as described in a recent paper (Longo:2001b, 19), within the scope of the OECD, with the sole purpose of further clarifying these types of dysfunctions:
a) An excessively uniformed regulatory framework reduces the capacity of the CS to adapt to different environments and to respond to changes.
b) Too many regulations lead to an excessive standardization of personnel practices.
c) Management is so centralized that managers have little autonomy to exercise their responsibilities in the field of HR management.
d) The organization (structures and positions) is highly restricted and fragmented. It usually derives from the law or from centralized collective agreements, rather than from the managers’ own criteria. Tasks have been excessively specified, making job assignments highly rigid.
e) There is almost no mobility, neither internal nor external. Internal mobility is even more difficult owing to the excessive regulation of tasks already mentioned and sometimes due to horizontal and vertical barriers.
f) Recruitment and selection systems are long, complex, and excessively formalized. There is too much emphasis on formal merits and credentials.
g) Job security is excessively guaranteed (i.e. a high degree of stability is perceived).
h) Promotion is prevented by grade barriers that pose obstacles to progress. Excessive emphasis is usually given to seniority or length of service.
i) Rewards are granted according to the grade rather than the position, and this does not help link wages to responsibilities assumed nor to actual workload. Grades may become barriers for a wage progression scheme.
j) There is an almost unbridgeable gap between performance, and promotion and reward systems. Performance-based compensation systems clash with the lack of effective performance evaluation mechanisms.
k) Systems have a poor capacity for producing skilled or qualified managers or leaders.
l) Management styles tend to be paternalistic, meaning that managers support their staff rather than make demand from them.
m) Labor relations are excessively collectivized (or unionized) and this comes into conflict with an increasing need for segmented and personalized human resources practices. Sometimes, a tendency towards conflict escalation is perceived.

**MAIN TRENDS IN CS SYSTEM REFORMS**

**From Personnel Administration to HRM**

Taking into consideration public management reforms, however deep or broad, that are undertaken within the framework of the OECD, the HRM in the public sector is undoubtedly one of the fields in which the most substantial changes were introduced in the two last decades.

First of all, CS reforms have added value to HRM systems, which have become a central management function in the civil service, reinforced by similar trends in the private sector. This added value has helped overcome the idea whereby personnel management was understood simply as personnel administration—i.e. an activity made up of mere procedures intended to maintain the existing structure—and assume HRM as a strategically important system, regarded as essential for the accomplishment of public organizations’ mission.

This fundamental shift has resulted from four main courses of action that have managed to introduce changes as a response to the dysfunctions previously specified. Such courses of action are the following:

**Decentralize HRM**

There has been a generalized trend towards the transfer of autonomy and the broadening of line managers’ discretion in the field of HRM. Responsibilities in personnel issues are assumed in a more fragmented and decentralized manner. Central personnel services tend to evolve from direct management or primary control to the
role of a partner, consultant or, at least, internal supplier of specialized services.

Harness Managerial Roles

Public sector managers have become fundamental actors in the institutional designs introduced by CS reforms. Their development and professionalization are high-priority objectives.

The intensive use of managerial training is present in all reforms, without exception.

The professionalization goal has often led some organizations to separate a group of managers and differentiate them from the rest of the CS, by subjecting them to a more flexible regulation. These Senior Civil Service models (in United Kingdom, U.S.A., Australia, New Zealand, Italy, and the Netherlands, among other countries) are all based, without detriment to their diversity, on the separation of politics and management, and on the recognition that there should be a management level in the hands of professionals, opening such vacancies to eligible candidates from outside the public administration.

Make Managerial Practices More Flexible

Flexibility is the motto of CS reforms in the scope of the OECD and takes the largest share of the changes introduced to HRM policies and practices in the public sector. Flexible policies have been introduced in five main areas:

- **Numerical flexibility:** this is reflected in a consistent tendency towards downsizing, i.e. reducing staff members on the operating public payroll, though with great differences among countries as to the magnitude of such reductions and the methodologies used (global or sectoral plans, early retirement, retirement incentives, fixed number of vacancies to be filled, etc.)
- **Contractual flexibility**, which is mainly reflected in:
  a) the introduction of dismissals on economic, technical or organizational grounds.
  b) the use of fixed-term labor contracts that do not ensure stability, and
  c) the use of outsourced activities and services (contracting out).

- **Functional flexibility**, which results in:
  a) More decentralized and skills-based recruitment and selection mechanisms.
  b) The design of more horizontally and vertically flattened positions, known as “broadbanding.”
  c) The elimination of horizontal and vertical barriers to mobility and promotion.
  d) The possibility of transferring personnel in the interest of the organization.
  e) Replacing length of service by performance for promotion purposes.
  f) The design and implementation of horizontal or on-the-job careers.

- **Wage flexibility**, which has primarily involved:
  a) A tendency to break uniformity in wage fixing policies, reducing the scale of salary negotiations in order to come closer to each organizational context.
  b) Wage progression tied to learning and performance improvement.
  c) The introduction of variable pay formulas based on performance.

- **Flexibility in the working time**, mainly exemplified in:
  a) The rearrangement of the workday, making schedules more flexible through the annualization of working hours, packages of available hours, compensation of extra hours with free time (time off in lieu), and others.
b) The expansion of part-time job modali-
ties, especially in some countries, such as
the Netherlands and United Kingdom.

**Reorient Labor Relations**

Lately, labor relations have experienced an expan-
sion and intensification of collective bargaining
agreements and trade unions’ participation in es-
tablishing work conditions, in a context in which
CS systems are adopting private sector practices.
(Naturally enough, different national cultures
have given this approach different shapes).

In addition and in seeming contradiction
with the trend described above, attempts have
been made to personalize the relationship with
employees (e.g. individualized career plans, per-
formance-based rewards, etc.), thus overcoming
excessively collectivist approaches.

The importance gained by labor relations
in determining working conditions has led gov-
ernments to try to strengthen their position as
employers. In some cases (Italy or Sweden),
agencies have been created to concentrate the
representation of public organizations in collec-
tive bargaining.
APPENDIX 3

DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS

Most indicators presented in this document have been drawn from the document “Second Generation Indicators,” a World Bank report on the quantitative indicators of governance (World Bank, 2002). The indicators contained therein follow the description offered in that report and on the following website:


All definitions and the following diagram have been drawn from the World Bank website. The definitions used by the OECD to construct the Public Sector Pay and Employment Database have also been taken into account. However, the definitions adopted by the World Bank have been preferred since they are more general than those used by the OECD, and thus are better suited for less developed countries.

QUANTITATIVE DATA TO BE SURVEYED FOR THE REPORTS

[The original version of the Analytical Framework requested information about 24 indicators in order to elaborate the Institutional Assessments. The Short Form Summary requests information about only the following seven]:

Professionalism of the Civil Service

1. Number of Political Appointments

This measures the percentage of positions in the civilian central government that are filled using political criteria and mechanisms vis-à-vis the total positions that make up the administrative universe under analysis. In general, a low percentage denotes a more professional and merit-based Civil Service.

Fiscal Weight of Public Employment

2. Central Government Wage Bill/ Gross Domestic Product

This measures the incidence of the former upon the latter. A high percentage indicates that the governmental wage bill may represent a burden on the country’s economy.

Civil Service Incentives

3. Vertical Wage Compression

This indicator measures the difference between the higher and the lower paying jobs in the central government’s wage scale. For the purposes of this measurement, the lowest pay corresponds to 1 on the scale. A high compression rate means less career and performance incentives. A high decompression rate reflects that the system is dominated by some elites and that there is a high degree of internal inequity in the compensation structure.

4. Average Central Government Wage/ Per Capita GDP

This ratio shows to what extent wages are satisfactory for public employees in a given national context. The report should indicate whether the average wage was calculated by dividing the central government wage bill by the number of central government employees, or through a wage survey.
5. **Average Central Government Wage/Average Private Sector Wage**

This ratio measures how competitive public pay is vis-à-vis other sectors in the labor market.

### Civil Service Employment

6. **Total Number of Central Government Employees/Total Population**

This measures the percentage of the former to the latter. In general and in relation to comparable international figures, an excessively large percentage would reflect an inefficient management of public employment, with signs of nepotistic practices. A very low percentage would reveal an insufficiently developed public sector, globally considered.

### Indicator of Productivity and Efficiency

7. **Central Government Expenditure (excluding pensions and debt service)/Total Number of Central Government Employees**

### NOTES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS

#### A. Main Components of Government Employment (World Bank)

![Diagram of government employment](http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/cross.htm)

*Civilian central government + armed forces = Central government*
B. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION DATA


Total Public Employment: includes employees from both state-owned enterprises (SOE) and the general government.

State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) employees: people working in companies mainly or totally owned by the government.

General Government: refers to employment in “all government departments, offices, organizations and other bodies which are agencies or instruments of the central or local authorities, whether accounted for or financed in, ordinary or extraordinary budgets or extra-budgetary funds. They are not solely engaged in administration but also in defense and public order, in the promotion of economic growth and in the provision of education, health, cultural and social services.” (International Standard of Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC), Series M No. 4, Rev 3-1990)

Within General Government we have distinguished the following categories:

a) Central Government: includes armed forces and the civilian central government.

- Armed Forces: (where possible, administrative employees of the Ministry of Defense have been excluded and are accounted for as Civilian Central Government employees.)
- Civilian Central Government: includes central executive and legislative administration in departments directly dependent on the Head of State or the Parliament, together with all other ministries and administrative departments, including autonomous agencies, together with education, health, and police employees paid by central government

b) Subnational Government: encompasses all government administration employees who are not directly funded by the central government. It includes municipalities, as well as regional, provincial, or state (in federal systems) employment.

Central Government Wage Bill: The sum of wages and salaries paid to civilian central government and the armed forces. Wages and salaries consist of all payments in cash, but not in kind, to employees in return for services rendered, before deduction of withholding taxes and employee pension contributions. Monetary allowances (e.g. for housing, transportation) are included in the wage bill. Pensions are not.
Average Government Wage: represents the ratio of the Central Government Wage Bill to the total number of central government employees. Non-monetary benefits (e.g., free meals, transportation) and expected future benefits (e.g., pensions) are not included in this wage measure. (It should be noted, however, that in some countries these benefits make up a significant share of a public employee’s total rewards.)

ADDITIONAL NOTES

• Take note of any deviations from these definitions.

• Take down both the year and source in all cases (for example, “Public expenditure data from the civilian central government, from [Title, year, and page number, and/or link to data].”)

• Employment data should include full-time and part-time employees. Make reference to the type of employment, where possible.

• For all cases, if data on the government level requested were not available, report data on the level of government deemed most appropriate for which data are available.
APPENDIX 4

INDICES FOR THE EVALUATION OF CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS

1. DEFINITION OF INDICES AND SUB-INDICES

The institutional diagnosis of each CS system will concentrate on the following five indices:

1. Efficiency
2. Merit
3. Structural consistency
4. Functional capacity
5. Integrating capacity

Indices 3 and 4 are broken down into three sub-indices, as shown below.

Analysts will construct the indices and sub-indices based on their analysis of the critical points, following the order of the HRM subsystems, as described in the analytical framework. Each critical point is related to a minimum of one index and a maximum of two. Moreover, section 3 to this Appendix includes the critical points related to each index or sub-index, identifying them with the number under which they appear in Appendix 6.

Index 1. (E) EFFICIENCY

This index evaluates the degree of optimization of the investment in human capital identified in the CS system, as well as its alignment with the fiscal policy scale and its reference markets. It is related to 13 critical points.

Index 2. (M) MERIT

This index assesses the extent to which the CS system incorporates guarantees of professionalism to its different policies and practices, protecting them against arbitrariness, politicization and corruption. It is related to 10 critical points.

Index 3. (SC) STRUCTURAL CONSISTENCY

This index evaluates how sound and systemically integrated the CS system is, focusing on all the basic structural elements that a system of public employment and human resources management should have. It is broken down into three sub-indices:

(STC) STRATEGIC COHERENCE

This values the degree in which the different employment and human resource management policies and practices are linked to strategic governmental priorities. It is related to 7 critical points.

(DC) DIRECTIVE CONSISTENCY

This evaluates the degree of development of the directive function in the CS system, with special attention to the relationship between the central techno-structure and line managements. It is related to 8 critical points.

(CP) CONSISTENCY OF PROCESSES

This sub-index measures, in the area under analysis, the degree of development and integration of the basic processes that underpin an integrated employment and HRM system. It is related to 14 critical points.

Index 4. (FC) FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY

This index evaluates the capacity of the analyzed CS system to influence public employees effectively, encouraging behaviors in line with the organization’s priorities and aimed at improving public services. It is divided into three sub-indices:
(COM) COMPETENCY

This index evaluates personnel policies and practices that most directly affect the design, supply, development and stimulus of employees’ capabilities, and tend to ensure that the main skills required by the public system are in place. It is related to 15 critical points.

(IE) INCENTIVE EFFECTIVENESS

This sub-index measures the extent to which existing personnel management policies and practices promote productivity, learning and service quality. It is related to 14 critical points.

(FL) FLEXIBILITY

This measures to what extent the analyzed policies and practices incorporate guidelines that facilitate adaptation to change, by overcoming bureaucratic and rigid patterns and coming in line with the flexible tendencies that characterize current personnel management policies. It is related to 12 critical points.

Index 5. (IC) INTEGRATING CAPACITY

This index evaluates the effectiveness with which the CS system ensures the harmonization of the expectations and interests of the different actors involved (management, employees and other stakeholders), reinforcing the sense of belonging and reducing conflict. It is related to 19 critical points.

2. HOW TO OBTAIN INDICES AND SUB-INDICES

The allocation of a score to these indices and sub-indices should follow the procedure below:

I. The critical points of all subsystems, jointly related in Appendix 6, will be valued according to the following scale, which measures how close the real context under analysis comes to the statements included in each critical point.

5 The real context analyzed is entirely or highly consistent with that expressed in the statement, in relation to both content and number of occurrences.

4 The real context analyzed is substantially comparable to the statement, but is not fully equivalent in content or there are exceptions that prevent the analyst from making a generalization of the match detected.

3 The real context analyzed is partially coincident with that reflected in the statement. There are some common elements in content and number of occurrences that enable the analyst to identify a high, though not substantial, degree of coincidence.

2 The real context analyzed is significantly different from the statement. There are some coincidences, but also some deep discrepancies of content and/or differences in number of occurrences.

1 The real context analyzed is completely different from that in the statement. Coincidences of content are negligible or take place only in exceptional cases.

0 The real context analyzed is absolutely different from that expressed in the statement. No coincidences are identified.

II. The valuations of critical points, resulting from implementing this analytical scale plus any relevant weighing, according to section IV.2.3 of the analytical framework, shall be grouped by indices or sub-indices, as appropriate and indicated in the section of this Appendix, and in the checklist of Appendix 6.

III. Once grouped, all the valuations of one index or sub-index shall be added and divided by the number of critical points under that index or sub-index, which will give a resulting value (RV).
IV. At this point, the procedure will differ depending on whether or not the index is broken down into sub-indices:

   IV.1. In the case of indices 1 (Efficiency), 2 (Merit) and 5 (Integrating Capacity), the resulting value (RV) shall be compared against the maximum reference value (MRV) of the index concerned, which can be seen at the end of this Appendix and which results from dividing the maximum theoretical scores of the critical points (the maximum level of the scale times its corresponding weight in each case) by the number of critical points in the index.

   For the purposes of this comparison, the maximum reference value (MRV) shall be understood to be 20 in all cases, for which purpose the following rule of three shall be applied:

   \[ RV \times 20 \div MRV = VI \]

   \( VI \) is the index value

   IV.2. In the case of indices 3 (Structural Consistency) and 4 (Functional Capacity), in which additions have been made separately for each of their sub-indices, the resulting value (RV) of each sub-index shall be compared with the maximum reference value (MRV) of the sub-index concerned, which can be found at the end of this Appendix and which is the result of dividing the maximum theoretical score of the critical points (the maximum level of the scale times its corresponding weight in each case) by the number of critical points in the sub-indices.

   For the purposes of this comparison, the maximum reference value (MRV) shall be understood to be 10 in all cases, for which purpose the following rule of three shall be applied:

   \[ RV \times 10 \div MRV = VS \]

   \( VS \) is the sub-index value

   Next, all the VS in the same index shall be grouped together and added up, and taking 20 as the maximum value for each index, the value of each index (IV) shall be calculated for each case by applying the corresponding rule of three.
3. Critical Points Grouped by Indices and Sub-indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indices and Sub-indices</th>
<th>Critical Points (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EFFICIENCY (E)</td>
<td>5, 6, 7, 8, 36, 41, 56, 57, 62, 63, 75, 76, 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERIT (M)</td>
<td>24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 38, 60, 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRUCTURAL CONSISTENCY (SC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC COHERENCE (STC)</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 11, 42, 50, 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTIVE CONSISTENCY (DC)</td>
<td>10, 23, 45, 49, 90, 91, 92, 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSISTENCY OF PROCESSES (PC)</td>
<td>1, 4, 12, 14, 17, 47, 56, 59, 61, 66, 74, 76, 80, 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY (FC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPETENCY (COM)</td>
<td>9, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 54, 71, 72,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCENTIVE EFFECTIVENESS (IE)</td>
<td>16, 37, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 51, 55, 58, 64, 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEXIBILITY (FL)</td>
<td>3, 13, 15, 16, 22, 35, 39, 40, 53, 69, 70, 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTEGRATING CAPACITY (IC)</td>
<td>27, 33, 44, 48, 51, 52, 65, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) The critical points are identified by the number assigned to them in Appendix 6 checklist.

4. Maximum Reference Values of the Indices and Sub-indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indices/Sub-indices</th>
<th>Mrv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EFFICIENCY (E)</td>
<td>9.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERIT (M)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC COHERENCE (STC)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTIVE CONSISTENCY (DC)</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSISTENCY OF PROCESSES (PC)</td>
<td>8.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPETENCY (COM)</td>
<td>10.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCENTIVE EFFECTIVENESS (IE)</td>
<td>9.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEXIBILITY (FL)</td>
<td>9.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTEGRATING CAPACITY (IC)</td>
<td>8.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Final Maximum Values of the Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index 1. EFFICIENCY</th>
<th>20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Index 2. MERIT</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index 3. STRUCTURAL CONSISTENCY</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index 4. FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index 5. INTEGRATING CAPACITY</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORETICAL MAXIMUM TOTAL VALUATION</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE FINAL REPORT SCHEME (SHORT FORM)

From the formal point of view, the short form report is expected to be concrete and clear. Analysts, who will be well acquainted with the situation and context by the time they write the report, should convey the most relevant conclusions to their target readers who are not familiar about their object of study. Therefore, analysts are required to do their best to make their conclusions as easily readable as possible.

Please complete the spaces within brackets [ .. ], keeping the length of the text to the suggested maximum.
SUMMARY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS (SHORT FORM)
The Case of [country]

Assessment completed in [month] [year].
CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Analysis of the Subsystems ......................................................... 52
Human Resources Planning .......................................................... 52
Work Organization ...................................................................... 52
Employment or Staffing Management .......................................... 52
Performance Management ........................................................... 52
Compensation Management .......................................................... 52
Professional Development Management ....................................... 52
Human and Social Relations Management ..................................... 52
Symbolic Valuation of the Human Resources Subsystems ............... 52

INDICATORS ................................................................. 53
A) Quantitative Indicators ............................................................ 53
B) Indices for the Evaluation of Civil Service Systems ................. 53
Table of Indices ......................................................................... 53

CONCLUSIONS .............................................................. 54
Analysis of Causal Area ............................................................... 54
Factors Related to the Internal Context ....................................... 54
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Main Conclusions of the Assessment .......................................... 54

RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................ 54
Proposed Improvements .............................................................. 54
Further Comments ..................................................................... 54

SUMMARY TABLE .................................................................. 54

APPENDICES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SHORT FORM .......... 55

[The purpose of this short form is to release a brief document (not longer than 15 pages), that will a) facilitate a summarized view of the civil service system in the country concerned, b) provide the IDB with a basic document to be regularly updated, and c) facilitate comparison with the rest of the countries in the region.]
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(Maximum length: 1 page, both sides)

[Incorporate a summary of the main conclusions of the paper. There is a short summary of all the information that will be analyzed in the diagnosis below. Special emphasis should be given to the institutional context, the legislative framework, and the changes introduced in the period between the first report and this update (when appropriate).]

Analysis of the Subsystems

[Brief introduction, followed by an analysis of each of the subsystems (length: between one-half and one page per subsystem), following the methodology described. The table of subsystems will provide a panoramic view of how some subsystems affect the way other subsystems work.]

Human Resources Planning

(Length: between one-half and one page).

Work Organization

(Length: between one-half and one page).

Employment or Staffing Management

(Length: between one-half and one page).

Performance Management

(Length: between one-half and one page).

Compensation Management

(Length: between one-half and one page).

Professional Development Management

(Length: between one-half and one page).

Human and Social Relations Management

(Length: between one-half and one page).

Symbolic Valuation of the Human Resources Subsystems

[The purpose of this table is to summarize each subsystem’s global valuation by adding a sign:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sign</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>overall positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>←</td>
<td>intermediate, evolving positively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–</td>
<td>negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When making the valuation, analysts should take into account whether all the subsystems are in place and operation as well as interconnected.]
II. INDICATORS

A) Quantitative Indicators

[Until now, the Analytical Framework requested information about 24 indicators in order to make the Institutional Assessments. For this short form summary, analysts are required to provide information on only the following seven, whose definitions are included in Appendix 3]:

1. Number of Political Appointments
2. Central Government Wage Bill /Gross Domestic Product
3. Vertical Wage Compression
4. Average Central Government Wage/Per capita GDP
5. Average Central Government Wage/Average Private Sector Wage
6. Total Number of Central Government Employees/Total Population
7. Central Government Expenditure (excluding pensions and debt service)/Total Number of Central Government Employees

B) Indices for the Evaluation of Civil Service Systems

[Analysts will construct the indices and sub-indices based on the analysis of the critical points, following the order of the HRM subsystems, as described in the analytical framework.]

[The reports should not only quantify indices and sub-indices, but also include a qualitative analysis as well as an explanation of the method used to elaborate them.]

Table of indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Index value (scale: 0 to 20)</th>
<th>Sub-Index</th>
<th>Sub-index value (scale: 0 to 10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(E) EFFICIENCY</td>
<td>[-]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M) MERIT</td>
<td>[-]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SC) STRUCTURAL CONSISTENCY</td>
<td>[-]</td>
<td>(STC) STRATEGIC COHERENCE</td>
<td>[-]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(DC) DIRECTIVE CONSISTENCY</td>
<td>[-]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(CP) CONSISTENCY OF PROCESSES</td>
<td>[-]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(FC) FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY</td>
<td>[-]</td>
<td>(COM) COMPETENCY</td>
<td>[-]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(IE) INCENTIVE EFFECTIVENESS</td>
<td>[-]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CI) INTEGRATING CAPACITY</td>
<td>[-]</td>
<td>(FL) FLEXIBILITY</td>
<td>[-]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. CONCLUSIONS

(Length: no more than one page, both sides).

[In this final part of his or her work, the SC systems analyst will be in a position to briefly assess the context analyzed and draw some conclusions. These conclusions should focus on the key elements of the diagnosis as well as on any area deemed decisive for the potential improvement of the systems under analysis.]

Analysis of Causal Areas

[Conclusions related to the systems and subsystems]

Factors Related to the Internal Context

[Conclusions concerning the organizational culture, budgetary adjustments, or any other relevant issue]

Factors Related to the External Context

[Conclusions concerning the legal framework, public policies, elections, economy of the country or any other relevant issue]

Main Conclusions of the Assessment

[Executive summary of the conclusions]

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

(Length: 1 page maximum)

[The recommendations on the system reform or modernization deemed appropriate for each case. The examination of the subsystems and of the mechanisms for the organization of the HR function will serve as the basis to account for the recommendations included].

Proposed improvements

Further Comments

V. SUMMARY TABLE

[This table will specify any information that analysts may deem essential or at least very helpful to understand the conclusions of the report. It may include some brief keys to the interpretation of the country, its critical points and the scores given to the quantitative indicators.]
Table of indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Comments Introduced by the Analyst</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BACKGROUND</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of the Institutional Context</td>
<td>Analysis of the legal framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Analysis of the Civil Service</td>
<td>Organizational analysis of the Human Resources function</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantitative indicators of the CS system analyzed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBSYSTEMS ANALYSIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work Organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compensation Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional Development Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human and Social Relations Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparison with other analyses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM INDICES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDICES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SHORT FORM

1. Weighed description of the **93 critical points** (Appendix 6 of the Analytical Framework, duly analyzed and valued).

2. **Technical file**: basic data about the methodology used for information collection purposes.
   - Date of completion of the report
   - Consultants engaged in the collection of information and drafting of the report
   - Information sources*

*Information sources:

a) **Documentary:**
   - *Rules of different types*: laws, regulations, guidelines, collective bargaining agreements, etc.
   - *Management instruments of a general nature*, such as staffing plans, budgets, organization charts, list of staff members, pay scales, job descriptions.
   - *Sample of instruments used*, such as recruitment or promotion notices, performance evaluation reports, negotiation reports, and disciplinary actions.
b) Opinions of informants:
- Central government leaders, either political or executive managers, responsible for the operation of the CS system.
- Technical experts in the different HRM areas of government.
- Line managers from the public administration, managers of various hierarchical levels from different types of organizations, encompassing the widest possible diversity of public sector agencies, degrees of autonomy, and specific-sector characteristics.
- (The analyst should take special care in learning what consulted managers think about sensitive personnel-related areas, such as health and education, and about other more specific issues, such as justice, police, etc.)
- External experts from the academic, professional or other sectors, with a thorough knowledge and reliable opinions about the CS.
- Unions, associations or guilds of employees, especially for the analysis of labor relations.

Data-Gathering Instruments
- Interviews: open or semi-guided, of an individual or a group. Interviews are a frequently used vehicle to get to know interviewees’ opinions and check the viability of other sources of information.
- Panels of experts, organized to share qualitative information and harmonize opinions on highly complex or controversial issues.
- Diagnostic techniques, like “brain storming,” the nominal group technique or others, focused on analyzing specific matters.
- Questionnaires and surveys on certain topics and distributed to a significant number of representative and relevant informants.
## General Checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsystems</th>
<th>Critical Points</th>
<th>Indices or Sub-Indices</th>
<th>Weigh</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>1. The processes comprising a HRP system are adequately developed.</td>
<td>STC</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. HR planning decisions usually derive from the organization’s strategic priorities and guidelines. There is a close match between them.</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. HRP mechanisms in place make personnel practices adaptable to changes in the organization’s strategy.</td>
<td>STC</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Personnel information systems provide knowledge on the quantitative and qualitative availability of existing and expected HR in different organizational situations and units.</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. The HRP policies and instruments in place favor optimization and facilitate a suitable distribution of resources and workload among the units.</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. The organization is neither overstaffed nor understaffed.</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Labor costs in the public sector are within reasonable parameters, compatible with the country’s economy.</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Staff members are redistributed whenever necessary.</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. The technical skills of the staff are in line with the knowledge society. The weight of qualified personnel is significant.</td>
<td>COM</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Organization</td>
<td>10. Line managers are acquainted with HRP plans and are involved in their design and follow-up.</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Personnel policies, decisions and practices, in each of the HRM areas, respond to meaningful objectives consciously established in the planning process.</td>
<td>STC</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. The processes that comprise this Work Organization system are adequately developed.</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Job designs follow management criteria rather than legal considerations or collective agreements. The legal framework or labor agreements only provide a general frame within which the work is organized and managed according to the needs of the organization.</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### General Checklist (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsystems</th>
<th>Critical Points</th>
<th>Indices or Sub-Indices</th>
<th>Weigh ED</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14. Jobs are described accurately, so that the chain of responsibilities is clear. Employees know what they are accountable for and why their contribution is rewarded.</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Job descriptions are not as exhaustively detailed as to preclude proper adaptation to changing or unexpected circumstances.</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Job design tends to enrich or enlarge the jobs both horizontally and vertically in order to produce gains in job quality and encourage employee motivation without serious losses in productivity or coordination (see “specialization” in the glossary).</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>IE</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. The classification and hierarchy of positions respond to sound criteria and are adjusted to each organization.</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Qualification or skills profiles of job holders go beyond degrees, expertise, or formal merit and identify other competencies (see glossary).</td>
<td>COM</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Skills profiles are defined prior to the technical studies conducted by experts.</td>
<td>COM</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Profiles include the competencies deemed key for the successful performance of each job holder.</td>
<td>COM</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Task requirements are generally consistent with the elements that make up the position profiles.</td>
<td>COM</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Job designs and profile definitions are reviewed on a regular basis to adapt them to the evolution of the tasks and their new requirements.</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Line managers have a crucial role in the job design and profile definitions that concern them.</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Management</td>
<td>24. Recruitment to fill vacant positions is open, both in fact and in law, to all candidates who meet the requirements laid down. These requirements are established on the basis of the candidates’ qualifications, which are technically and not arbitrarily evaluated.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>COM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. There are procedures and mechanisms throughout the hiring process to avoid arbitrariness, politicization, cronyism or patronage practices.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Only a reasonably limited number of positions are filled with people appointed as a result of political mechanisms.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsystems</td>
<td>Critical Points</td>
<td>Indices or Sub-Indices</td>
<td>Weigh ED</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>There are mechanisms in place to guarantee the principles of equality and non-discrimination, intended to eliminate any disadvantage based on sex, race, culture, or origin, to gain access to or be promoted in the public sector.</td>
<td>M, IC</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>The methods used for the search, communication, and attraction of candidates normally result in an adequate number of eligible applicants for the positions to be filled.</td>
<td>COM</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Selection is based on the profiles of competencies (see glossary) prepared for the applicants to the vacant positions.</td>
<td>COM</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>The selection instruments used normally suit the previously defined profiles, and their design is based on technically validated effectiveness criteria applicable to the identification of professional skills.</td>
<td>M, COM</td>
<td>B, A</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Selection committees or bodies are formed on the basis of the professionalism and expertise of its members, who select the best candidates using their independent judgment.</td>
<td>M, COM</td>
<td>A, A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Hiring decisions are based on technically proven merit and professional skills.</td>
<td>M, COM, IC</td>
<td>A, A, C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>There are adequate procedures in place to welcome employees, facilitate their entry into the organization and their first steps in the new position and work environment, and such procedures are correctly implemented. Furthermore, employees are provided with guidelines on the core principles and behavior they must be acquainted with at the time of entry.</td>
<td>COM</td>
<td>C</td>
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<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>There are adequate procedures in place (such as trial periods) to ensure that the selection of candidates is correct and that corrective measures are adopted, if appropriate.</td>
<td>COM</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>The functional and geographic mobility mechanisms adopted enable the organization to be flexible enough to respond to staff redistribution needs.</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Absenteeism rates are, normally, acceptable.</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>B</td>
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<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>The disciplinary actions taken allow the organization to correct employees’ behavior in a fast, effective and exemplary manner.</td>
<td>IE</td>
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### General Checklist (continued)

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<th>Subsystems</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsystems</td>
<td>38. There are no dismissals or terminations of professional, non-political positions resulting from change of government.</td>
<td>M B</td>
<td>0 1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<td>Subsystems</td>
<td>39. Employees can be dismissed due to gross negligence or low performance, founded on objective facts.</td>
<td>IE IE FL FL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsystems</td>
<td>40. Employment contracts may be terminated due to technical, economic, or organizational reasons, grounded on objective facts that impose the need for lay-offs.</td>
<td>FL FL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsystems</td>
<td>41. There is no excessive staff turnover in any department or sector.</td>
<td>E E</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsystems</td>
<td>42. Top management usually defines standards of expected performance, consistent with the organization’s priorities and strategy. Consequently, employees are very well aware of what aspects of their contribution will be specifically valued in a given period.</td>
<td>STC IE IE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsystems</td>
<td>43. Performance objectives are set forth within the framework of improvement plans resulting from the previous management cycle.</td>
<td>IE IE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsystems</td>
<td>44. Performance objectives are communicated to the employees in a way that their involvement and commitment are encouraged.</td>
<td>IE IC IE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsystems</td>
<td>45. Throughout the management cycle, top managers actively follow, observe, and support performance improvement efforts by providing resources or removing obstacles where necessary.</td>
<td>DC IE IE</td>
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<td>Subsystems</td>
<td>46. People’s performance is evaluated by the organization according to the expected standards.</td>
<td>IE IE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsystems</td>
<td>47. Evaluation criteria and practices enable the organization to efficiently distinguish differences in performance among employees.</td>
<td>CP IE IE</td>
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<td>Subsystems</td>
<td>48. Performance evaluation criteria are regarded as reliable and objective by those responsible for their implementation.</td>
<td>IC IC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsystems</td>
<td>49. Line managers who are responsible for work units at different hierarchical levels play a leading role in the performance management of the employees under their supervision.</td>
<td>DC DC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsystems</td>
<td>50. The wage structure and compensation policies derive from a set of priorities and objectives linked to the organization’s strategy rather than</td>
<td>STC STC</td>
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<th>Subsystems</th>
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<td></td>
<td>to inertial practices or reactive responses to claims and labor conflicts.</td>
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<td>51.</td>
<td>In general, the people in the organization have the perception that their</td>
<td>IC B</td>
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<td></td>
<td>compensations are consistent with their contribution.</td>
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<td>52.</td>
<td>People feel that the compensation received by other employees is equitable</td>
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<td>vis-à-vis their own salaries.</td>
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<td>53.</td>
<td>Job classifications translated to salary levels contribute to a flexible</td>
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<td>progression, based on performance and training.</td>
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<td>54.</td>
<td>The compensation structure is adequate to attract, motivate, and retain</td>
<td>COM A</td>
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<td>skilled employees in the different types of positions required by the</td>
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<td>organization.</td>
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<td>55.</td>
<td>The wage scale is reasonable. Vertical differences in salary respond to the</td>
<td>IE B</td>
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<td></td>
<td>different nature of the positions.</td>
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<td>56.</td>
<td>There is some balance between the staff compensation in the organization and</td>
<td>CP B</td>
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<td>the salaries earned by equivalent employees in different sections and areas of</td>
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<td></td>
<td>the public service.</td>
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<td>57.</td>
<td>Salary costs at every level are not excessively high vis-à-vis those prevailing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>in the market.</td>
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<td>58.</td>
<td>The compensation policies adopted promote effort, improved individual and</td>
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<td>group performance, as well as learning and skills development.</td>
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<td>59.</td>
<td>Decisions on salary administration are adopted in accordance with pre-</td>
<td>CP A</td>
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<td></td>
<td>established criteria and in line with the structural design parameters</td>
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<td>laid down by the organization.</td>
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<td>60.</td>
<td>No arbitrary practice, rent-seeking, or political patronage is detected in</td>
<td>M B</td>
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<td></td>
<td>salary decisions.</td>
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<td>61.</td>
<td>The HR information system has all the updated information on compensation that</td>
<td>CP A</td>
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<td>is required for the correct management of the salary system.</td>
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<td>62.</td>
<td>Non-wage benefits given are cost-effective.</td>
<td>E C</td>
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<td>63.</td>
<td>The pension plan for public employees meets their social security needs, is</td>
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<td></td>
<td>financially sound, does not create exclusive privileges vis-à-vis other social</td>
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<td>groups, and does not represent an excessive burden on the economy.</td>
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### General Checklist (continued)

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</table>
| Development Management      | **64.** Useful policies and instruments are in place for the non-monetary recognition of achievements.  
**65.** In general, people perceive that their reasonable expectations of promotion are satisfied in the organization.  
**66.** There are career and succession plans that harmonize individual expectations with the foreseeable needs of the organization.  
**67.** Promotion criteria and mechanisms are based on performance, potential for growth, and skills development.  
**68.** No elements of abuse or political patronage are verifiable in promotion practices.  
**69.** The organization manages the progress made by its human resources with flexibility—i.e. without too many formal barriers or restrictions.  
**70.** There are formulas other than the strictly hierarchical career—e.g. horizontal careers or change of positions—based on the recognition of professional excellence, without necessarily granting more authority to the individual.  
**71.** Employees receive adequate training from the organization to supplement their initial training, adapt them to changing tasks, solve poor performance, and support their professional growth.  
**72.** Training activities support collective learning, thus strengthening advances in the organization’s capacity to deal with problems and respond effectively.  
**73.** Training activities effectively support innovation and cultural change processes.  
**74.** Training is based on a reliable diagnosis of needs.  
**75.** Investments in training are made through plans resulting from the diagnosis of needs and are designed to support clear organizational priorities.  
**76.** Training is evaluated in terms of the satisfaction produced on trainees together with the result-cost ratio and its impact on the employees’ performance. | EI C IC B CP C IE A M B FL B FL B COM B COM C FL C CP C STC E C CP C E C |
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</table>
| Human and Social Relations Management | 77. The organization is concerned with evaluating the work environment or climate on a regular basis by resorting to reliable instruments.  
78. Climate evaluations are taken into account at the time of reviewing and improving HRM policies and practices in force.  
79. The organization makes frequent use of different mechanisms to learn about the employees’ initiatives, requests, suggestions, information, and opinions.  
80. In general, all-level management decisions as well as all types of relevant information fed by top managers flow easily and fluently in the organization and reach every stakeholder in due time and manner.  
81. The organization has specific communication channels to reinforce the staff’s sense of belonging and involvement in the global project.  
82. Each party plays his or her role without stepping beyond it, and these roles are reciprocally recognized by the other party.  
83. In general, power is reasonably balanced between management and staff. Negotiations between the parties usually reflect this balance.  
84. Labor relations usually and preferably choose the path of negotiation and consensus rather than confrontation or disrepute.  
85. Intermediated labor relations—i.e. those carried out by representatives—do not exclude direct or personal relations between management and employees where appropriate.  
86. Labor conflict is not intense in number, impact, or in the radical methods used.  
87. There are effective mechanisms in place to manage and settle labor conflicts.  
88. Occupational health and safety practices are satisfactory.  
89. There are adequate social security policies and benefits for employees that do not exceed those that are characteristic in the environment in which the organization operates. Furthermore, the benefits are appreciated by staff members.                                                                                                                                           | IC C                                                                 |         |       |
**General Checklist (continued)**

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<tr>
<td>The Human Resources Function Organization</td>
<td>90. Managers are empowered and autonomous enough to deal with the personnel assigned to the units under their supervision.</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>B</td>
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<td></td>
<td>91. Managers are suitably trained to perform their tasks.</td>
<td>DC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>92. Managers are aware of and assume their responsibilities as human resources managers in relation to the staff members under their scope of formal authority.</td>
<td>DC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>93. The central services responsible for the CS system are perceived, by the rest of the organization, as adding value and contributing to the attainment of common goals</td>
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BIBLIOGRAPHY


PART II

INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENTS BY COUNTRY
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Main Conclusions

Since its independence from Britain in 1966, Barbados has made sustained efforts to reform its public sector—specifically, successive governments have undertaken reforms in order to improve the efficiency of the Civil Service System (CSS). These reforms have sought to address constraints, including the centralization of human resource management and reactive decision-making processes that were arguably manifestations of historical antecedents.

In the 2004 reform ethos, the Ministry of the Civil Service (MCS), the premier actor with responsibility for human resource management policy-making, through its Office of Public Sector Reform (OPSR), coordinated related activities to pragmatically strengthen a range of human resource management subsystems, namely Human Resource Planning, Work Organization, Performance Management, and Professional Development Management. In turn, the Human and Social Relations, Employment and Compensation Management subsystems are primarily being addressed at policy-making levels.

It should be noted that the Public Sector Reform Program also emphasizes the optimization of human resources. There prevails a vision to modernize the legal framework for the CSS. The reform effort is underpinned by a client-centered philosophy.

The context of the reforms evidences social capital and facilitates consultation between internal and external stakeholders, specifically public officials and the unions representing civil servants. Consequently, there is consensus on the appropriate reform direction. In this regard, Barbados’ Protocol Four of the Social Partnership 2001–2004, specifically sections 3.14 to 3.16, is strongly supportive of the continued reform of the public sector. Furthermore, this Social Compact clearly articulates the commitment of the social partners—namely, the Government, the Employers’ representatives and the Workers’ representatives—to collaborate and consult on “fundamental issues affecting their individual and collective contributions to all aspects of national development.” Reference to the partners’ commitment to industrial relations (in section 6.4) proves existing concern for the efficiency of the CSS and, in particular, for human and social relations management.

Efforts to improve the operation of the central civil service overtime will be explained when
discussing the genealogy of reforms in Barbados, while highlighting actions geared to improving specific HRM subsystems.

The OPSR, set up in 1997, with responsibility for developing strategic plans, introducing performance management, and conducting organizational reviews, among other tasks, facilitated related initiatives.

In 1999, efforts to strengthen the human resource planning subsystem were underway with the purpose of strategically planning for human resource needs, optimizing availability and preventing reactive human resource management decisions. A core element of these efforts lies in the modernization of human resource management systems. The Personnel Module of the SmartStream Human Resources, launched in July 1999, facilitated the maintenance of information on the requirements, duties and compensation of each position within ministries and departments, thereby creating ready access to information (Challenge to Change, the Newsletter for Public Sector Reform, July to September 2000, Vol.4, No. 3, page 19). Allied to this was the introduction of strategic planning in select agencies. This development resonated with the need for organizational as well as national plans to inform effective HR planning.

Reform of the Work Organization subsystem has focused mainly on efforts to provide formal training in job description writing at the line agency level where there is a dearth of trained personnel with this competence. The training exercise takes place following a “job evaluation for public sector employees that was completed in 2003” (Testimonial).

Under the aegis of the OPSR, the Performance Review and Development System (PRDS) was introduced in five pilot agencies. The introduction of standards as benchmarks for measuring performance and the allied use of performance appraisal as a developmental tool have implications for positive developments in the Performance Management subsystem.

In the area of Professional Development Management, the reform undertaken has sought to bridge the gap between the opportunities for professional development offered to employees and the lack of training needs analysis. These reforms are giving shape to the training policy that is currently being developed.

Changes in the Human and Social Relations Management subsystem focus on the policy/planning area. There are expressed concerns regarding evidence of top-down communication within the CSS. The Internal Reform Committees (IRCs) are “seen as avenues through which employees at all levels of the organization are able to contribute to the change process. Many of these committees, however, are no longer functioning or are merely limping along” (The Earle and Phillips Consulting Group 2003:55, section 12.8). “A revitalization plan for the IRC program is ongoing” (PSR Program Plan 2003–2004, 2003:8). This plan is a positive development, particularly in light of the lack of formalized instruments for assessing the organizational climate in the central civil service. The OPSR/Network Services Centre Inc. (NSC) has facilitated employee assistance programs as well as training in the professional skills needed to support the program. Again, these efforts are contributing to the positive development of the Human and Social Relations subsystem.

Policy priorities are also evident in the Employment Management and the Compensation Management subsystems. A new Public Service Act designed to address issues including improved accountability and expected standards of behavior as well as to support policy direction and structural change is being drafted, given the fact that the policy framework developed for this Act has been completed. “Legislation is now to be prepared” (OPSR: Select Modernization Initiatives within the Barbados Public Sector 2003:3, item 13).

Efforts to strengthen the Compensation Management subsystem include the pension reform, currently at the public education and consultation phase, which is being spearheaded by the National Insurance Department and is “ex-
pected to result in maintaining sufficient funds to pay for benefits in the future” (OPSR: Select Modernization Initiatives within the Barbados Public Sector 2003:3, item 9).

Collectively, these reforms address key elements of the HRM system. However, the framework or foundation required to support these reform efforts have yet to be addressed. Such framework involves a coherent and clearly articulated HR strategy that specifies related goals and objectives, to which all stakeholders should commit, and an integrated HRM system that will facilitate interconnections between the HR subsystems and will ultimately contribute to greater efficiency of the CSS in Barbados. In other words, it is critical to create an HRM system that should not only integrate all the key elements of each subsystem, but have coherence among its subsystems as well.

Finally, with regard to the organization of this report, it should be pointed out that this chapter builds upon the author’s 2004 report to the Inter-American Development Bank entitled “Short Form for Institutional Assessment of Civil Service Systems: Case of Barbados,” which basically offered an overview of the CSS in the country. The present paper incorporates other sections relating to the country’s institutional context, its background and legal framework. In addition, the analysis of each of the seven HRM subsystems has been further enlarged to focus more sharply on each of the ninety-three critical points for assessing CSS. In general, this revised work conforms to the original methodological framework provided by Longo, F. (2002). To this end, interviews were conducted in June and July 2007 with appropriate persons having the institutional memory of the CSS in 2004. Other elements of the original report were retained, namely the “indices for the evaluation of the CSS”, the internal and external environments, the critical points valuation, the summary table of preceding sections, and the conclusions of the diagnosis.

II. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

The CSS of Barbados operates within a democratic ethos that reflects politico-administrative and socio-economic stability. A constitutional monarchy, Barbados has a parliamentary form of government, and a plurality of political parties, namely: the Democratic Labour Party, the Barbados Labour Party and the National Democratic Party. Arguably, the Westminster-Whitehall politico-administrative system is most closely approximated in Barbados given the ideological similarities of the two most long-standing political parties and the existence of the House of Assembly, an inherited institution.

It is also argued that centralized decision-making, another vestige of the colonial past, also influences the decision-making process within the CSS. Bissessar, A. (2002) asserted that the fragmentation and centralization of HRM, which are reflected in the duplication of responsibilities, delays in decision-making, lack of accountability, absence of planning and budgeting for human resources, were among major deficiencies that policy-makers and reformers identified in the public sector in the 1960s-1980s period. These deficits have been receiving sustained attention, as available resources so permit.

As far as the country’s economic development is concerned, according to the Central Bank of Barbados, the “country has the demographic profile of a developed country” (Central Bank of Barbados: www.centralbank.org.bb/country_info.shtml; October 23, 2004). Furthermore, this view is shared by the World Bank. Indeed, economic stability is reflected not only in its per capita income, US$ 7,500, but in the quality of life in terms of its equitable distribution of income, owing to a “well-developed national security safety net for the disadvantaged and a virtual absence of social and political unrest,” among other factors (Barbados Vital Statistics, Central Bank of Barbados, 10/23/2004, page 1).

Overall, the institutional context reveals socio-economic and political stability. The CSS is characterized by both positive developments as
well as by deficits. Strides, as positive outcomes of reform, in particular improvements to the CSS, are anticipated.

**Background**

The staff complement of the public sector is distributed among a range of ministries, departments, statutory bodies and public enterprises. Overall, the civil service employs 21,000 persons. A number of agencies are responsible for human resource management. The main actors are the Ministry of the Civil Service (MCS) and The Service Commission (Public Service or PSC). The Personnel Administration Division, headed by the Chief Personnel Officer, provides administrative support for the PSC. The PSC has a constitutional mandate for employment management, while the MSC has a policy-making role with regard to the CSS. Primary actors within the MCS are the Office of Public Service Reform, which gives direction to reform efforts, and the Training Division.

Successive governments, fully aware of the critical importance of the CSS, have introduced related reforms over time. The impulses driving reforms during the 1960s-80s reportedly focused on the HR planning direction, related funding, and the organization of the HRM system, bearing in mind the need to reduce fragmentation, centralization, reactive decision-making, “over-emphasis on procedures and regulations” and improve productivity. Progress in the successful implementation of these reforms was arguably slow, largely because of resource constraints and resistance to change. These constraints apparently affected the pace of changes scheduled to be introduced to the CSS during those decades. In tandem with these reform efforts, there was reportedly a sharper focus on issues related to economic growth.

During the 1990s, reforms to the HR Planning subsystem were given due support with the introduction of the Personnel Module of Smart-Stream Human Resources in July 1999. The HR Planning subsystem is now being formalized, with the development of an HRM information system (HRMIS) that is in its “final stages of implementation” (Office of Public Sector Reform: Select Modernization Initiatives within the Barbados Public Sector, item 1, updated August 2003).

Today, under the aegis of the MCS, the OPSR seeks to address elements of other HRM subsystems and modernize the legal framework.

**Legal Framework**

The CSS currently operates within the legal framework of the Constitution of Barbados, (1966); the Service Commissions (Public Service) Regulations (1978), the General Orders for the Public Service of Barbados (1970), The Civil Establishment Act and Orders, The Pension Act (that governs the payment of pensions), and the Training Act. The General Orders for the Public Service of Barbados (1970) have an impact on the CSS; although they “have no legal force”, they address wide-ranging issues related to the conditions of service and help “to govern behavior”—in other words, informally speaking, they “constitute a manual”. “The General Orders, which were revised in 1997, are a code of conduct or a set of administrative procedures for public servants in Barbados” (Testimonials).

The Constitution provides for the setting up of the Service Commissions as well as for other Commissions, namely: the Judicial, Legal and Police Services Commissions. The Service Commissions (Public Service) Regulations issued in 1978 establish the Commissions’ functions, which involve the following: appointments and promotions, probationary service, termination of appointments, retirement and discipline. The Chairman, Deputy Chairman and members of the Service Commission (Public Service) are appointed by the Governor General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. The Chairman and Deputy Chairman generally hold office for not less than three years and no more than five years. Members of Parliament may not hold office on the Commission.
The Civil Establishment Act provides for the establishment of offices in the Public Service and for the recruitment and remuneration of public officers. This is carried out through the Civil Establishment Orders. In turn, “the Training Act provides for the establishment of the Training Fund as well as a Training Loan Fund used to make loans to public officers and public employees” to facilitate their attendance at training courses “approved by the Minister.” (Bissessar, A. 2002: 18–19, partially paraphrased).

The legal framework for the CSS is being modernized. The leadership of the civil service and the unions representing civil servants have collaborated in keeping with the spirit of the Social Partnership to develop broad guidelines for a new Public Service Act that should address all the core elements of the Employment Management subsystem to ensure merit-based and transparent approaches, as well as select elements of the Work Organization and Human and Social Relations subsystems. Specifically, the Act responds to the need to address the succession planning void and the safety of civil servants’ work environment.

The General Orders for the Public Service of Barbados (1970) will become an integral part of the Act. Additionally, a Code of Conduct and a Code of Discipline to complement the legal framework will appear as schedules to the Act (Testimonial).

III. ANALYSIS OF HRM SUBSYSTEMS

Longo’s (2002) methodological framework establishes ninety-three critical points as the basis for the institutional assessment of the CSS. In analyzing each of the seven HRM subsystems that constitute the CSS, the related critical points are specified. In keeping with Longo’s framework, the analysis emphasizes the “existence and integrity of each of the HRM areas and processes, and the fulfillment of their basic purposes; the major connections with the other HRM subsystems, and the way each subsystem behaves in relation to the critical points, which enable the analyst to prove its effectiveness and quality” (Longo, F. 2002:43).

Human Resources Planning

HR planning “is the subsystem that contributes to ensuring the strategic coherence in all HRM policies and practices by linking them with organizational priorities. Therefore, it may be considered the ‘front door’ in any integrated HRM system” (ibid. 17).

Existence and Integrity of the System

(Critical point 1)

There is a vision of “a strategic approach to HR planning and the introduction of a computerized human resource management information system” (CARICAD 2001:12). Pending the service-wide formalization of the human resource management information system (HRMIS) to facilitate meaningful HR planning, so far decision-making within this subsystem is generally reactive. Efforts to modernize the Government’s HRM systems and to improve the financial systems were undertaken. “The first modules of the SmartStream Financials went live in April, 1998” while the personnel module started the following year. While the HRMIS system was centralized at the Ministry of the Civil Service, the Personnel Administration Division, the Treasury Department and the Data Processing Department, it is being rolled out to all governmental departments and ministries, thus allowing wider access to information (Challenge to Change, the Newsletter for Public Sector Reform, July to September 2000, Vol. 4, No. 3, page 1, partially paraphrased).

Strategic Coherence

(2–3)

OPSR has been providing “government agencies with a management tool, i.e. strategic planning, to assist them in producing fundamental decisions about their future” (ibid.), but this tool has not yet been institutionalized in all of the eighteen government ministries. Coherence between HR planning in the central Personnel
Administration Division responsible for employment management and strategic planning at line agency level is likely to become evident when an accurate and timely HRMIS is fully implemented. In the absence of HRMIS, there are challenges posed to the availability optimization. Strategic coherence between this subsystem and the other six subsystems is thus constrained.

Basic Information (4)
The formalization of HRMIS is in progress. Adequate knowledge of qualitative and quantitative HRM requirements for today and the foreseeable future is contingent upon the institutionalization of the system in ministries and departments with responsibility for personnel matters.

Effectiveness (5–9)
The usual practice is that agencies submit their requirements for posts to the MCS. These requirements are satisfied depending largely on the availability of resources. The effectiveness of employment management is limited in the absence of adequate knowledge of qualitative and quantitative HR requirements.

The significance of HR planning is recognized by the MCS. It is expected that the “introduction of the SmartStream solution will provide management information to enable the MCS to better carry out workforce planning by enabling staff to run analyses on areas such as positions and employee skills. The Ministry will also be better equipped to do succession planning, compensation management, including ‘what if’ scenarios and the task associated with employee and labor unions relations (Challenge to Change, the Newsletter for Public Sector Reform, July to September 2000, Vol. 4, No. 3, page 4).

Administration (10–11)
While the production model exists at the central level, the process of formalization is incomplete in the line agencies, thus precluding managers from participating in the implementation of accurate and timely HR forecasts.

Work Organization
Ideally, this subsystem reveals the “HRM policies and practices that define the characteristics of and conditions for performing the tasks concerned” (Longo 2002:20), as well as the competencies, basic skills and attitudes necessary for the successful performance of tasks.

Existence and Integrity of the Subsystem (12)
The job evaluation exercise in progress since 2000 has the potential for using the job analysis element as a basis for developing job descriptions (Fitt, R. in Challenge to Change, October to December 2000, pages 1 and 4). This exercise was “completed in 2003” (Testimonial). The current practice is that ministries and departments prepare job descriptions that include functions, responsibilities and qualification requirements.

This subsystem has an interconnection with the Employment Management subsystem, thus enhancing functional capacity. There is, however, a concern regarding the adequacy of the line agencies’ capacities to prepare job descriptions, reflecting an apparent deficit and the need for a core of trained job analysts within the CSS in Barbados. Nevertheless, staff members in both the central and line agencies have apparently developed the skills of job description writing over time, even without the benefit of formalized training.

Technical Quality and Flexibility of Job Design (13–17)
“Ministries and departments are responsible for the development of their job descriptions. Job description was an important instrument in the recent job evaluation exercise, reflecting in general formal educational qualifications, professional requirements, tasks as well as skills” (Testimonial). Job design comprises the job title, its activities, functions, responsibilities and the academic qualifications required. These instruments tend to be broadly framed, showing limitations in terms of rationality, flexibility and accuracy.
These gaps are recognized; therefore, reform efforts emphasize the need to improve the competencies for developing job design. In tandem with the job evaluation exercise, steps are being taken to institutionalize training in writing job descriptions among ministries and departments’ staff members.

**Quality of Profiles Definition (18–21)**

Job descriptions do not include skills or competencies profiles. Given the practice of producing job descriptions that are too broadly framed, this is an area that requires strengthening.

**Administration (22–23)**

This subsystem would benefit from creating a team of job analysts that regularly reviews the job descriptions resulting from job evaluations and classifications. The vision of the OPSR is to conduct “more job analyses to generate specific information on numbers of jobs available, job descriptions and training specification” (CARI-CAD 2001:12).

**Employment Management**

This subsystem focuses on the policies, practices and procedures relating to an individual’s recruitment, selection, induction, mobility, and separation from an organization. Ideally, the philosophy that underpins these activities should be based on such values as transparency, equity and merit.

**Equal Opportunity and Merit (24–27)**

Established criteria are used in making recruitment decisions. In line with this, the procedure in the central civil service reflects both equity and merit. Employment is open by law, and positions are generally filled according to such established technical and professional criteria. Depending on the job level and category, either a sub-committee of the PSC or the Personnel Administration Division makes up the recruitment panel. As it can be noted, this subsystem is centrally managed, since its key actors are the PSC, having the constitutional mandate to approve employment decisions, and the Personnel Administration Division, acting as the Secretariat to the Commission. The purpose of the PSC is to prevent arbitrariness in the recruitment process. The Commission interviews candidates to ensure that they satisfy stipulated requirements.

Ethnicity, culture and gender are not factors that are generally considered for purposes of recruitment.

There are no designated political posts. The eighteen Permanent Secretaries “are appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Public Service Commission after consultation with the Prime Minister. It is apparently a common belief that consultation means approval” (Testimonial).

Yet, while employment decisions within the civil service are not generally challenged, documentation suggests that related decisions taken with respect to public corporations are sometimes politicized.

Despite the evident focus on merit, in exceptional cases there are contested views concerning the quality of recruits into the public sector in general and the need to make the recruitment process more inclusive. There is the view that “given the current concerns about attitudes and the level of service delivery within the public service, more attention ought to be paid to the quality of the employees recruited into and retained by the public sector. One participant in the Impact Study of the OPSR called for greater involvement from department heads or permanent secretaries in the recruitment and selection process” (The Earle and Phillips Consulting Group 2003: 53, section 12.3).

**Recruitment and Selection Quality (28–32)**

As already explained, depending on the job level and category, either a subcommittee of the PSC or the Personnel Administration Division constitutes the recruitment panel. The recruitment panels are manned by “high quality personnel” who generally act independently (Testimonial).
Jobs are not widely advertised in all cases, as candidates are sometimes sourced internally—in other words, within the civil service or the ministry or department concerned. Ministries and Departments submit requests for staff to the Personnel Administration Division, which identifies suitable candidates that meet the division’s mandate. Usually, clerical, administrative and secretarial positions are filled internally with relative ease. Technical jobs, to the contrary, are generally widely advertised, as it is sometimes more difficult to fill such positions. Reportedly, there are deficits in some occupational categories, such as lawyers, engineers, land surveyors and information technology experts (Testimonial).

Permanent secretaries have the power, under a Delegation of Functions Order, to hire people to fill temporary positions. In particular, “General Order 1970:2.5 reads as follows: “the approval of the Minister responsible for establishments is required for the creation of temporary posts.” While the number of individuals in temporary positions was not established, it is argued by another source that “the number of ‘temporary’ persons hired has increased over time as well as the duration of temporary assignments; in other words, individuals may hold temporary posts indefinitely” (Testimonial).

**Induction Quality (33–34)**

Induction training is not formalized, although “there is an effort to expose newly recruited officers to training early in their careers” (Testimonial). With this in mind, there is an apparent need to strengthen orientation activities.

**Mobility (35)**

Decisions concerning mobility are generally made centrally, based on recommendations from line agencies. These recommendations are not always accepted as the Personnel Administration Division may deem other candidates more suitable, even if they are from outside of the public sector. There is a perception in exceptional cases that political pressure may influence such decisions (Testimonial).

**Absenteeism and Discipline (36–37)**

These aspects of the Employment Management subsystem require strengthening. There is no evidence that absentee indices are maintained. “Personnel Officers monitor attendance” (Testimonial) to ensure that employees’ leave rights are observed and in turn that absences do not exceed prescribed limits.

The disciplinary procedure, apparently problematic, leads to calls for reform. “The disciplinary procedure must also be addressed. Civil servants from all levels are frustrated with the fact that non-productive workers seemingly cannot be disciplined. Reference was made to the practice of transferring poorly performing employees and the influence which politicians wield in the process” (The Earle and Phillips Consulting Group 2003:53, section 12.2). Apparently permanent secretaries have “limited powers as they relate to disciplining civil servants” (ibid., partially paraphrased). There are delays in enforcing discipline effectively and quickly. To obviate these delays and improve the effectiveness of the disciplinary process, a Code of Conduct and a Code of Discipline will be incorporated in the proposed Public Service Act. It is expected that the new Act “will be enacted before the end of this financial year, i.e. March 31, 2005” (Testimonial).

The Code of Conduct is expansive and will “cover areas such as punctuality, absence from duty, employment activities, gifts and bribes, handling of records, information and documents, engagement in political activity, strikes, criminal conviction, sexual harassment, the use of information technology and the Internet, and adherence to legislation” (Brief on Policy Framework for Public Service Act 2002-01-10, OPSR, in Bissessar, A. 2002).

**Separation (38–41)**

Separations are generally influenced by policy shifts rather than by changes in the administration. Employees are not arbitrarily dismissed in the event that the government changes.

“Policy changes may, however, cause departures as occurred when the Queen Elizabeth
Hospital ceased to be a part of the Civil Service and was instead managed by a Board, resulting in some nurses opting to resign” (Testimonial).

Overall, while there are certain positive aspects of the Employment Management subsystem, other aspects require strengthening.

**Performance Management**

Ideally, elements of this subsystem should include stipulated performance guidelines framed within organizational goals and against which performance is measured, and a performance appraisal instrument that basically serves as a developmental tool for providing performance-related feedback to employees and for charting avenues for employees’ development.

**Performance Planning and Follow-up (42–45)**

Performance standards and objectives have been established and communicated to employees in five pilot agencies.

Although not yet formalized throughout the entire civil service, this subsystem is developing positively with the introduction of the Performance Review and Development System (PRDS) in pilot agencies. The PRDS Unit in the Personnel Administration Division plays a crucial role, since its stated purpose is “to assess performance in the workplace in relation to agreed performance standards” (Office of Public Sector Reform: Select Modernization Initiatives within the Barbados Public Sector, updated August 2003:3, item 10). “A prerequisite for participation in the PRDS is the requirement to have a strategic plan for the organization in place. Hence, the five ministries that are part of the pilot testing have strategic plans” (Testimonial).

**Performance Evaluation (46–48)**

The PRDS has reportedly been effective. “There is now general acceptance of the new system as it is perceived to be less subjective than the old system and there is greater transparency” (The Earle and Phillips Consulting Group, 2003: 32–33).

**Administration (49)**

Managers are being trained to use the system. However, as training is not a *fait accompli*, this presents a challenge to providing an accurate assessment of the management dimension.

The PRDS Unit has developed a cadre of trainers who will facilitate the training of managers and supervisors and other civil service staff in the use of the system. Training in counseling skills is ongoing.

The sustained development of this subsystem, leading to the institutionalization of the PDRS throughout the central civil service, will enhance the functional capacity of the CSS and the linkages between professional development management and compensation. Evidence of commitment to managing the system will also be critical.

**Compensation Management**

This HRM subsystem seeks to strike a balance between an employee’s contribution in terms of “their contribution to achieving the organization’s objectives” (Longo, F. 2002) and the rewards he or she receives. The monetary and non-monetary benefits that employees receive from an organization ideally compensate them equitably *vis-à-vis* others performing similar tasks within and outside the organization.

**Compensation Strategy, Internal and External Equity (50–57)**

Wage decisions in the CSS do not reflect abusive practices and are based on established wage plans. The relevant ‘indicator’ suggests that wage costs for the public sector are a relative burden to the economy. The estimated wages bill for 2004/05 for statutory boards that depend on Government for funding and which have a total staff complement of approximately 7,000, is US$131,460,500. Estimated wages for central Government that has approximately 21,000 employees is US$329,400,000. Wages in the civil service are tightly compressed within the compensation structure, as shown by the vertical wage indicator 1:5.5.
As far as external equity is concerned, civil service salaries are apparently not considered competitive, thus suggesting some dissatisfaction with salaries and an inability of the public service to attract and retain skilled employees in certain fields. As already stated, there are deficits in some occupational categories.

In addition to salaries, employees receive superannuation and a range of allowances, many of which are linked to specific occupational categories.

**Effectiveness of Compensation Policies and Wages Administration (58)**

Incentive awards are not the norm, but their introduction is being analyzed as part of the PDRS. Other related initiatives at the agency level have been launched, such as the awards ceremonies to recognize employees’ achievements, as in the case of the Barbados Statistical Service Employee of the Year Award (Challenge to Change, the Newsletter for Public Sector Reform, October to December 2003:12). Other agencies grant awards in recognition of exemplary conduct, performance and cooperation—including the Most Cooperative Employee for the Year Award granted by the Training Division of the MCS (Challenge to Change, the Newsletter for Public Sector Reform, April to June 2000:4).

The pension reform, currently in the public education and consultation phase, is being spearheaded by the National Insurance Department and is “expected to result in maintaining sufficient funds to pay for benefits in the future” (OPSR: Select Modernization Initiatives within the Barbados Public Sector 2003:3, item 9). It was not established whether the current pension scheme is considered adequate, although a minority so agreed.

**Wages Administration (59–61)**

There is an element of transparency in the pay regime, as salaries are generally based on negotiations between the Government (MCS) and the unions, namely: the Barbados Workers Union and the National Union of Public Workers.

It is argued that while the MCS through the Establishment Order creates permanent posts, the creation of temporary posts under General Orders 2.5, “particularly for indefinite periods, has the propensity to create anomalies” (Testimonial).

**Other Benefits (62–64)**

In “addition to salary and superannuation benefits, some employees receive travel, entertainment and telephone allowances” (Testimonial, partially paraphrased). There are also allowances that are unique to police, prison and nursing officers—the flexibility responsibility allowance “is aimed at compensating police, prison and nursing officers for the extra hours they are required to work” (OPSR 2003: 8, item 34).

Non-monetary benefits are mainly in the form of awards for exemplary service and recognition of attendance. These awards are not institutionalized throughout the service.

The completed job evaluation exercise “to re-assess the relative values of jobs in the public service” (OPSR 2003:3, item 10) offers an opportunity to link role classification with payment and to enhance the integrity of this subsystem. In addition, the integrating capacity of the CSS as well as the interconnections between this subsystem and the Work Organization, Professional Development Management, and Performance Management subsystems are likely to be strengthened.

**Development Management**

This subsystem focuses on the organization’s efforts to promote staff development and learning. These efforts are framed within defined “career paths that match the organization’s needs with the individual profile” (Longo 2002:34). The effectiveness of this subsystem is dependent on the extent to which appropriate career, promotion and training policies are adopted.
**Effectiveness of Promotion Policies and Career Design Quality (65–70)**

“Qualification constitutes the main promotion criterion; in other words, this criterion is heavily weighed. Other considerations may include performance, experience and seniority (Testimonial).

There is a current career/succession planning void that has to be addressed as the vision of the OPSR in Barbados entails a “strategic approach to HR planning including succession planning” (Archer, M. in CARICAD 2001:12). This void limits the interconnections between this subsystem, and the Employment Management, Professional Development Management and Performance Management subsystems, and it ultimately undermines the integrating capacity of the CSS.

While there are no formal barriers to limit an individual’s mobility, in practice individuals only seldom move from one occupational category to the next. The notion of a technical staff member, such as an engineer or a chief technical director, moving into the administrative cadre to become, for example, a permanent secretary would be an exception (Testimonial).

**Individual and Collective Learning Management (71–76)**

There are positive developments taking place in this subsystem. However, some aspects of this subsystem require strengthening. “A recently developed training policy is expected to come on stream in five months (i.e. early 2005)” (Testimonial).

Under the Training Act, a Training Budget was created so that a wide range of training and development opportunities can now be offered to employees. But these training and development efforts are undertaken outside the framework of formalized training needs assessments.

“At present, Ministries and Departments inform the relevant division of their training needs and the courses they wish to undertake. So, at the end of the day, the only information the division has to base its decisions upon is the number of people who want to do a training course and when. Bearing in mind that the department operates under tight human and financial resources, this system of allocating training is not cost and time effective” (Challenge to Change, April to June 2001:14). “This sometimes creates a situation where individuals who attend courses are not necessarily members of the target population for the courses in question” (Testimonial). For training activities to be adequate in complementing an individual’s initial skills and qualifications, it is necessary to strengthen mechanisms for accurately identifying the persons to be trained.

There is the perception that “training is likely to improve the capacity of the organization to solve problems, but this is constrained to the extent that trained individuals have the opportunity to apply learning appropriately.” The desire to harmonize organizational objectives and individual development needs is evidenced in the gap between learning and application. This gap is exacerbated by the fact that even though the “importance of impact assessment is apparently recognized, the costs and benefits of training are not evaluated” (Testimonials).

**Human and Social Relations Management**

This subsystem examines how relations between the organization and all its employees are managed. The capacity of the organization to deal with all the dimensions of the subsystem, i.e. work climate, labor relations and social policies, is critical.

**Work Climate (77–78)**

This subsystem reflects conflicting trends. While there are no structured instruments to specifically measure the organizational climate, there are positive developments intended to maintain open and effective communication channels and improve employee satisfaction. These undertakings include innovations such as the Internal Reform Committees (IRCs), an Employee Assistance Program (EAP) that could provide some feedback regarding the organizational climate,
and a Customer Charter Program to engage external stakeholders.

The EAP “has developed quickly as a result of wide interest in the issues that it addresses” (The Public Sector Reform: Program Plan 2003–2004, 2003:6). It has been expanded to include all the services offered under an EAP according to the standards and practices of the Employee Assistance Professionals Association (EAPA). Its activities comprise contracting the services of an EAP vendor; individual and group counseling for public employees and their immediate family; employee outreach and self-development through the provision of workshops on stress management, personal empowerment and motivation, conflict resolution and anger management, team-building and improving workplace morale, change management, managing workplace violence, personal finance; critical incident stress debriefing and management on an ad hoc basis following any trauma or crises in departments and for emergency and fire service personnel; departmental interventions at the request of heads of departments in situations where workplace violence or a breakdown in interpersonal relationships results in a crisis. Naturally, staff satisfaction is limited to the extent that the services offered have not been used as extensively as originally thought.

Another positive development is the Customer Charter Program that aims to improve public services and is “ongoing in the Registration Department, Licensing Authority, Land Tax Department and the Airport, and is already completed in the Immigration and Land Tax Department” (OPSR Program Plan 2003–2004, 2003:7).

**Labor Relations Balance and Quality (82–85)**
In general terms, Protocol Four of the Social Partnership (2001–2004) embodies the signatory partners’ commitment to “industrial harmony by the application of the very concept of voluntarism and through the observance of the principles of tripartism as established by the Labour Organization.” Labor conflict is not excessive nor are labor relations adversarial; in fact, there are mechanisms in place to resolve conflict. Rights disputes are usually resolved to the satisfaction of the parties involved and labor relations ethos evidences a certain degree of trust; however, this does not preclude confrontational behavior from emerging from time to time. In short, positive developments in this subsystem are counterbalanced by dysfunctions.

**Labor Conflict Management (86–87)**
Conflicts over policy change, safety and health issues, and allegations regarding employees being ‘superseded’ have resulted in long-standing disputes. One example is the policy decision to remove the Queen Elizabeth Hospital from the civil service and make it a Board, a situation that raised the issue of the status of nurses. Some nurses wanted to retain their status as civil servants, others migrated, while still others decided to await a new placement because they opted not to work with the Board. This dispute is still unresolved.

Complaints by superseded civil servants have resulted in ongoing conflicts regarding promotions. A case in point is the appointment of an individual who was not a civil servant to the post
of Chief Community Development Officer, after which the union called a strike.

A long-standing dispute over a health and safety issue is the case of the Louis Lynch Secondary School that was located in close proximity to a laundry allegedly exposing children to carcinogens. Therefore, there is room for improvement in terms of health and safety practices.

Existing working conditions of some civil servants are “decrepit” (Earle and Phillips Consulting Group 2003:27) and influence performance negatively, causing high “levels of frustration” (ibid. 2003:34). Consultants assert that civil servants work in undesirable conditions, “yet they are expected to produce. Emphasis is placed on the external as opposed to the internal customer and the public gets better treatment than some staff” (Testimonial).

**Social Policies Management (88–89)**

It was not firmly established what the general perception was of the adequacy of the social care and benefits for civil servants as compared to the same practices in the private sector. A minority view, however, purports that pension and leave benefits are adequate; moreover, pensioners receive their expected benefits timely.

Leaves of absence for education and professional development purposes are generous for civil servants, who are granted a maximum of three years. Employees enjoy vacation, maternity, sick and departmental leaves.

**The Organization of the HR Function**

The description of the HRM subsystems presented above is complemented in this section with the analysis of the mechanisms used for the management of the system, particularly the distribution of personnel decisions among the different responsible parties (Longo F. 2002). This dimension addresses the extent to which HRM responsibilities are fragmented or unified as well as the degree of centralization or decentralization of the decision-making process concerning personnel-related issues.

**Autonomy and Capacity of Supervisors (90–92)**

In 1970, the Ministry of Civil Service was empowered to make temporary appointments through the General Orders. The rationale was that in the event that a vacancy arose for reasons of retirement, leave of absence for training or other purpose, permanent secretaries could expeditiously ‘fill’ such positions. However, the line agencies’ power was restricted to hiring new personnel, while dismissals, transfers and terminations were excluded. Decisions regarding wages and salaries, however, were not delegated.

Managers have some decision-making responsibilities over the Work Organization and Professional Development Management subsystems. With no previous specific training, line managers are responsible for preparing job descriptions and for identifying training needs of the staff members under their supervision.

The managers’ capacity to perform adequately in the HRM arena is questioned. According to some opinions, “in general, managers ‘across the board’ have not received training in HRM and are not sufficiently qualified to perform HR functions.” There is also the related perception that “because of the dearth of HR training, a lot of related work converges at the top, but the ‘old guard’ are not trained in HRM and they take decisions on the basis of their gut feelings or because of pressure from the political directorate” (Testimonial).

**Central HR Administration (93)**

As already explained, the central agencies responsible for HRM are the MCS, commissioned with the task of formulating HRM policies, the Training Division, the PSC, which has the constitutional mandate for making employment management decisions, and the Personnel Administration Division, which acts as the Secretariat to the PSC.

“There is tension between the center and the line, particularly as this relates to recruitment decisions. The PSC has been bringing in perma-
nent secretaries who are technical persons from outside. This causes conflict. The complaint is that these ‘outsiders’ do not know the culture of the civil service” (Testimonial).

Despite an inherent tension, central agencies are collectively seen as adding value.

**Symbolic Valuation of the Human Resources Subsystems**

The following chart shows a graphic representation of the level of development of each of the subsystems previously analyzed.

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**Human Resources Management Subsystems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning [+/-]</th>
<th>Compensation Management [+/-]</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work Organization [+</td>
<td>Monetary and non-monetary payment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment Management [+]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Performance Management [+]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Human and Social Relations Management**

| [+/-] | |
| Work Climate | Labor Relations | Social Policies |
| Positive | The subsystem is fully developed or at a maturing stage |
| Intermediate | There are still aspects to develop, but the tendency is positive |
| Negative | The subsystem is very weak |

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IV. INDICATORS

IV.1. Quantitative Indicators

1. Number of Political Appointments

| Total number of political appointments | 18 | Source: MCS September 2004 |
| Total number of positions for the central Government | 21,000 | Source: MCS September 2004 |
| Political appointments rate | 0% |

There are no designated political posts in the civil service, indicating that the service is professional and merit-based. There are 18 Permanent Secretaries, who are appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Public Service Commission after consultation with the Prime Minister. ‘Consultation’ is understood as approval.

Fiscal Weight of Public Employment

2. Central Government Wage Bill/Gross Domestic Product

| Central government wage bill (in million dollars) | 329.4 | Economic Report, Central Bank Reports, September 2003, Barbados (658.8 million Barbados dollars x 0.50) |
| GDP (in million dollars) | 2,598 | GDP (5,196 million Barbados dollars x 0.50) Source: MCS October 2004 |

Central government wage bill/Gross Domestic Product 13%

This is a measure of the extent to which the cost of public employment is a burden on the economy. The wage bill excludes training grants and pensions. Using the World Bank comparator of 5–25%, the fiscal weight of public employment is a relative burden on the economy.

Civil Service Incentives

3. Vertical Wage Compression

| I. Higher salary of civilian central Government (in dollars) | 50,961 | MCS, Pay scale August 2004. (101,922 Barbados dollars x 0.50) |
| II. Lower salary of civilian central Government (in dollars) | 9,244 | MCS, Pay scale August 2004. (18,488 Barbados dollars x 0.50) |

I/II. Vertical wage compression 5.5

Civil Service Incentives

4. Average Central Government Wage/Per Capita GDP

I. Average central government wage (in dollars) | Not available |
| II. Per capita GDP by month (in dollars) | Not available |

Average central government wage/Per capita GDP Not available

1 All figures expressed in US Dollars. 1Bds = 0.50 US Dollars (Source: www.xe.com Universal Currency Converter)
5. Average Central Government Wage/Average Private Sector Wage

| I. Average central government wage (in dollars) | Not available |
| II. Average private sector wage                | Not available |

Average central government wage/Average private sector wage | Not available |

Civil Service Employment Figures
6. Total Number of Central Government Employees/Total Population

| I. Total number of central government employees | 21,000 | Source: MCS October 2004 |

Total number of central government employees/Total population | 8% |

7. Central Government Expenditure (excluding pensions and debt service)/Total Number of Central Government Employees

| I. Central government expenditure (in million dollars) | 329.4 | Source: MCS October 2004 (658.800 million Barbados dollars x 0.50) |
| II. Total number of central government employees     | 21,000 | Source: MCS October 2004 |
| III. Central government expenditure (excluding pensions and debt service)/Total number of central government employees (in dollars) | 15,805 |

Elaboration of Indices

The indices and sub-indices listed above were constructed on the basis of the analysis of 93 critical points that reflect key elements of HRM subsystems. Appendix A lists the valuation of such critical points and their corresponding number to which these values relate.

Efficiency [10.50]
This index measures the degree of optimization of the investment in human resources identified in the CSS of Barbados, as well as its alignment with the fiscal policy scale and its reference markets (Longo, F. 2002:77). This index, linked to thirteen critical points, is the basis for evaluating the existing HR Planning subsystem, the cost of public employment relative to the state of the economy, the adequacy of pensions and social care benefits, the current efforts to assess the costs and benefits of training, and the benefits of non-monetary incentives.

A HRMIS is in its final stages of implementation. This development is likely to obviate the current reactive approach to HR planning. The cost of public employment is a relative burden on the economy. Relevant aspects of the Professional Development Management and the Human and Social Relations Management subsystems require strengthening.

Merit [14.15]
This index assesses the extent to which employment and wage decisions conform to professional criteria. The conclusion is that these decisions are not generally influenced by nepotistic prac-
## II.2 Indices for the Evaluation of the Civil Service System

### Table of Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Index value (scale: 0–20)</th>
<th>Scale Percentage</th>
<th>Sub-Index</th>
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<td>(E) Efficiency</td>
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<tr>
<td>(SC) Structural Consistency</td>
<td>11.27</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>(STC) Strategic Coherence</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(DC) Directive Consistency</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(CP) Consistency of Processes</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(FC) Functional Capacity</td>
<td>10.75</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>(COM) Competency</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(IE) Incentive Effectiveness</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(FL) Flexibility</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CI) Integrating Capacity</td>
<td>10.12</td>
<td>51%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Strategies in the CSS in Barbados. The index is linked to 10 critical points.

### Structural Consistency [10.75]

This index measures the core building blocks in the HRM system, namely: the HR Planning, Work Organization and Performance Management subsystems. The index is interconnected to 3 sub-indices, Strategic Coherence, Directive Consistency, and Consistency of Processes that are collectively associated to 29 critical points.

- Strategic coherence [4.43] measures the interconnection between the Government of Barbados’ strategic priorities and HRM policies and practices.
- Directive consistency [5.71] measures the level of development of the directive function in the CSS in Barbados, specifically the alignment between the “central technology and line management” (Longo, F. 2002:78). This sub-index is related to 8 critical points.
- Consistency of processes [5.25] measures the extent to which the processes that underpin an integrated HRM system are in place in the CSS in Barbados. The information system that supports HR planning is in its implementation stage. PRDS has been implemented in five pilot agencies and the Work Organization subsystem is being addressed.

### Functional Capacity [10.75]

This index evaluates the extent to which the CSS in Barbados encourages behaviors that promote
improvement in public services. This index is linked to three sub-indices, namely, Competency, Incentive Effectiveness, and Flexibility that are collectively related to 41 critical points.

- Competency [5.50] values the extent to which HRM policies and practices facilitate an adequate supply of skilled personnel. This sub-index is linked to 15 critical points.
- Incentive effectiveness [5.15], associated with 14 critical points, measures the extent to which existing policies and practices promote productivity, learning and improved service quality.
- The Flexibility index [5] measures the capacity of existing policies and practices to adjust to changes in policy priorities.

**Integrating Capacity [10.12]**

This index rates the extent to which the CSS in Barbados can align different stakeholders’ expectations and interests in an effort to empower them and reduce conflicts.

**V. CONCLUSIONS**

**Analysis of Causal Areas**

The absence of an explicit, coherent and politically supported organizational strategy for HR influences the efficiency of the CSS. The Government of Barbados has implemented a public sector reform program that incorporates a vision of a strategic approach to HR planning, a computerized HRMIS, policy initiatives including the development of a HRM policy, a training policy and the modernization of the legal framework of the CSS that will ultimately lead to the enactment of a new Public Service Act, a Code of Conduct and a Code of Discipline. The implementation of these strategic activities will undoubtedly have a positive impact on the efficiency of the CSS.

All these positive developments taking place within the CSS in Barbados reflect the formalization and strengthening of the HR Planning, Work Organization, Performance Management, and the Human and Social Relations subsystems within the context of an appropriate legal framework. Apparently the reform has some support from internal and external stakeholders, though there is still some inertia and resistance to change.

The formalization of the HR Planning subsystem depends on the implementation of an accurate and timely HRMIS. The current constraints placed upon the optimization of HR planning availability are likely to be overcome once the information system, undoubtedly a core building block for the planning subsystem, is in place. The interconnections between this subsystem and Employment Management will also be strengthened with the introduction of HRMIS. The career/ succession planning void in the Professional Development subsystem also undermines the integrating capacity of the CSS, specifically the linkages between Planning, Employment Management and Professional Development Management.

In the wake of a job evaluation exercise, the Work Organization subsystem is being strengthened, while the functional capacity of the CSS will be enhanced with the development and regular review of job descriptions that incorporate competencies profiles. In order to sustain this thrust, a core of trained job analysts is required.

The formalization of the Performance Management subsystem is ongoing in pilot ministries. This is a positive development with implications for the structural consistency of the CSS. The Human and Social Relations subsystem arguably reflect conflicting trends as efforts to reach out and respond to employees’ needs and to facilitate employee satisfaction are in juxtaposition to concerns regarding top-down approaches to communication.

Although there is no evidence of abusive practices in wage decisions, the existing compensation structure is characterized by tightly compressed salaries that may not always contribute to motivating or attracting personnel.
While the CSS in Barbados evidences positive developments, these efforts are not framed within a coherent HR strategy that articulates related priorities and objectives and an integrated HRM system.

**Internal and External Factors**

The reforms being undertaken by the Government of Barbados to improve the efficiency of the CSS are influenced by the existing organizational culture, in particular the apparent ‘disconnection’ of some civil servants from the reform endeavor and their resistance to change. Reform-oriented decisions taken by top managers are seen to be far removed from the staff at other levels in the civil service. “The attitudes of public servants and their unwillingness to buy in to the reform program is one of the major barriers which the program has encountered. This observation was made by Government Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and the workers themselves” (The Earle and Phillips Consulting Group 2003: 52). It is argued that generally civil servants do not see the benefits to be gained from reform and they feel no sense of ownership as their views were not solicited. This disconnection or lack of engagement is exacerbated by a culture of resistance to change that prevails in some agencies. Some people have resisted change because they are comfortable with the status quo and because they are afraid of possible increased workload or job loss” (ibid.: 26). The consulting group also asserts that public sector reform in Barbados has lost its momentum and requires political as well as administrative leadership to publicly affirm their commitment and support for planned change (ibid., partially paraphrased).

Legal factors also influence the efficiency of the CSS in Barbados. The main limitation is that the legal framework is adjusting too slowly to effective HRM, since it does not respond readily to changes in policy priorities. It is also recognized that the existing legal framework constrains the Employment Management subsystem, specifically the disciplinary process, which is described as “inefficient and ineffective,” resulting in “too many non-productive persons against whom no sanctions are imposed.”

There is also a lack of a comprehensive legal framework, as it addresses only some aspects of three of the seven subsystems, namely, the Employment Management, Professional Development Management and Compensation Management subsystems.

**Main Conclusions**

The Government of Barbados has embarked on a reform agenda that incorporates improvements to the HR Planning, Work Organization, Professional Development Management, Performance Management, and Human and Social Relations Management subsystems and ultimately improves the efficiency of the CSS. Internal and external stakeholders have agreed on an appropriate path for such reforms. Key elements of the reform include the modernization of the legal framework for the CSS to address changes in HR policy priorities, the development of a HR policy as well as a training policy, the formalization of the HR Planning subsystem, the introduction of a computerized HRMIS, and a PRDS. While these reforms are of significance, they are not framed within an integrated HRM system.

**VI. RECOMMENDATIONS**

In keeping with contemporary human resource management practices, a broad strategy that delineates related priorities and objectives and has all stakeholders’ support constitutes a core building block for the development of an integrated HRM system. While current reforms address key elements of HR subsystems, the framework required to support these reform efforts, namely a coherent HR strategy, has yet to be addressed.

With this limitation in mind, two recommendations are made: (a) articulate a coherent HR strategy that specifies goals and objectives and to which all stakeholders commit, and (b) put all key
elements in place in order to ensure the integrity of an integrated HRM system. As an example, a main objective of HR Planning is the optimization of its availability. Institutionalizing HRMIS is a priority to supply timely and accurate information to decision-makers with responsibility for HR planning. The first recommendation is framed against a background of change dialectics and status quo retention. Despite the current consensus among Government and unions, there are on-the-ground counter-currents of resistance to change as well as evident signs of inertia. The strategy that addresses the priorities and objectives of contemporary HR practice comprehensively will require political endorsement, as well as support from leadership in government agencies, trade unions and other stakeholders including civil servants themselves. Civil servants will probably engage if they are able to identify benefits to be derived from reform efforts. The need for sensitization of civil servants to the likely benefits of CSS reforms may be facilitated by using change management teams that incorporate agency leadership and a cross-section of agency personnel.

Other recommendations are offered in an attempt to articulate the systems and structures to support the HRM priorities and objectives as well as reinforce the linkages between the HRM subsystems, namely: (a) develop an integrated HRM system that will facilitate the linkages between the HRM subsystems and will ultimately contribute to greater efficiency of the CSS in Barbados, and (b) fill the void in succession planning, since this limits the linkages between Professional Development Management and Performance Management subsystems and in turn undermines the integrating capacity of the CSS. HR Planning is a core building block of an integrated HRM system and is linked to other HR subsystems.

The HRMIS will prove critical to the desirable linkages between subsystems within the CSS and specifically for efficiency, structural consistency and strategic coherence.

Another key element is to create a legal framework that supports the related structures and systems. Therefore, sustaining current efforts to modernize the legal framework is desirable.
### VII. SUMMARY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Evaluator’s Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of the Institutional Context</td>
<td>Analysis of the Legal Framework  The legal framework includes the Constitution (1966), The Service Commissions (Public Service Regulations (1978), The Civil Establishment Act and Orders, the Pensions Act and the Training Act. The enactment of a new Public Service Act is imminent in order to address deficits in terms of the adequacy and consistency of employment management, specifically enforcement of discipline, human and social relations management and work organization practice. The existing General Orders for the Public Service of Barbados (1970) is being integrated into the new Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Analysis of the Civil Service</td>
<td>Analysis of the Human Resources Organization Function  Collectively, the PSC, MCS, Personnel Administration Division and the Training Division have overall responsibility, showing a centralized decision-making process in the CSS in Barbados. Decision-making on aspects of employment management, work organization and professional development management are made at the line agency level. Permanent secretaries make temporary appointments, while line managers identify training needs and write job descriptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyzed Quantitative Indicators of the CSS</td>
<td>The staff complement of the civil service is 21,000. Central government wage bill accounts for 13% of the GDP, i.e. it represents a relative burden of public employment on the economy. There is also evidence of tight compression in the compensation structure. Average wage data in both the public and private sectors were not established, thus precluding comparability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis by Subsystems</td>
<td>Planning  The HRMIS production model is established in the MCS and the Personnel Administration Department. This subsystem, which is being ‘rolled out’ to Ministries and Departments, is in transition due to limited access to information for HR planning purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work Organization  Job evaluation was completed in 2003. Job descriptions include formal educational qualifications/ professional requirements and functions and responsibilities. The exclusion of competencies profiles limits rationality, flexibility and accuracy. The potential of this subsystem for providing job satisfaction will be more fully realized when the void in trained job analysts is filled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment Management  Employment management decisions are based on professional criteria and in general preclude arbitrariness. But these measures are sometimes contested. Expressed difficulties have been encountered in enforcing discipline quickly and effectively in cases of non-performance. This has sometimes led to feelings of frustration and low morale among civil servants with good performance. Mechanisms for reception (induction) and absenteeism controls are inadequate.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance Management  The formalization of the PDRS in five pilot agencies is a positive development. Sustaining this thrust to incorporate other agencies will lead to the strengthening of the interconnections between this subsystem and the Professional Development Management and Compensation subsystems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compensation Management  Wage decisions do not respond to nepotistic practices. There prevails internal equity. Wages are tightly compressed and the wage bill is a burden on the economy. Non-monetary benefits are likely to be institutionalized. While the adequacy of the pension regime was not established, efforts are being made to protect pensions /pensions rights and to ensure their continuity.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional Development Management  Horizontal careers are not the norm. Promotion is based largely on qualifications. Experience, performance and seniority may also be taken into account. Training needs articulated by individuals take precedence in the absence of organizational training needs analyses. A training policy for the civil service of Barbados is expected to come on stream in January 2005. Training needs assessments are yet to be formalized and investment in training to be evaluated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Protocol Four of the Social Partnership (2001–2004) provides a macro framework for the sustained interaction between unions and Government. In the absence of structured instruments for assessing the organizational climate, initiatives such as IRCs and EAPs should be used more extensively. Top-down communication within the CSS is apparently an issue to be addressed.

The CSS in Barbados is based on its recruitment system and system management models. Its ‘recruitment system’ is framed on the British model, whereby the professionalism and independence of persons in charge of personnel selection are emphasized. The CSS also reflects ‘integrated systems’ in which the “public employer appears to be highly centralized” (Longo, F. 2002:59).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Evaluator’s Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Protocol Four of the Social Partnership (2001–2004) provides a macro framework for the sustained interaction between unions and Government. In the absence of structured instruments for assessing the organizational climate, initiatives such as IRCs and EAPs should be used more extensively. Top-down communication within the CSS is apparently an issue to be addressed. The CSS in Barbados is based on its recruitment system and system management models. Its ‘recruitment system’ is framed on the British model, whereby the professionalism and independence of persons in charge of personnel selection are emphasized. The CSS also reflects ‘integrated systems’ in which the “public employer appears to be highly centralized” (Longo, F. 2002:59).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDICES

Appendix A Critical Points Valuation – Comparative Table:

See Appendices section.

Appendix B Summary – Comparative Table:

See Appendices section.

Appendix C. Report Technical Information

• Report Dates
  Diagnosis Dates: November 2004

• Consultant
  Dr. Hedy Isaacs

• Acknowledgements

2004: The relevant information was gleaned remotely from interviews as well as from documentation. The consultant wishes to thank Mrs. Avril Gollop, Head of the Civil Service in Barbados, who facilitated access to Mr. Roland Fitt, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of the Civil Service, with whom interviews were conducted in August, September and October 2004, during which he supplied relevant documentation.

The consultant is also grateful to Mr. Selwyn Smith, a retired Permanent Secretary, for sharing documentation on the current Public Sector Reform Program in Barbados.

The assistance of Ms. Ingrid Carlson, from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Washington, D.C, was invaluable. She supplied me with a copy of the evaluation of the CSS Barbados, prepared by Bissessar, A. (2002) as well as a letter of introduction to the IADB Country Office in Barbados.

2007: Mr. Ellesworth Young, a retired Permanent Secretary and a lecturer at the University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, Barbados, and Mr. Selwyn Smith, a retired Permanent Secretary and current Deputy Chairman of the Service Commission (Public Service) in Barbados, shared valuable details through telephone interviews. I greatly appreciate their assistance.

Mr. Alyson Forte, a Deputy Permanent Secretary (Actg), Ministry of Labor and Civil Service helped clarify some issues related to the performance evaluation exercise as well as the legal framework for the CSS. I wish to thank him for his help.

Works Consulted

Documents


OPSR, Barbados.

SmartStream HR: Reforming Human Resource Management within the Civil Service. OPSR, Barbados.


List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSS</td>
<td>Barbados Statistical Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARICAD</td>
<td>Caribbean Center for Development Administration</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>Civil Service Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAPA</td>
<td>Employee Assistance Professional Association</td>
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<td>EAP</td>
<td>Employee Assistance Program</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
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<td>HRM</td>
<td>Human Resources Management</td>
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<td>HRMIS</td>
<td>Human Resources Management Information System</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>Internal Reform Committee</td>
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<td>MCS</td>
<td>Ministry of the Civil Service</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>Network Services Centre, Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPSR</td>
<td>Office of Public Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRDS</td>
<td>Performance Review and Development System</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Service Commission</td>
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</table>
Institutional Assessment of Civil Service Systems: The Case of Belize

Mercedes Iacoviello

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Main Conclusions

Meritocratic criteria for Human Resource (HR) decisions and practices are reasonably well rooted in the Belizean civil service that inherited the tradition of the British colonial system. Over time the public service has been faced with a rapid increase in size, challenges regarding its systems of functional control, accountability, and decreasing standards of efficiency and quality of service. Concerns about the system are more related to efficiency issues than to transparency and merit. The country’s public service is still very much oriented to rule-following, because of its colonial heritage, but the enforcement of rules is weak in comparison with colonial times, when breaking the rules could have very serious consequences. In sum, the problem does not lie with the rules themselves, but with the low compliance level.

The application of merit criteria for recruitment decisions is one of the strongest aspects of the public service in Belize. Guarantees against arbitrariness are effective, although they do not apply for the temporary employee category (known as the “open vote” employees) that comprises around 2,000 jobs out of a total of 12,000 public officers. There are adequate mechanisms for reception, absenteeism control and mobility. Though infrequently used, legislation provides for the possibility of separation on the grounds of bad performance or economic reasons. Another strength is related to the Labor Relations subsystem, given the various instances of interaction between management and unions, with union representatives taking part in joint bodies that have responsibility in the design of HR policies.

The Work Organization function is reasonably developed, with job descriptions periodically reviewed, although job classification and profile definition processes are still rather formal. The Compensation Management function presents a salary strategy dominated by a budgetary focus, which compromises the possibility of establishing effective incentive schemes, especially for higher levels in the pay scale. The legislation sets forth incentives for good performers, but they are not effectively used. As for the Professional Development subsystem, careers in governmental agencies include vertical and horizontal tracks, but advancement is still heavily based on seniority and formal credentials. Training efforts are more oriented to the preferences of individual public officers than to organizational needs.

The HR Planning process is affected by the low development of an effective strategic plan-
ning system for the Belize Government. In addition, salary expenditures represent a heavy burden to public accounts. The Performance Management function, in turn, presents recurring problems to improving the performance evaluation process. Therefore, it is difficult to define performance goals given the flaws already mentioned in the strategic planning system.

In sum, when comparing the different HR functions within the Belizean civil service system we can see that Employment and Human Relations subsystems are more mature, while Work Organization, Professional Development, and Compensation Management subsystems are less developed, the weakest ones being HR Planning and Performance Management.

Many of the weaknesses identified in this study are widely known and publicly acknowledged, with accurate diagnoses on which reform plans are based. There is consensus across the board, in all areas and parties, that something has to be done to improve the efficiency of the public service, and in several instances the HR aspects of the reform have been deemed crucial. There are many ongoing initiatives to solve these problems, although without an overall strategic plan coordinating them.

There is an effort undertaken by the authorities at the Ministry of Public Service and the Public Sector Reform Council to change from a rules-driven to a business-driven, result-oriented public service. However, the concentration of responsibility to gear the reform in the Ministry of Public Service, without clear incentives for the rest of the ministers to follow the initiatives, is challenging the implementation of the programmed changes. In that sense, one recommendation that can be derived from the study is that the institutions in charge of the reform should be reinforced, so that their initiatives are accompanied by the necessary actions in other government areas, and a real pressure for change is established. The need to maximize positive interactions with other ongoing reform initiatives should also be considered. The fact that there is an ambitious Financial Reform effort under- way has to be used as a platform to introduce improvements in the civil service system.

From the analysis of each specific subsystem, several recommendations can be drawn. First, the focus on strategic planning should be emphasized even further. Most of the weaknesses in several subsystems result from the fact that efforts to improve specific processes are isolated, i.e. not framed within a strategic plan. Second, it is central to develop performance management and incentive structures so that result-driven behavior is rewarded. This is the only way to make sure that the process-oriented culture is gradually replaced by a focus on results. Third, HR Development needs to be aligned with strategic objectives. Moreover, the ongoing process to develop an HRD plan is a key step to move in that direction. Fourth, even though the Work Organization and Employment Management subsystems are reasonably developed, more flexible and efficient procedures should be introduced in order to avoid bureaucratization.

The contents of this chapter build upon the author’s final report “Institutional Assessment of the Civil Service Systems: Case of Belize,” submitted to the IDB in July 2005. The evaluation corresponds to the situation of the Belizean civil service as of that date.

II. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Belize is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of government based on the British model.1 The British monarch, Queen

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1 The Government is a parliamentary democracy based on the Westminster System. Under its Constitution, members of the House of Representatives are elected by the people while members of the Senate are appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister (who is the head of the Cabinet), the Leader of the Opposition, and the Governor General in his or her own deliberate judgment. The Constitution provides that the Cabinet is “collectively responsible to the National Assembly for any advice
Elizabeth II, is the Head of State and is represented in Belize by a Governor-General, a position held since the country’s independence in 1981. The Governor-General has a largely ceremonial role and is expected to be politically neutral. The Constitution divides the Government into three branches—the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. Additionally, the civil or public service is overseen by an independent Public Services Commission. Belize has a functioning two-party political system revolving around the People’s United Party (PUP) and the United Democratic Party (UDP). The present Prime Minister, Said Musa (PUP), was re-elected in 2003, and will be in power until 2008 (US Library of Congress).

Belize maintains strong ties to both the United Kingdom, as a member of the Commonwealth, and to the English-speaking Caribbean, as a signatory member of the Caribbean Common Market, CARICOM (WB 2002). Territorial disputes between the United Kingdom and Guatemala delayed the independence of Belize (formerly British Honduras) until 1981, and Guatemala refused to recognize the new nation until 1992.

The economy of Belize depends primarily on agriculture. Exports, which have recently increased by expanded production of citrus, bananas, seafood, and apparel, accounted for 13% of GDP and 68% of exports in 2000 (WB 2002). Domestic industry is limited, constrained by relatively high-cost labor and energy and a small domestic market. A combination of natural factors—climate, the longest barrier reef in the Western Hemisphere, numerous islands, excellent fishing, safe waters for boating, jungle wildlife, and Mayan ruins—support the thriving tourist industry. Development costs are high, but the Government of Belize has designated tourism as one of its major development priorities (US Department of State 2004). Continuing along the path of increasing diversity and improving international competitiveness in traditional exports will help Belize consolidate its economic and social progress (WB 2002), and since its main sources of growth activities are based on natural resources, sustainable development is critical (WB 2000).

Growth in Belize accelerated to 5% in fiscal year 2003/04. This high growth was due to expanding exports and recovery of the agricultural sector from damages inflicted by the hurricanes in 2000 and 2001. Also, the shrimp and farmed fish industry received a major push last year when the sector gained access to the large European Union (EU) market. With a favorable external climate, growth in exports is expected to accelerate. Although the large bulk of export earnings come from traditional exports, non-traditional sectors are expanding. The Belize’s dollar has been pegged to the US dollar since 1976. This means that the country has no monetary policy. As a result, fiscal policy becomes the only measure left to respond to external shocks or natural disasters. This makes it all the more imperative that public debt levels be brought down so that the country has some room to increase expenditure and take on debt when exogenous shocks demand it (IDB 2004).

Background

The Belize Public Service is staffed with approximately 12,000 public officers including the uniformed services, teachers, and open vote personnel. An estimate dated February 2004 given to the Governor General by or under the general authority of the Cabinet and for all things done by or under the authority of any Minister in the execution of his office.”

2 The PUP has won every national election between 1954 and 1989, with the exception of the 1984 election.

3 There is an article in the Guatemalan Constitution specifically related to the Belize situation “ARTICULO 19.—Belice. El Ejecutivo queda facultado para realizar las gestiones que tiendan a resolver la situación de los derechos de Guatemala respecto a Belice, de conformidad con los intereses nacionales…” (Political Constitution of the Guatemalan Republic, 1985).
indicates a total of 11,771 employees, of which the permanent establishment comprises 7,586 employees, open vote workers are estimated at 2,148, contract officers account for a total of 189, and Police and Defense force total 1,848 employees (MAT 2004). Under the British model of parliamentary government, public service employees are expected to execute the policies of the Cabinet ministers who head various executive ministries regardless of the ministers’ political affiliations. In turn, public service employees are to be insulated from overt political pressure (US Library of Congress 2005), and its role is “to provide the services of the State and implement programs and projects of the Government in a fair, accountable and efficient manner” (PRC 2000).

In 2000, the Government of Belize launched a Public Sector Reform (PSR), whose priorities comprised the following: a) transparency and accountability, b) rule by clear, rational, widely promulgated code of law, c) checks and balances to reinforce appropriate incentives; d) ensuring the widest possible participation of the people of Belize in policies, programs and projects; e) leaving activities in the private and civil society sectors unless there is a compelling case for Government intervention; and f) improved professionalism and competence within the public administration and accountability to the people (Government of Belize 2000). The Public Sector Reform Council was created in January 2000 with the mandate to advise on and coordinate the implementation of the Public Sector Reform.

This initiative was attempted within a broader reform process aimed at modifying the political system that addressed the public service as one of the institutions to be evaluated and reformed. The final report of the Political Reform Commission (PRC 2000) justified the need for reform in the criticism that the public service received from multiple actors, including public officers themselves: “The public complains of poor service, high levels of corruption and lackadaisical attitudes. The Executive complains of inefficiency, insufficient control, sabotage of programs, and archaic regulations. Public officers complain of the service having no direction, of persistent political victimization, and of poor compensation.” Such a variety of positions explain the limited results obtained in previous attempts to reform the public sector.

The Public Sector Reform strategies urged the following be done: rationalize the roles and functions of ministries, improve policy development and coordination, public sector performance, Human Resource Management (HRM), Human Resource Development (HRD), financial management systems, the application of information technology, and industrial relations (Government of Belize 2000). On the same venue, the Cabinet approved a policy for the reform of the public service in order to “provide greater autonomy to the Executive Officers in each Ministry/Department, to rationalize their functions, and to establish a human resource development committee” (WB 2002).

After a couple of years, the initiative lost its momentum and in June 2003, the Prime Minister reactivated the Public Sector Reform Council formed by representatives from the Ministry of Public Service, the Ministry of Finance, public service unions, and the private sector (PSRC 2003). This Council meets on a monthly basis, acts as an advisory body to the Prime Minister and Minister of Public Service and monitors the implementation of reform initiatives. Based on an extensive consultation process and on a review of previous diagnostic documents, it developed a “list of recurrent topics,” and elaborated a work program for 2004–2005 that includes HRM as one of seven main issues to work on. Coincident with the consultations by the Public Sector Reform Council, there was a detailed examination of the public sector finance system, which resulted in a set of recommendations for the ministries in order to adopt strategic planning methods to formulate business plans.

From the initial official document about the Public Sector Reform published in 2000, about 75% of the programmed strategies were at least attempted, although many of them were discontinued and about 50% effectively implemented.
The challenge that remains is to involve all ministries in these initiatives, and also to establish a detailed prioritization of the goals to achieve, since all reform documents list a wide variety of goals that are difficult to obtain with the existing financial and human resources (Universalia 2000). The only strategy that was fully implemented was the one related to the improvement of the financial management system (Testimonial). There are also several sector reform initiatives, but there is no macro plan under which they can be coordinated.  

Legal Framework

The Constitution provides for a Public Services Commission which consists of a Chairman and eighteen other members (Belize Constitution 105–1). The function of the Commission is to make recommendations to the Governor-General regarding the appointment of persons to the Public Service; the exercise of disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such offices; and the removal of such persons from office (Belize Constitution 106). It also has the responsibility for setting the code of conduct, fixing salaries, and generally managing the public service (PRC 2000). The power to carry out these recommendations lies with the Governor-General. The chairman and nine members of the Services Commission are appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister, after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. The remaining nine members are ex-officio, which means that they become members by virtue of the position they hold and cease to be members as soon as they cease to hold that position. No member of this Commission can be a member of the National Assembly or a holder of any public office except an ex-officio member. A member can be removed from office by the Governor-General only after being so advised by the Belize Advisory Council and for reasons of inability to carry out his or her duties or for misbehavior, which must first have been referred to the Belize Advisory Council for inquiry and report to the Governor-General with their advice (Government of Belize 1999). The Public Services Commission is organized in five sub-committees charged with dealing with specific areas of the public service: Police Force, the Military Service, the Prison Service, the Fire-Fighting Service, and one for the rest of the public service. (PRC 2000).

The rules for recruitment and selection were modified in 2001 through a constitutional amendment, following the recommendations by the Public Sector Reform Council, and new Services Commissions Regulations and Public Service Regulations were issued. The Services Commission was divided into three areas: Public Services Commission (Constitution of Belize (BC) 105–1), Judicial and Legal Services Commission (BC 110 E), and Security Services Commission (BC 110 C). Each Commission has the power to appoint, transfer, confirm, exercise discipline and remove public officers in its own sphere of action.

The permanent (also called “established”) officers are governed by the Public Service Regulations, issued in 1997, revised and published in 2001. They are currently under another revision by the Joint Staff Relations Council, which includes representatives for the Government and the unions. Temporary employees, also called “open-vote” workers, are covered by the Government Workers Regulations, issued in 1992. In addition to these major regulations, guidelines and manuals were produced by the Ministry of Public Service for discipline, transfers, performance appraisal, merit awards and recruitment processes.

There are sectoral reform initiatives for the Judiciary (Delivering Justice), a Health Sector Reform, a comprehensive change management process at the Ministry of Natural Resources, and strategic planning being undertaken for the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Tourism (MAT 2004).

According to the interviewees, this term was inherited from the British tradition, and its original meaning is not really clear. It is used to describe employees that are hired on a temporary basis.
The Ministry of Public Service (MPS)\(^6\) is the organization in charge of personnel management and industrial relations practices in the national government, namely: a) recruitments, transfers, promotions and disciplinary measures, b) promotion and development of training programs, c) the Secretariat to the Public Services Commission, d) the Secretariat to the Joint Staff Relations Council, whose role is to oversee the conditions of service and welfare of public officers. The Ministry works in close partnership with the Ministries of Finance and Budget Management, advising on matters relating to the creation and reclassification of posts, and to human resource requirements of Ministries, in terms of numbers and levels, rental of buildings and other matters (MPS 2000).

### III. ANALYSIS OF HRM SUBSYSTEMS

The analysis of the HR subsystems presented in this section follows the ninety-three critical points established by the methodology used in this study (Longo 2002), which are listed together with their corresponding valuation in Appendix A. For each subsection the corresponding critical points are indicated between parenthesis, and a brief introduction is provided about the HR decisions and practices associated with each subsystem.

**Human Resources Planning**

HR Planning constitutes the door to the HRM system, facilitating the comparison of qualitative and quantitative needs of human resources with its existing availability of internal resources in order to establish the HR gaps and the possible strategies to deal with them (Longo 2002).

**Existence and Integrity of the System (Critical point 1)**

There is a strategic management process at the macro level, but it is not layered down, and each minister establishes his or her own priorities and strategies without considering the national plan. This situation is recognized as a shortcoming by managers in the public sector. The problem does not lie in the lack of knowledge about planning, but rather in how to engage in a trustworthy process in the Belize environment (Universalia 2000). Cabinet members do not seem to appreciate Chief Executive Officers’ viewpoint as far as personnel needs in their areas are concerned. There is a vision of the public service in political parties’ manifestos, but the technical vision implied needs to be translated into a strategy to support a plan. A Minister’s plan formally involves a 20-year vision for the sector, but it is a general statement from which no targets can be derived (Testimonial). Another important restraint is that the Ministry of Finance uses a straight-line approach to cash flow management; one twelfth of the approved budget is released each month, independently of project revenue inflows and planned expenditures. This puts pressure on ministries with seasonal activities that result in negative effects on productivity and service delivery (MAT 2004).

**Strategic Coherence (2–3)**

According to the World Bank (WB, 2002) the Belizean public sector “suffers from being relatively large, with weak systems of financial control and accountability and quality of public services.” Central Government employees account for 8% of the total labor force. Total wage and salary expenditures increased from 33% of the total expenditure during 1994/95 to 40% in 1999/2000. One of the goals of the Public Sector Reform was to rationalize the roles and functions of the ministries, together with improving policy devel-

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\(^6\) The Ministry is staffed by 40 public officers, 29 employees for public service and 11 labor.

\(^7\) The MPS has traditionally served as a Secretariat to the Commission, but in June 2000 the Cabinet approved the PS Commission’s functioning from its own office. To staff the Office, some members of the Ministry were transferred to hold positions in the Office (MPS 2000)
Opment and coordination (PSR 2000), but other than a diagnosis of government agencies completed in 2004 and a document with recommendations sent to the Cabinet, there was no attempt to implement this initiative (Testimonial).

**Basic Information (4)**

It is important to mention that Information Technology (IT) infrastructure is at its infancy in Belize, and only recently have electronic mail and Internet access begun to influence how information is shared (Universalia 2000). At present, the HR information available for managerial decisions is very limited, although the Ministry of Public Service (MPS) is involved in an ambitious project to solve the situation. Payroll was computerized in 1998 through the incorporation of the SmartStream system, and the financial component of the system was immediately implemented. It was only in October 2004 that the Ministry of Public Service, with funding by the Ministry of Finance, embarked on the implementation of the HR component, which was expected to be completed by September 2005. Since there is already information in the system, it was necessary to clean up corrupted data that had been introduced without a focus on the HR processes involved. After completion of the implementation phase, the system will provide inputs for HR planning, for the identification of training needs, and for the update of the job design system.

**Effectiveness (5–9)**

There are serious limitations to the effectiveness of HR planning policies, although the HR system will provide tools to solve some of them. There is a deficit of skilled employees just as there is a surplus of unskilled employees in many governmental agencies. Overstaffing is still common in most ministries, especially at clerical levels, while there is a shortage of specialized, technical and managerial personnel. There are large numbers of both established and open vote workers in the lower categories, along with the chronic overwork of qualified personnel (WB 1995). Moreover, there are situations of overqualification, like the case of secondary teachers with master’s degrees that are not required for the job (Testimonial). Personal emoluments have been held steady at around 50% of total recurrent expenditures, but the figure grows to 60% when it includes pensions, denominational teachers’ salaries and employees working on locally funded capital projects. Materials, supplies and maintenance account for about a 10% of recurrent expenditures; as a result, the civil service is seriously under-equipped with computers and materials, and not adequately supplied with the tools needed to accomplish its tasks (WB 1995; MAT 2004).

**Administration (10–11)**

The SmartStream HR system makes provision for the monitoring and restriction of the number of officers employed within a ministry, and also of the employment of officers that are not qualified for a specified position. Through the system it is also possible to identify areas that either have a shortage or excess number of officers to be adequately staffed. Also, it can provide the employment records of all employees on the horizontal grades across the public service, making it more efficient to reassign resources among agencies.

**Work Organization**

The Work Organization function establishes and specifies the contents of the tasks for each job, and the characteristics of the people who will carry them out. It includes both the description of the activities, functions, responsibilities and targets assigned to each position (job design) and the definition of the competencies, skills and attitudes required for the successful performance at each position (profile definition) (Longo 2002).

**Existence and Integrity of the System (12)**

Presently, there are 16 ministries responsible for 44 departments (PRC 2000). The Ministry of Public Service assists the ministries by reviewing their personnel requirements and recommend-
ing to the Minister of Finance the approval of the positions needed for the effective functioning of the area, and it also reviews and approves the re-styling and upgrading of existing positions (MPS 2000). The Public Sector Reform called for flatter structures, through the development and implementation of a reclassified service scheme (PSR 2000), but beyond a preliminary diagnosis, this strategy was not attempted (Testimonial). A recent study concludes that there is a lack of information at all levels within ministries on their organizational structures, with charts that do not reflect the real organization of the areas, and reporting lines that are not clear in some cases (MAT 2004).

**Technical Quality and Flexibility of Job Design (13–17)**

Job classifications tend to represent rank rather than identify responsibilities (Universalia 2000). There has been an effort to revise the job descriptions and requirements for positions, a task undertaken on an “as needed” basis by the Ministry of Public Service, responding to requests by the ministries (MPS 2000). At present, there is a more ambitious initiative to streamline the complete job classification. This is being developed in parallel with the implementation of the HR component of the information system, the first phase of which includes the creation of jobs in the system, the grouping of positions into jobs, the verification of positions in accordance to the budget, the loading of position descriptions and skills required for each position, and the transfer of all employees in the system to their correct position (Testimonial). The Ministry of Public Service is gathering information from the other ministries, but the response rate so far has been very low. They are expected to analyze the proposed job classification and see if every task conducted in their Ministry can fit the proposed job descriptions, and if the ranks proposed seem reasonable according to the tasks allocated to each position. The goal is to establish a list of less than 20 skills. An acknowledged weakness of the public service is that its functions are not clearly defined. It is not clear for employees what is expected from them (Testimonial).

**Quality of Profiles Definition (18–21)**

Profiles are technically defined, and the Ministry of Public Service checks that the requisites correspond to the characteristics of the position to be covered. In defining profiles, emphasis on formal credentials is still very strong. Other competencies, as leadership, initiative, decision making and problem solving are starting to be recognized as critical for managerial positions (Waight 2004).

**Administration (22–23)**

Job descriptions are periodically reviewed by the Ministry of Public Service at the request of the ministries, although it is still necessary to provide for mechanisms to make them more flexible and adaptable. It is very important to establish agile procedures to update job descriptions, since changes are almost constantly taking place in the different agencies. There is an increasing customer service challenge for all areas in the Government, as well as increased expectations for rural development and greater access to government services for Spanish-speaking immigrants (Universalia 2000). Moreover, new legislation can affect job descriptions and profiles in certain areas. For example, the new Finance Act establishes new responsibilities for the Ministry of Finance; therefore, its job classification may be subject to changes (Testimonial).

**Employment Management**

This subsystem covers the personnel policies and practices concerned with managing the processes by which people enter, move within, and leave the organization. It involves all practices related to an individual’s recruitment, selection, induction, mobility and separation from an organization (Longo 2002). It is central to the HRM system, especially in the public sector, since it should be managed based on equity, merit and quality principles.
**Equal Opportunity and Merit (24–27)**

As a general principle, Ministers of Government have no say in the appointment of members of the public service, who are designated following the recommendations of the Public Services Commission. However, in the case of Permanent Secretaries (presently named as CEOs), Heads of Departments and other officers stipulated in section 107(1) of the Constitution, the Governor-General makes the appointment of these officers with the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Public Services Commission.

Some criticism has been raised about the independence of the appointment process and of the members of the Public Services Commission. In fact, one of the recommendations by the Political Reform Commission was to exclude its ex-officio members (PRC 2000). Nevertheless, the fact of having ex-officio members can be viewed as a positive factor. Other Civil Service Commissions in the Caribbean countries have been criticized for their prohibition of including public officers, because they attempt to guarantee impartiality, but they create commissions that are weak to protect public officers from political interference, and at the same time they interfere with the managerial responsibilities of senior public servants (Draper 2003).

There is a thirty-level hierarchy of positions. The five highest ones (level 26 to level 30) are reserved for the positions that follow a political appointment procedure, according to section 107(1) of the Belize Constitution. The rest of the public service (corresponding to levels 1 to 25 in the pay scale) is subjected to a merit-based selection procedure administered by the Public Services Commission. The procedure has been simplified and decentralized for the eight lowest levels (levels 1 to 8), which correspond to maintenance and basic administrative tasks. For these eight levels, the authority for recruitment and selection was delegated to the CEO in each relevant ministry by the Public Services Commission Order in year 2000 (Clarke 2002). Even after this delegation process, the Commission checks that vacant positions included in the budget are filled following the established procedures. It also controls the promotion process in middle-rank positions (external recruitment is basically for entry levels). During the last two years there has been a curtailment of positions, and most movements are associated with promotions.

There is a category of employees that is not subject to this complex system of guarantees, which is called “open vote” workers. They correspond to temporary assignments, most of them in the lower classification levels, who are hired at the complete discretion of the ministries (WB 1995). According to the Public Services Com-

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8 This article applies to the offices of Financial Secretary, Deputy Financial Secretary, Secretary to the Cabinet, Solicitor General, Permanent Secretary, head of a department of Government, Commissioner of Police, Director, Security and Intelligence Service, Commandant, Belize Defense Force, Ambassador, High Commissioner or principal representative of Belize in any other country or accredited to any international organization. Permanent Secretaries used to be included in section 106, but moved to section 107 through a constitutional amendment after a recommendation by the PS Reform Commission that Permanent Secretaries no longer be the most senior permanent position in the public service but instead be political appointees of the government in office with responsibilities to coordinate the implementation of the Government’s policies in the ministry (PRC 2000).

9 The arguments were that: (a) the appointment process gives the Prime Minister and the political party in power significant control over the composition and this facilitates “rubberstamping” of the political directorate instructions and encourages political victimization, (b) the composition is not necessarily sympathetic or understanding of particular concerns or features of certain disciplines of the public sector, for example, the military, the police, the prison and fire-fighting services, and (c) the composition facilitates partiality and subjectivity in the appeal process of public officers who are of the view that they have been unjustly disciplined or removed from office as it includes as ex-officio officers those who may have recommended the disciplinary measure or removal.
mission they are not used in excess, even though some concerns arose in the Public Reform Commission regarding the possibility of the use of this provision to dispense partisan favors, hiring unqualified personnel, and also because of the lack of limits of time of service for these employees (PRC 2000). There has been an effort to limit the number of open vote workers, which amounted to around 2,700 employees by 1993 (WB 1995) and declined to 2,060 in 2000. Of that total, 821 were skilled and semi-skilled workers, and 841 occupied administrative positions (the status of the rest was not verified) (MPS 2000). Even though there is no conclusive evidence about the abusive use of this type of assignment, there is definitely potential for undermining the merit system as a whole if an increasing number of employees are hired under this category.

Discrimination does not seem to be an issue in the selection process. The composition of the selection panel is varied, and the Public Services Commission can ask for additional interviews if there is suspicion of bias in any of them. There is still a stronger presence of men in the top positions, but in the last years the situation has improved. Even though there is no conclusive evidence about the abusive use of this type of assignment, there is definitely potential for undermining the merit system as a whole if an increasing number of employees are hired under this category.

One issue that should be taken into account is that almost half of its population is not fluent in English, and therefore not eligible for public employment. According to the last census (CSO 2000), 54% of the population speak English very well, 26% not so well, and 19% do not speak it at all. Also, illiteracy and lack of access to higher education are constraints to access to public positions. The literacy rate is around 70% according to the last census; however, 17% of the urban population and only 7% of the rural population have reached secondary school (CSO 2000).

Recruitment and Selection Quality (28–32)
The Government is the largest employer in Belize, and is able to attract highly qualified workers. All positions are advertised in major weekly newspapers. Belizian citizenship is a requirement for all public service positions, but if some technical positions cannot be covered with local professionals, recruitment is opened to the CARICOM countries. The Ministry of Public Service receives applications for employment all year round, which are reviewed when requests for personnel are received by the ministries. The number of vacancies advertised for 2000 were 62, and the number of applications received, 492 (MPS 2000).

Selection procedures are very detailed, and in general terms complied with in the majority of the areas.

The question that remains unanswered is if such procedures are efficient enough to establish who the most competent candidate for a position is, since the alignment between job description and individual profiles is far from perfect. According to the regulations, the appointment and promotion of public officers are based on three factors, in descending order of importance: performance/merit, integrity/professionalism and experience/employment history (Services Commissions Regulations (SCR) art.16, PSR art. 11). Procedures are quite formal, and tend to emphasize paper qualifications over more general competencies (Testimonial).

The central selection tool used is a panel formed by four interviewers including a specialist in the area and a person with general knowledge of administration from another ministry. Direct supervisors are included only if they are specialists in the area.

Induction Quality (33–34)
A two-day induction program is offered to every new employee during the first three months in service. Meetings are held when there is a significant number of new hires, which means that a number of employees attend this meeting when

10 The first issue of the Belize Today magazine, issued by the Ministry of Information, highlights ten women that have been appointed in top positions in a variety of organizations, most of them in governmental offices.

11 The second language is Spanish, with 44% that speak it fluently, 11% speak it not so well, and 45% do not speak it at all.
they have already been working for a couple of months. Nevertheless, new hires appreciate this opportunity of getting to know how the Government works and what role they play in it. Every new hire receives a copy of the public service regulations.

In colonial days there used to be a two-year provisional appointment, after which and provided the appointed employee passed an exam he could become eligible for a permanent position. Nowadays, the provisional appointment is formally for one year (SCR 14), but most employees get into the permanent service after that period. Supervisors have to fill out two reports on the new hires during their first year in the public service. If both reports are qualified above average, the public officer is confirmed in the permanent position. There are documented cases of people who were not confirmed because this requirement was not met (Testimonial).

**Mobility (35)**
The Commission is in charge of approving transfers between ministries (SCR 43–49). The power to transfer public officers within the clerical, secretarial, administrative and accounting grades (known as “horizontal grades”) was delegated to the Ministry of Public Service in 1994, and transfers within the Ministry were delegated to the CEOs in 2000 (MPS 2000). Geographic transfers are very common, and in such cases relocation grants are assigned to the public officer. In the 1970s everything was concentrated in Belize City, but after years of decentralization, it is possible to transfer employees without affecting their access to a variety of services (Testimonial).

**Absenteism and Discipline (36–37)**
The power to discipline public officers is vested in the Services Commission, and appeals against its decisions can be presented to the Belize Advisory Council (SCR, part IV, 23–42). The Public Service Regulations include a section about the expected conduct of public officers (PSR, part III, 19–43). Regarding the control of absenteeism, the Ministry of Public Service reviews sick leave requests and monitors how often officers proceed on sick leaves and recommends the convening of Medical Boards when appropriate (MPS 2000).

**Separation (38–41)**
The regulations provide for the dismissal or removal of public officers in consequence of discipline proceedings, on the abolition of their office and on the need to improve the organization of their Ministry or Department (SCR, art. 22). The compulsory age for retirement is 55 years, and re-employment is allowed if there is a chronic shortage in a technical or professional field (SCR, art. 18). There is some concern regarding an increase in the number of re-hired pensioners in the last years (MAT 2004). Resignations are approved by the Ministry of Public Service in accordance to the Public Service Regulations, receiving around 12 requests per month (MPS 2000).

**Performance Management**
This subsystem refers to the process of planning and evaluating the employees’ contribution to the organization (Longo 2002). It should be managed so that individual and group performance is aligned with the organization’s priorities, and maintained at the highest possible level to enable sustained improvement of their contribution to the organization.

**Performance Planning and Follow-up (42–45)**
The Public Sector Reform aimed at improving the public sector’s performance via a) the setting of standards through the review, development, publication and implementation of policy and procedure manuals and other management guidelines that may be necessary from time to time; and b) the enforcement of personal and institutional accountability through the developing and strengthening of favorable work ethics; performance contracts for senior executives; comprehensive auditing procedures (including performance and financial audits of Ministries);
strengthening of Parliamentary Committees, particularly the Public Accounts Committee, which would receive reports from Ministries on an annual basis and evaluate their performance; recognition of outstanding performance and prompt delivery of awards and incentives; enforcement of the disciplinary code. It also established the enforcement of the use of the new performance appraisal system and the development and institution of a transparent merit/award system (PSR 2000). In practice, most of these initiatives could not be applied, and it remains very difficult to define individual or group performance goals given the flaws in the strategic planning process (Testimonial). Most institutions and organizations operate in the absence of clear mandates and performance targets, not providing the necessary performance framework within which to address serious capacity and motivational issues (Universalia 2000).

**Performance Evaluation (46–48)**
The present system was established in 1997, and is experiencing an excessive benevolent bias (Testimonial). A new procedure was put recently in place after the Performance Appraisal (PA) Review process, in a more complex and rich form than the previous one issued. It is a good system from a technical point of view, but its use is far from being generalized. It is being updated once again, and the Cabinet established a moratorium in hiring and merit increments until the PA appraisal is fully developed and implemented (Testimonial). The performance contracts for CEOs planned in the Public Sector Reform were not implemented.

**Administration (49)**
Line managers find it very difficult to assume their role in performance management, a situation that is reflected in the generalized benevolent bias in performance evaluations. Performance appraisal forms are generally not completed on time, and the process—in a high incidence of the cases—has to be initiated by officers who demand to be paid increments that are overdue (MAT 2004).

**Compensation Management**

This subsystem includes the management of monetary compensations (salaries and bonuses) and non-monetary benefits offered by the organization to its employees to reward them for their contribution towards achieving the organization’s objectives (Longo 2002). It should be based on internal and external equity principles, with a compensation structure based on the assessment and classification of positions, and some variable compensation structure that link rewards to performance or results (either at the individual, group or institutional level).

**Compensation Strategy, Internal and External Equity (50–57)**
Given the high proportion of recurring expenditures allocated to personal emoluments, the salary strategy is dominated by a budgetary focus (WB 1995). The wage compression is reasonable, reflecting a ratio of 9.8 between the highest and the lowest salaries for career positions (see Indicator 3). In general, there is a balance among payments applied to similar positions for the established officers in different areas, and the Ministry of Public Service conducts salary reviews when ministries send requests for appointments or promotions (MPS 2000). The problem arises when comparing the terms and conditions of employment of established officers with those of contract officers, since they are much more favorable for the latter. In general, contract officers have no previous exposure to public service operational regulations, and this situation combined with a more favorable payment scheme accounts for the negative effect on staff morale (MAT 2004). Regarding external equity, the entry level salary is a bit higher in the public sector, but an employee can improve his/her situation much faster in the private sector as a result of good performance. As a consequence, at higher levels the public service loses people to the private sector, while at lower levels it still attracts competent candidates. Therefore, it is important to work on a strategy for the retention of managers.
Effectiveness of Compensation Policies and Wages Administration (58)

The Public Service regulations establish an automatic increment system (PSR art. 106) in which the annual increment is tied to performance (PSR art. 108). In practice it is assigned automatically to every officer (WBI 1995), instead of being based on a well conducted staff appraisal, despite the existence of such a system (Universalia 2000). In the case of promotions, officers receive the minimum salary of the post to which they are being promoted, provided that the difference with the previous salary is not less than two increments on the higher scale (PSR art. 109). Incentive allowances are paid as an additional compensation for the additional job covered when an officer replaces another one that retires from the public service. There is also an award of one increment for passing clerical promotion examinations (PSR art. 12) and a merit award for outstanding service (PSR art. 111). In sum, there are several tools that aim at establishing some incentives for good performers, although there is a generalized perception that they are not being effectively used for that purpose. The perception is that the structure of incentives attract candidates that are less result-oriented, reinforcing the existing focus on procedures (Testimonial).

Wages Administration (59–61)

The Public Service Regulations establish the rules for salary management (PSR art. 105–128). Decisions about wage administration tend to follow the established procedures; therefore, there are no abusive practices associated with them. Information deficits will be solved after the implementation of the HR system.

Other Benefits (62–64)

A variety of allowances are established in the Public Service Regulations, such as an acting allowance, a subsistence allowance for officers recruited abroad, subsistence and travel allowances for travel on duty overseas, transfer grants for relocation to a new station, and mileage and motor vehicle maintenance allowance for officers who use their personal vehicles (PSR art. 114–128).

The Workers Compensation Act establishes a retirement system based on the social security, and on the results of the respective collective agreement. The Pensions Act applies to the Public Service (SCR art. 52), and establishes a “non-contributing” scheme. There is a proposal to extend the retirement age from 55 to 60 years old, and to review the Pensions Act so that new hires start contributing to the Social Security system. Non-monetary compensation is not frequent. In a way, the merit award implies a non-monetary recognition, even though there is a lump sum payment associated to it.

Effectiveness of Promotion Policies and Career Design Quality (65–70)

Horizontal tracks have been established for supportive functions, which are grouped in the clerical, secretarial, administrative and accounting grades (known as “horizontal grades”). Regulations in force establish examinations as a requisite to cover positions in the clerical grade. The advance to an upper position in this grade depends on the results of the exam, seniority in lower level, and the evaluation of the candidate in terms of performance, integrity and experience (PSR art. 12–13). There is a cadet or traineeship system, which takes the form of recruitment of qualified, but inexperienced candidates from outside and within the Service, into middle-management positions. These officers are given “on-the-job” training with continuous supervision. 
The goal is that these officers provide improved support to senior management, and bring new insights, methodologies and professionalism to the organization (MPS 2000).

Each office uses informal succession planning mechanisms, but it is not based on a comprehensive HR planning system. There are large gaps between some Heads of Department and the next senior officer (MAT 2004).

**Individual and Collective Learning Management (71–76)**

The Ministry of Public Services is in charge of coordinating the training function, including the promotion and development of In-Service Training Programs for the whole Public Service, and the coordination of scholarship programs (Government of Belize 1999). The regulations are heavily focused on the administration of study leaves, grants and allowances for trainees (PSR art. 78), and therefore the efforts have been focused on these formal issues more than providing a strategic direction to training activities. The result is a training function that is generally ruled by the individual preferences of public officers, although the perception is that it is still better than in the private sector, where companies do not provide training to their employees. One of the strategies established for the Public Sector Reform program was the improvement of HRD, and it was announced that priority would be given to staff training and development. Of the specific actions that were planned, specialized training was not attempted in a formal way, and customer-oriented training was focused on immigration and customs officers (Testimonial). There is a complete lack of planning for staff training; hence, training activities continue to take place primarily on an ad hoc basis (MAT 2004), instead of being linked to performance problems and needs (Waight 2004).

Public officers are not made responsible for self-development, and expect training to be offered by the Government (Testimonial).

Even though there is not a formal HRD body within the Ministry of Public Service, at the time of this evaluation there was an advanced project to develop an HRD policy for Belize. That project reflected an effort to provide an ample focus on HRD policy, so that it included the needs of both public and private sectors (Testimonial). A need assessment for HRD development in Belize was conducted recently and it established that the main flaw in the public sector is related to leadership rather than technical skills (Waight 2004). This confirms a previous diagnosis indicating that many senior managers lack training to set direction, develop work plans and objectives, assign tasks to teams, and supervise and monitor progress (Universalia 2000). The eight critical areas of HR needs identified in the public sector were reading, English competency, critical thinking, employability, entrepreneurship, management, teacher training, and specializations. Public sector organizations are becoming more finance sensitive, with more expectation of creativity and decision-making from line employees because of the need to provide just-in-time re-

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12 For example, Director of Immigration PS 25 and Senior Immigration Officer PS 11 (MAT 2004).

13 The MPS report for 2000 describes the training activities during that period, most of which consisted of announcing courses offered abroad, processing applications for awards, approving study leaves and providing direct financial assistance for bachelor degrees.

14 In some cases, there is targeted training, like the continuous training for performance appraisal, but it is almost an exception. The Ministry of National Development has a targeted development program, which is heavily focused on real projects conducted by the participants and monitored by the instructor. The program involves five classes offered by the local university and is funded by the participant’s organizations.

15 There used to be a Training Unit, whose functions were absorbed by a newly established Department of Management Services, created in year 2000 (MPS 2000).

16 The consultant hired for this project had previously conducted a needs assessment at the request of the local university in order to establish the training needs required by the industry from university programs, which provides a good starting point for the HRD policy.
response. The educational system, however, is not producing problem solvers, critical thinkers and creative employees (Waight 2004).

There is still a major contextual factor that has an impact on the effectiveness of training and development programs. The changes that are expected to occur because of these programs require the goals to be clearly set for each position, and also that the areas have the necessary resources to develop the activities. Since salaries are a high percentage of the budget, those resources cannot be guaranteed with such limited funding for operations (MAT 2004).

Human and Social Relations Management

This subsystem is concerned with the management of the relations between the organization and its employees regarding personnel policies and practices when these acquire, in a given context, a collective dimension (Longo 2002). It involves labor relations management, which includes the collective bargaining of pay and working conditions; the management of the organizational climate in terms of communication policies and practices, and social benefits that are offered to employees in general or to aid particularly needy groups or individuals.

Work Climate (77–78)

Some of the Public Sector Reform initiatives were indirectly related to the work climate (office enhancement, reorganization of office hours, celebration of an annual public service week, simplification of public service procedures), but most of them have been only partially attempted. The excessive formality of the decision-making process results in a lack of concern for individual situations. There is the perception that little attention is paid to the everyday problems that individuals and groups face in the public service, thus affecting the work climate (Testimonial). There are some initiatives regarding quality of work improvement, such as the Employee Assistance Programme (EAP) that started in 2000, intending to provide professional counseling services for employees that experience serious personal problems (MPS 2000). A recent survey indicates that there are environmental factors that affect productivity, such as health and safety concerns, as well as excessive transportation costs that impact heavily on staff at lower pay scale levels, and also the urgent need to repair and provide security to several offices, especially in the districts (MAT 2004).

Communication Effectiveness (79–81).

There are not many initiatives to improve communication in the Government, and there is a concern about the lack of interaction between offices that work on related areas: public officers in one department can be unaware of developments in other areas even in their own ministry (MAT 2004). There is a publication by the Ministry of Information, BelizeToday.org, which—even though it is not aimed at being a house-organ since it is more of a general interest magazine—, is distributed for free to every public officer, and in a way acts as a channel to disseminate the vision of the Government. The first edition was issued in April 2005, as a sequel of a previous magazine published for many years by the Government of Information Service.

Labor Relations Balance and Quality (82–85)

There are several instances of interaction between management and the unions in the public sector, with union representatives taking part in several joint bodies with responsibility in the design and implementation of HR policies, like the Joint Staff Council, and the Human Resource Development Committee.

Since the ratification of International Labor Organization conventions (ILO Conventions Act, chapter 304:01) was registered in June 17

The PSR main document emphasizes the need of promoting multipartite approach to guarantee effective and meaningful Public Sector Reform, expanding the role of the Unions through active participation, improved communication and appropriate representation (PSR 2000).
1999, both the Labor Relations Convention (ILO No. 151) and the Collective Bargaining Convention (ILO No. 154) have the force of law in Belize, providing a formal legal framework to the negotiations between management and the unions in the public sector. In 2003, the first collective agreement was subscribed, after a negotiation on salary increases, improvement of benefits and modification of tax structure. It was the result of a negotiating body formed by the Public Service Union (PSU), the Teachers Union and the Association of Public Service Senior Managers. More recently, there was a collective agreement for the Central Bank (December 2004), which included a variety of issues.

The Joint Staff Relations Council represents a more informal but still important instance for discussion of issues between management and the unions, as a complement to other instances of collective bargaining. The chair of this Council is the CEO of the Public Service Ministry, and the co-chair is the president of the Public Service Union, who is responsible for the session in the absence of the chair. It was created as a “gentlemen’s agreement” as a negotiation area, but there is no formal legislation supporting it. It is not an instance of conflict resolution, but its advisory role to the Cabinet provides an instance to discuss sensitive issues before they escalate into a conflict. From the Government’s perspective, it provides a good model of balanced labor relations. The Council reviews all regulations related to conditions of service (leaves, hours, benefits, allowances). It was consulted for the development of the new Performance Appraisal system and the merit award procedure. From the unions’ perspective, this is a valuable instance but it has a weak impact on the conditions of employment, since the final decision lies with the Ministry of Public Service and the Cabinet, whose members decide whether to pass or not the legislation changes proposed. For example, when revising the Government Workers Regulations there was no agreement on some issues and the legislation was not changed. But when the regulations are related to less sensitive issues, the legislation is passed with the proposed changes, specially if it does not have a financial impact.

**Labor Conflict Management (86–88)**

From the unions’ perspective, labor relations in the past worked very smoothly, but the critical fiscal position made it more difficult to negotiate compensation, increments and grants, thereby deteriorating labor relations in recent years. For example, the union has been on grievance for four years on increments and salaries for public officers being moved to statutory bodies (parastatal organizations—electricity, social security, large hospitals). The agreement was that movement would not affect their income and conditions of employment, but it resulted in a four-year lasting conflict that was solved only recently. According to the union’s position, there has also been an increasing degree of politicization of the decision-making process that makes it difficult to interact between politicians and public servants. The replacement of Permanent Secretaries by CEOs appointed by the ministers is seen as a negative change. The division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Public Service and the Services Commission is also seen as a negative factor. The Commission has

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18 Even before that ratification, the right to negotiate was recognized to the Unions in Belize. The response from ILO to a complaint filed by the PSUB against the Belize Government in year 1994 says that “… none of the arguments formulated makes the ILO Committee to think that the restrictions imposed on public officers on the matter of negotiation are frequent, and the present restriction is considered as exceptional…” (ILO, Case 1775, par.514).

19 There are eight unions in Belize. In addition to the three already mentioned, there are the Christian Workers, Communication Workers, Water Services, Belize Electricity Workers, and Belize Workers. The last one represents the cane industry workers.

20 In any case, conflicts do not escalate to the level of street demonstrations.
been challenging the regulations issued on recommendation of the Joint Staff Council. Since the Commission has a constitutional status, they do not pay attention to circulars and administrative directions from the Council. It was easier to negotiate when the CEO at the Ministry of Public Service was the only one empowered to make decisions on the majority of HR issues. The system became more complex and power “broke into pieces” among different institutions (Testimonial).

**Social Policies Management (88–89)**

Public officers are entitled to paid leave of absence for vacation, sickness, maternity, paternity, illness of spouse or children, and training as well as up to 90 days of leave without pay (PSR art. 75). There are few aspects in which the public sector offers advantages. The vacation leave lasts 14 days in the Labor Law, while the Public Service Regulations concedes 20 days for junior officers and 30 days for senior officers (PSR art.56). Furthermore, public officers have access to advanced pay for certain purposes—e.g. the purchase of household items, a means of transportation, or for medical or maternity purposes (PSR art. 129(1)). On the other hand, private companies offer insurance benefits (life, dental insurance, for example) that are not granted in the public service. Until now, public employees have enjoyed the advantage of a “non-contributing pension scheme,” but there is a project to change the system to match the situation in the private sector—i.e. urging public officers to contribute to the social security system (Testimonial).

**The Organization of the HR Function**

The description of each subsystem forming part of the HRM presented above is complemented in this section with the analysis of the mechanisms used for the management of the system, particularly the distribution of personnel-related decisions among the different responsible parties (Longo 22).

**Autonomy and Capacity of Supervisors (90–92)**

In 2002, the Public Services Commission delegated all its powers of appointment, promotion, transfer, discipline and removal from office to CEOs where decisions concerned officers on pay scale 1 to 8, while keeping the power of and responsibility for a general oversight and monitoring of the execution of such delegated powers. The authority for fixing salaries and privileges for officers on pay scale 1 to 8 remains with the Ministry of Public Service, which, regarding delegated functions, still has to provide guidance to the ministries through the production of manuals, the publication of job descriptions, and the training of all users of the new system (Clarke 2002). In the context of the decentralization process of the HR function and the delegation of power to the CEOs, managers in the different ministries are expected to assume more responsibility for the people assigned to their sphere of formal authority. In general, managers play this role, although it is sometimes difficult for them to make decisions that could create dissatisfaction in his or her unit (Testimonial). For example, the recurrent benevolent bias of performance appraisals clearly reflects this conflict.

**Central HR Administration (93)**

Three institutions are involved in the central administration of the HR function: the Ministry of Public Service, the Public Services Commission and the Public Sector Reform Council. Even though legislation contemplates differentiated roles for the three of them, there is some degree of tension between them in terms of their re-

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21 The PS Commission reserves the power of promotion unto itself on all Clerical Grade Officers.

22 Note that the Ministry of Public Service was dissolved by the end of 2005, after this assessment was completed. Its personnel administration and development functions were transferred to the Office of Governance, which reports directly to the Prime Minister. The recruitment and selection functions are still under the purview of the Public Services Commission.
sponsibilities. As already mentioned, the Public Sector Reform established the need to delegate powers from the Public Services Commission to the Ministry of Public Services, including the power to transfer, recruit and terminate employees. In the last years, part of these responsibilities was taken back by the Commission, but constitutionally these policies are under the Ministry’s scope of action. These changes in competencies of both institutions reflect a political competition over the control of these functions (testimonial), and this creates some overlapping of functions between the two of them (MAT 2004).

**Symbolic Valuation of the Human Resources Subsystems**

The following chart shows a graphic representation of the level of development of each of the subsystems previously analyzed.
When comparing the different HR functions within the Belizean civil service system, we can see that the Employment and Human Relations subsystems are more mature, the Work Organization, Development and Compensation Management subsystems are less developed, while the weakest ones are the HR Planning and Performance Management subsystems.

### IV. INDICATORS

#### IV.1. Quantitative Indicators

1. **Number of Political Appointments**

   | Total number of political appointments | 18 | Number of officials covering positions in pay ranges 26 to 30 (Constitution of Belize art. 107). Source: Number of established staff by grade, 1994 (World Bank 1995) |
   | Total number of positions for the civilian central Government | 3,392 | Number of officials covering positions in pay ranges 1 to 25 (Constitution of Belize art. 106). Source: Number of established staff by grade, 1994 (World Bank 1995) |

   **Political appointments rate** | 0% |

#### Fiscal Weight of Public Employment

2. **Central Government Wage Bill/Gross Domestic Product**

   | GDP (in million dollars) | 1,081.7 | GDP, market prices, year 2004 (2,121 million Belize dollars x 0.51) Source: Central Statistical Office, www.cso.gov.bz |

   **Central government wage bill/Gross Domestic Product** | 10% |

#### Civil Service Incentives

3. **Vertical Wage Compression**

   | I. Higher salary of civilian central Government (in dollars) | 34,082 | Maximum salary for pay range 25 (Belize dollars). Pay ranges 26 to 30 are designated through political appointments. MPS, Pay scale 2005. (66.808 Belize dollars x 0.51) |
   | II. Lower salary of civilian central Government (in dollars) | 3,476 | Minimum salary for pay range 1 (Belize dollars). MPS, Pay scale 2005. (6816 Belize dollars x 0.51) |
   | III. Vertical wage compression | 9.8 |

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23 All figures expressed in US Dollars. 1Bds = 0.51 US Dollars (Source: www.xe.com Universal Currency Converter)
(continued)

Civil Service Incentives

4. Average Central Government Wage/Per Capita GDP

| II. Per capita GDP by month (in dollars) | 319 | GDP Market prices (2,121 million Belize dollars x 0.51)/Population according to Census 2000 (282,600)= 7,521.28/12 months Source: www.cso.gov.bz |

Average central government wage/Per capita GDP 2.4

5. Average Central Government Wage/Average Private Sector Wage

| II. Average private sector wage | Not available |

Average central government wage/Average private sector wage Not available

Civil Service Employment Figures

6. Total Number of Central Government Employees/Total Population

| I. Total number of central government employees | 9,923 | Estimated number of public officers, teachers and support staff in schools. It does not include the Belize Defense Force and the Police. Source: Management Audit Team Report (2004) |

Total number of central government employees/Total population 3%
7. Central Government Expenditure (excluding pensions and debt service)/Total Number of Central Government Employees


II. Total number of central government employees 9,923 Estimated number of public officers, teachers and support staff in schools. The Belize Defense Force and the Police are not included. Source: Management Audit Team Report (2004)

III. Central government expenditure (excluding pensions and debt service)/Total number of central government employees (in dollars) 44,402

IV.2 Indices for the Evaluation of the Civil Service System

Table of Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Index value (scale: 0–20)</th>
<th>Scale Percentage</th>
<th>Sub-Index</th>
<th>Sub-index value (scale: 0–10)</th>
<th>Scale Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(E) Efficiency</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M) Merit</td>
<td>13.54</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SC) Structural Consistency</td>
<td>10.16</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>(STC) Strategic Coherence</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(DC) Directive Consistency</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(CP) Consistency of Processes</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(FC) Functional Capacity</td>
<td>10.37</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>(COM) Competency</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(IE) Incentive Effectiveness</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(FL) Flexibility</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CI) Integrating Capacity</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Elaboration of Indices

The indices and sub-indices listed above were constructed on the basis of the analysis of 93 critical points that reflect key elements of the HRM subsystems. Appendix A lists the valuation of these critical points and their corresponding number to which these values relate.
Efficiency
This index, related to thirteen critical points, measures the degree of optimization of the investment in human resources identified in the civil service system, as well as its alignment with the fiscal policy scale and its reference markets (Longo 2002). For this index, the performance of the Belizean civil service is relatively low (50% of the scale), reflecting the heavy burden that personnel costs represent if compared to the country’s economy and given the high proportion of the recurrent government expenditure that is allocated to personal emoluments. It also reflects the flaws in the strategic planning system that implies low grades for all items related to the strategic focus for each HR subsystem.

Merit
This index, linked to ten critical points, assesses the extent to which employment, career and wage decisions conform to professional criteria. The relatively good performance of the Belizean civil service for this index (68% of the scale) reflects the tradition of merit-based recruitment and selection inherited from the British colonial system.

Structural Consistency
This index measures the core building blocks in the HRM system, namely: the HR Planning, Work Organization, and Performance Management subsystems. The index is interconnected to 3 sub-indices, Strategic Coherence, Directive Consistency, and Consistency of Processes, which are collectively associated to 29 critical points.

Strategic coherence measures the interconnection between the Government’s strategic priorities and HRM policies and practices. This sub-index obtains a valuation of less than 45% of the scale, reflecting the lack of maturity of the strategic planning system.

Directive consistency measures the level of development of the directive function in the civil service system, specifically the alignment between the “central techno-structure and line directives” (Longo 2002). The valuation of the sub-index for Belize (44% of the scale) indicates the uneven development of the managerial function in the civil service, with a number of supervisors that do not have the competencies to effectively manage their work groups.

Consistency of processes measures the extent to which the processes that underpin an integrated HRM system are in place in the civil service system. It is the best valued of the three sub-indices, reaching 52% of the scale, since it benefits from some degree of systematization of the HR function (in the sense that there are procedures in place effectively implemented for most of the subsystems), a reasonable level of internal equity of the compensation system, and a developed labor relations system.

Functional Capacity
This index evaluates the extent to which the civil service system encourages behaviors that promote improvement in public services. This index is linked to three sub-indices, namely, Competency, Incentive Effectiveness, and Flexibility that are collectively related to 41 critical points.

Competency values the extent to which HRM policies and practices facilitate an adequate supply of skilled personnel. It reaches 54% of the scale, reflecting a positive valuation of a reasonably developed employment system that compensates the Work Organization and Training functions, which are far less dynamic.

Incentive effectiveness measures the extent to which existing policies and practices facilitate productivity, learning and improved service quality. This sub-index gets the lowest grade within this index (45% of the scale), showing the recurrent difficulties to effectively implement the performance evaluation process, and the inexistence of non-monetary incentives. Positive aspects that contribute to this index are the reasonable wage
compression and the internal equity of the compensation system.

*Flexibility* measures the capacity of existing policies and practices to adjust to changes in policy priorities, in this case getting the highest grade within this index (52% of the scale). One factor that contributes to this result is that Belize is one of the few countries in the region that has the effective possibility of moving public officers from one position to another, even relocating them in different geographical regions. Other factors that contribute positively to this index are the possibility of separating employees for bad performance and for economic reasons, as provided for in the regulations, although this mechanism is infrequently used. These aspects counteract some rigidities of the system, such as the detailed and formal job description process, the lack of flexible career tracks, and the disarticulation of training efforts.

**Integrating Capacity**

This index, related to 19 critical points, rates the extent to which the civil service system can align different stakeholders’ expectations and interests in an effort to empower them and reduce conflicts. This is one of the two indices (along with the Merit index) for which the Belizean civil service system performs reasonably well, reaching almost 60% of the possible maximum grade. This reflects the fact that labor relations in the public sector are well developed, with several instances of interaction between management and the unions.

**V. CONCLUSIONS**

**Analysis of Causal Areas**

Big efforts were made to develop a national strategy, specially from the Ministry of National Economic Development, but the Ministry of Finance is too strong and, therefore, budget restrictions dominate Public Service strategies. There are some guidelines in the political parties’ manifestos, but once a political party takes office there is no process in place to lead to a strategy from such guidelines. Furthermore, there is also a mid-term plan that every ministry has to elaborate, but consultation with other ministries are not well articulated. Consequently, national plans in different policy areas are not in line with ministries’ plans, with the responsibilities defined for each area, or with the job descriptions for individuals and groups in each agency (Testimonial).

In most interviews conducted for this study, a vision of a difference in the public service before and after independence prevailed. There were expectations of positive changes, i.e. getting rid of the formalities and inefficiencies of the rule-oriented colonial system, but there is a perception that after almost 25 years “the public service could never progress from the colonial system” (Testimonial). Even though there was a very important professionalization process in the last decades, with much better academic qualifications in the public service today if compared to colonial times, there is now great concern about the lack of managerial skills, and the low motivation in public officers. Despite public officers’ competencies, the perception is that they are not as productive as could be expected according to their credentials. The public service is still very much oriented to rule-following, because of the colonial heritage; however, the enforcement of rules is weak in comparison with colonial times, when breaking the rules could have very serious consequences. In sum, the problem does not lie with the rules themselves, but with their low level of compliance.

**Internal and External Factors**

One of the lessons that Draper (2003) derives from civil service reform processes in the Caribbean is that the region needs to focus on developing appropriate institutional mechanisms to coordinate the reform efforts. The fact that a single minister—or sometimes the Prime Minister’s office—is generally assigned with the responsi-
bility of gearing a reform that affects all areas of government creates a major flaw in the change management strategy. The lack of support and participation of the other ministers will make it virtually impossible to implement the reform (Draper 2003). In the Belizean case, according to Reform 2000, the Ministry of Public Service is the agency commissioned with the task of implementing 20 out of 34 potential projects, while line ministries are in charge of implementing only three, and have joint responsibilities with the Ministry of Public Service on another one (Universalia, 2000). This highly concentrated responsibility to gear the reform in the Ministry of Public Service, without clear incentives for the rest of the ministers to follow the initiatives, challenges the implementation of the programmed changes.

The need for public service reform became evident and pressing with respect to both its scope and its ability to achieve social and economic objectives in an efficient and effective manner (Clarke 2002). There is agreement “across the board” that something has to be done to improve the efficiency of the public service, and in several instances HRM aspects of the reform have been recognized as crucial. At the time of the launching of the reform, the three areas identified as having high potential to produce a measurable and positive impact on the public sector’s performance were governance, HRM and information technology (Universalia 2000).

Since the Public Sector Reform Council includes a representative from the opposition in the National Assembly as well as representatives of all the political parties, the Plan is almost certainly to be continued by the next administration. It might be given more or less emphasis, but it will not be discarded (Testimonial).

Main Conclusions

Belize is a multicultural society with values and attitudes formed by a colonial administration, more closely geared to following procedures than to solving problems and measuring results (Universalia 2000). At the time of its Independence (1981), Belize inherited a well-functioning public administration of Westminster style based on a cabinet government, an independent judiciary, and a professional public service. Over time, the public service has been faced with a rapid increase in size, with challenges concerning its systems of functional control, accountability, and with decreasing standards of efficiency and quality of service. These challenges have been attributed to the breakdown of the traditional system of centralized personnel and financial control (Universalia 2000). Merit is reasonably rooted in the HRM system; hence, concerns are more related to the efficiency of HR functions.

There is consensus around the need for reform, and there are several ongoing initiatives aimed at tackling identified weaknesses of the HRM system, in the context of an institutionalized public sector reform process. There is an effort by the authorities at the Ministry of Public Service to change from a rules-driven to a business-driven, result-oriented public service. This implies delegating not only responsibility, but also authority in order to get the expected results (Testimonial).

If compared with the situation in other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the civil service in Belize has an intermediate level of development, more comparable to Costa Rica or Caribbean countries such as Trinidad, Jamaica and Barbados than to the rest of the countries in Central America, which present highly politicized HR decisions in governmental organizations, hence almost inexisten civil services

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24 A diagnosis performed at the time of the Public Sector Reform launching process found out that some CEOs just “provided the document to their senior managers,” and some others admitted having little familiarity with the document (Universalia 2000). These attitudes are a consequence of the lack of pressure exerted for the reform initiatives.

25 Both the UDP and PUP manifestos include a section on public service reform, emphasizing the need to improve its efficiency.
(Iacoviello et al 2005). The fact of having a British style civil service to start with makes a big difference in Belize and the Caribbean. The main challenges are, therefore, different in nature—i.e. in Belize they are more concerned with avoiding the excessive bureaucratization of highly formalized procedures, rather than with dealing with excessively politicized decisions.

**VI. RECOMMENDATIONS**

The role of both the Ministry of Public Service and the Public Sector Reform Council should be reinforced, so that their initiatives are supported by all actions needed from other governmental areas. There should be real pressure for change, and power should be vested on institutions so that they can exert pressure on the areas involved in the implementation of reform initiatives. Reform efforts should be adopted by the public service at large, not only by the Ministry of Public Service. At the same time, the role of the Services Commission should be revised to guarantee that it oversees the central HR decisions throughout the government, without adding any unnecessary bureaucratization to the decision process, while avoiding overlapping with the Ministry.

Another central issue that was addressed in previous diagnostic reports (Universalia, 2000; PSRC, 2003; MAT, 2004) is that proposed actions to improve the HRM system should be prioritized and assigned to an agency that must be clearly accountable for results. Another issue to take into account is that positive interactions with other ongoing reform initiatives should be maximized. The fact that there is an ambitious Financial Reform effort underway has to be used as a springboard from which to introduce improvements into the civil service system.

From the analysis of each specific subsystem, several recommendations can be made. First, the focus on strategic planning should be emphasized even further. Most of the weaknesses in several subsystems result from the fact that efforts to improve specific processes are isolated, i.e. not framed within a strategic plan. Second, it is central to develop performance management and incentive structures so that result-driven behavior is rewarded. This is the only way to make sure that the process oriented culture is gradually replaced by a focus on results. Third, HR Development needs to be aligned to strategic objectives. Moreover, the ongoing process to develop an HRD plan is a key step to working in that direction. Fourth, even though the Work Organization and Employment Management subsystems are reasonably developed, more flexible and efficient procedures should be introduced in order to avoid bureaucratization.
### VII. SUMMARY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Evaluator’s Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analysis of the Institutional Context</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functional Analysis of the Civil Service</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of the Human Resources Organization function</td>
<td>The Ministry of Public Service, Services Commission, Public Sector Reform Council have responsibilities over HR management in the public sector. There is some degree of overlapping in their roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analyzed Quantitative Indicators of the CSS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil service comprises around 12,000 officers. The central government bill accounts for 10% of GDP. There is a reasonable wage compression and civil service incentives. Average salaries are higher for public sector, but less competitive at managerial levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analysis by Subsystems</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Strategic planning at macro level is not layered down. Systems of financial control and accountability of the public service are weak. Salary expenditures represent heavy burden to public accounts. The IT infrastructure is not developed; there are serious limitations to accessing basic information. The HR component of information system is being developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Organization</td>
<td>Job classification and profile definition processes are rather formal, under an ambitious streamlining initiative. Job descriptions are periodically reviewed by the MPS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Management</td>
<td>Meritocratic tradition for recruitment is in process of being partially decentralized from Public Services Commission to MPS and line ministers. Guarantees against arbitrariness are effective, but do not operate for a category of temporary employees (open vote) that comprises around 2,000 jobs. Adequate mechanisms for induction, absenteeism control and mobility. Possibility of separation for bad performance or for economic reasons (infrequently used).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Management</td>
<td>Recurrent problems to implement initiatives to improve performance evaluation process. It remains difficult to define performance goals given the flaws in the strategic planning system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation Management</td>
<td>The salary strategy is dominated by budgetary focus. Reasonable wage compression and internal equity. Higher salaries in average for the public sector, but less competitive at higher levels. Incentives for good performers are established in legislation, but are not effectively used for that purpose. Non-monetary compensation is infrequent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Development Management</td>
<td>Careers include vertical and horizontal tracks. Advancement is based heavily on seniority and formal credentials. Training efforts are more oriented to individual preferences of public officers than to organizational needs. There is an ongoing initiative to establish a HRD strategy for Belize, including public and private sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human and Social Relations Management</td>
<td>There are not many initiatives focused on work climate and communication. Several instances of interaction between management and unions, with union representatives taking part in joint bodies that have responsibility in the design of HR policies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDICES

Appendix A Critical Points Valuation – Comparative Table:

See Appendices section.

Appendix B Summary – Comparative Table:

See Appendices section.

Appendix C. Report Technical Information

• **Report Dates**
  Diagnosis Date: July 2005

• **Consultants**
  Mercedes Iacoviello
  Assistants: Paula Iacoviello and Cecilia Pivetta.

• **Acknowledgements**

The consultant would like to emphasize the valuable help that was provided by the staff of the IDB country office in Belize, especially by Martha Mejía-Zampieri, Representative In-Charge, and Harold Arzu, Operations Specialist. At the Ministry of Public Service, Margaret Ventura, CEO, and Nuria Castellanos, Administrative Officer, organized a series of interviews with key informants, and facilitated a number of documents and publications that were central for the assessment of the Belizean civil service.

• **Information Sources**

**Interviews**

Meeting with Minister for the Public Service, Mr. José Coye.
  Wednesday, 1st June 2005 at 1:30 p.m. – Belize City. Participants:

  *Nuria Castellanos* Administrative Officer, Ministry of Public Service
  *Harold Arzu* IDB Office in Belize

Meeting with the Human Resource Development Committee.
  Thursday, 2nd June 2005 from 9:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. – Ministry of the Public Service, Belmopan. Participants:

  *Marian Mc Nabb* CEO, Ministry of Education, Chair of the HDR Committee
  *Mary Ann Sutherland* Administrative Officer, Public Sector Union
  *Hugh O Brien* CEO, Ministry of National Development
  *Margaret Ventura* CEO, Ministry of Public Service
  *Consuelo Waight* External Consultant

Meeting with officials from the Office of the Services Commission.
  Thursday, 2nd June 2005 from 1:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. Office of the Services Commission, Belmopan

  *Justin Palacios* Director of the Public Service Commission
  *Charles Hyde* Chairman of the Public Service Commission

Meeting with the Joint Staff Relations Council.
  Thursday, 2nd June 2005 from 3:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.
  Ministry of the Public Service, Belmopan.

  *Mary Ann Sutherland* Administrative Officer, Public Sector Union
  *Dylan Reneau* President, Public Sector Union
  *Carla Burnett* Ministry of Finance
  *Margaret Ventura* CEO, Ministry of Public Service
Meeting with the Public Sector Union President, Mr. Dylan Reneau.
   Friday, 3rd June 2005 from 1 p.m. from 2 p.m., Ministry of the Public Service, Belmopan.

Meeting with the Coordinator of the Public Sector Reform Council, Mrs. Diana Locke.
   Friday, 3rd June 2005 from 2 p.m. to 3 p.m., Ministry of the Public Service, Belmopan.

Workshop-Institutional Assessment of Civil Service Systems-Case: Belize.
   Friday, 3rd June 2005 from 10 a.m. to 12:30 a.m., Ministry of the Public Service, Belmopan.

Mary Ann Sutherland Administrative Officer, Public Sector Union
Dylan Reneau President, Public Sector Union
Margaret Ventura CEO, Ministry of Public Service
Consuelo Waight External Consultant
Marian Mc Nabb CEO, Ministry of Education. Chair of the HDR Committee
Diana Locke Coordinator, Public Sector Reform Council

Documents


ILO (1994). Case No 1775, Queja contra el Gobierno de Belice presentada por el Sindicato del Servicio Público de Belice (PSUB) http://www.oit.org.pe/sindi/casos/bel/bel199401.html


Legislation

http://www.belizelaw.org/lawadmin/index.html


Prevention of Corruption in Public Life Act, Chapter 12, revised edition 2000, showing the law as at 31st December, 2000.


# Websites

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# List of Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Constitution of Belize</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Common Market</td>
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<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>EAP</td>
<td>Employee Assistance Program</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>HR</td>
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<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Service</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Performance Appraisal</td>
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<td>PSReg</td>
<td>Public Service Regulations</td>
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<td>PUP</td>
<td>People’s United Party</td>
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<td>SCReg</td>
<td>Services Commissions Regulations</td>
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<td>UDP</td>
<td>United Democratic Party</td>
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Main Conclusions

The Civil Service System (CSS) in Jamaica is in transition. However, despite the significant changes affecting CSS, the Public Employment and Human Resources Management (HRM) systems provide a stabilizing influence for the central Government and, by implication, aid in governance. The Government of Jamaica’s commitment to develop an efficient CSS is evident from the imminent or ongoing modernization efforts made—a reform agenda, which is juxtaposed to a CSS that can be characterized as “fragmented, operating within a tradition of inherited hierarchical structures, and nodes for centralized decision-making.”

Against a background of stakeholders’ consensus regarding a reform direction linked to cost containment some elements of the legal framework—i.e. Staff Orders—for the CSS are being revised with the intention of “liberalizing the management of human resources to facilitate less central management” (Testimonial).

The constituent subsystems of the CSS are also being reformed in order to give HRM a strategic direction. Specifically, in order to develop the institutional framework for HR Planning, a census of public sector employees, a core building block for the HR Planning subsystem, is envisaged.

The Performance Management subsystem has been formalized through a Performance Management Appraisal System (PMAS) and introduced in five pilot ministries. HR personnel are being trained in the other agencies, in preparation for introducing PMAS. Concurrently, the Work Organization subsystem is being reformed leading to the “revision of all job descriptions to make them more output-focused” (Testimonial). The Professional Development Management subsystem is soon to be reformed by incorporating a policy framework and an analysis of the impact of training. These reform initiatives collectively constitute the bases for developing an integrated HRM system.

The Employment Management subsystem evidences a void in induction. In turn, the Compensation Management subsystem does not address the inclusion of non-monetary benefits in a structured way. The institutionalization of these benefits is likely to have merit, particularly in an ethos of cost containment. While modernization moves swiftly, this initiative places new demands on internal relationships in the CSS as well as on relationships with external stakeholders. The capacity to assess the organizational climate is desirable.
In keeping with current HR practice, an integrated system driven by a strategy for HR and underpinned by HR planning is required so as to optimize human resources. In Jamaica, there is no integrated HRM system in place. However, if the current drive to improve CSS efficiency is sustained together with the systematization of the other HR subsystems, namely Employment Management, Compensation Management and Human and Social Relations Management, the integration process is likely to be facilitated.

Finally, with regard to the organization of this report, it should be pointed out that this chapter builds upon the author’s 2004 report to the Inter-American Development Bank entitled “Short Form for Institutional Assessment of CSS: Case of Jamaica,” which basically offered an overview of the CSS in the country at that time. The present paper incorporates other sections relating to the country’s institutional context, its background and legal framework. In addition, the analysis of each of the seven HRM subsystems has been further enlarged to focus more sharply on each of the ninety-three critical points for assessing CSS. In general, this revised work conforms to the original methodological framework provided by Longo, F. (2002). To this end, interviews were conducted in June 2007 with appropriate persons having the institutional memory of the CSS in 2004. Other elements of the original report were retained, namely the “indices for the elaboration of the CSS,” the internal and external environments, the critical points valuation, the summary table of preceding sections, and the conclusions of the diagnosis.

II. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

The Government of Jamaica is based on the Westminster-Whitehall (WW) politico-administrative model, from which a parliamentary political system derives, pursuant to which the Head of Government is the Prime Minister and the Governor-General is the representative of the Head of State, Queen Elizabeth II of England.

A central tenet of this model is a politically neutral civil service. While the imported WW model is not a mirror image of its “parent,” there are efforts by the central civil service to avoid arbitrariness in employment management practices. These efforts are buttressed by a Public Service Commission with related responsibilities as well as by a recent innovation, the PMAS: select ministries with delegated authority for employment management are expected to observe the required principle of merit.

Each ministry is presided over by a permanent secretary, who is both the administrative head of the agency and the accounting officer, with responsibility for reporting to Parliament when there are instances of mal-administration or improper spending. Permanent appointments are made by permanent secretaries in agencies with delegated authority for the Employment Management function. In other words, in select agencies, permanent secretaries have delegated authority for recruitment, selection, promotion, mobility and termination.

In addition to the influence of historical antecedents, the CSS is also affected by other contextual elements, including economic and social factors. Critical to the achievement of the Government’s mandate for economic growth is the need for improving the optimization of the cadre of human resources as well as introducing attitudinal and structural changes, among others.

The country’s policy mandates have shifted from its old practice of leading and controlling the economic activity since, even though the Government has not completely relinquished its leadership role in the economy, it also recognizes the critical role of the private sector in sustaining economic growth. The Government’s role is to facilitate the growth process, with the support of the civil service.

Jamaica’s economic growth path was adversely affected by the rise in the world oil prices and by a drop in foreign inflows. In its effort to regain economic stability, the country resorted to borrowing from international lending agencies.
Reliance on borrowing and conformance to certain structural adjustment loan program conditionalities led to a reduction in social programs, downsizing of the public sector and an existing debt burden of significant proportions. According to the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) (2002:6), debt servicing—the largest component of government expenditure—was expected to amount to J$115.7 billion in 2001.

In February 2004, the Government of Jamaica and the Jamaica Confederation of Trade Unions arrived at a Memorandum of Understanding for the Public Sector (MOU). As indicated in the MOU signed on February 17 2004, the parties or partners, recognizing that Government faces a “high debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio, a large fiscal deficit, low economic growth and low employment creation” agreed to “pursue the appropriate macro-economic policies which provide a stable economic environment and encourage GDP growth and employment creation” (ibid). The partners also agreed on a policy of wage restraint in the public sector for the period April 1, 2004 – March 31, 2006 (ibid:2), as a “general policy of employment constraint” (ibid:4) as well as expenditure restraint (ibid:5). Provision was made to deal with shortfalls in critical occupational categories, including teachers, health sector employees, and members of the security forces. The partners also committed to the “development of the public sector that is modern, efficient, and of the optimum size, properly equipped and suitably rewarded” (ibid: 6).

The Cabinet Office was designated with the responsibility for preparing a training plan that would facilitate the preparation of the “public sector workforce for the needs of a modern labour market” (ibid:7).

**Background**

Public sector entities include public enterprises, local authorities, executive agencies, a network of parastatals, statutory bodies and the central civil service. The total public sector staff complement is 97,434 while the civil service employs 32,067 persons (MoFP: Public Service Establishments Division, July 24, 2002).

Over time, the civil service has been characterized as large and centralized bureaucracies. Specifically, persistent concerns relate to the Government’s size and capacity, along with its lack of customer-centered orientation and of transparency (Isaacs 2002:18). Arguably, these may very well be exaggerated statements. What is apparent is that there is room for improvement in the way in which the Government functions (ibid). In 2002, some of these concerns were reiterated by the Cabinet Secretary, who asserted that “traditionally, our public services have been designed for the convenience of the people who work in them, rather than for the people they are meant to serve. Even where performance standards have been set, they have been set for management purposes, rather than reflecting the real need of the customers.”

Responses to the complaints have taken shape in efforts to change the organization of the HRM function: “improve models of governance through changing the rules by which public sector organizations are governed.” There is also emphasis on improving “the structure and staffing of public sector organizations, and the processes within the organizations” (21st Century Government Service – Decade of Excellence: Public Sector Modernization – Vision and Strategy 2002–2012, Cabinet Office; September 2002:3).

The CSS reform efforts undertaken since the country’s independence in 1962 evidence several landmarks, which are mentioned below.

Reforms in the Jamaican Civil Service were formalized under the Administrative Reform Programme (ARP I) in 1965. ARP I aimed at rationalizing HRM. In 1973, the Ministry of the Public Service (MPS) was created, with responsibility for developing systems for managing compensation, training and employee relations—i.e. industrial relations.

The Public Service Commission, established in the pre-independence period, is responsible for
elements of employment management, namely: recruitment, selection, mobility and termination. The Office of the Services Commissions (OSC), headed by the Chief Personnel Officer (CPO), provides administrative support for the PSC. In the late 1980s, the MPS, under the aegis of ARP II, added the development and implementation of a HR Planning system to its responsibilities. Various training institutions dedicated to the training of civil servants were also established. ARP II also included a model for improving HRM, namely: delegations to line agencies.

In the 1990s, the MPS was subsumed by the Ministry of Finance and Planning and its responsibilities were assumed by the Cabinet Office. A comprehensive reform agenda was devised in order to improve the legal framework for the CSS, to address elements such as professionalism, productivity and pay of public servants, and to introduce systems of accountability, improved customer service and a new organizational form—decentralization.

Legal Framework

The legal framework is constituted by a collective of law, acts and regulations, namely: the Public Service Law, Public Service Regulations (1961), the Staff Orders for the Public Service (1976), the Civil Service Establishment Act and the Pensions Act. There are three Services Commissions: the Police Service, the Judicial Service Commission and the Public Service Commission or PSC (the latter with its own constitutional provisions and on which we will focus our attention).

The PSC Law gives overall responsibility for employment to the Commission. “The PSC is appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. Members are appointed for three years and may be removed on the grounds of ill health, resignation or if they run foul of the law. There is a caveat that members of the PSC should not hold other public office while a member of the PSC” (Testimonial).

The Public Service Regulations (1961) provide criteria for appointment. These regulations and the Staff Orders “govern the conduct of public servants, setting out how they should undertake activities in an honest and accountable manner. The Regulations and Staff Orders are both in the process of review to bring them in line with effective modern principles and practices” (Cabinet Office 2002:20).

The Civil Service Establishment Act controls the size of the central government. Positions on the establishment are permanent in nature. “Temporary appointments are generally made in posts where incumbents are on vacation or for probationary purposes” (Testimonial). “Contract officers are appointees in permanent posts; dependent on the level of post and age of the individual, these appointees are often recalled pensioners” (Testimonial). The intent of the Establishment Act (MoFP 2002:33) is to contain the size of the central civil service to the level achieved after the downsizing exercise in 1992.

The Pensions Act governs the payment of pension to employees (on the establishment). The MoFP is responsible for the administration of both the Civil Service Establishment Act and the Pensions Act. “Other circulars and guidelines issued by the Cabinet Office also guide the operations of the central civil service. The Cabinet Office has a monitoring and standard-setting role” (Testimonial).

The Corruption Prevention Act sets the provisions for eliminating corruption and addresses the role of integrity in public life, specifically targeting public officers.

III. ANALYSIS OF HRM SUBSYSTEMS

The analysis of the HR subsystems presented in this section follows the ninety-three critical points established by the methodology used in this study (Longo 2002), which are listed with their corresponding valuation in Appendix A. For each subsection, the corresponding critical points are indicated between parentheses, and
a brief introduction is provided about the HR decisions and practices associated with each subsystem. In keeping with Longo’s framework, the analysis emphasizes the “existence and integrity of each of the HRM areas and processes, and the fulfillment of their basic purposes; the major connections with the other HRM subsystems, and the way each subsystem behaves in relation to the critical points, which enable the analyst to prove its effectiveness and quality” (Longo, F. 2002:43).

**Human Resources Planning**

The HR planning constitutes the front door to the HRM system, and facilitates the comparison of qualitative and quantitative needs of human resources with its existing availability of internal resources in order to establish the HR gaps and the possible strategies to deal with them (Longo, 2002). This subsystem is the foundation of an integrated system of human resource management “that contributes to ensuring strategic coherence in all human resource management policies and practices by linking them with organizational priorities” (ibid::17).

**System Integrity and Existence (Critical Point 1)**

The existing Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS) is a prototype rather than a production model. A census of public sector employees, a core building block for planning purposes, is envisaged so as to develop the institutional framework needed for HR planning. This is likely to take place “in January 2005” (Testimonial). “The HRM user requirements/software specification draft has been completed with a view to determining consistent and accurate user requirements in the HRM of the GOJ” (PSRU July 16th, 2004:12 Public Sector Reform Unit, Cabinet Office—Annual Report 2003–2004). The Government of Jamaica, recognizing the limitations of the existing HRMIS in terms of its capacity to proactively facilitate planning is currently in the process of acquiring relevant software to “replace HRMIS within the 2004 financial year” (Testimonial).

The formalization of this subsystem is critical even in an organizational environment that is characterized by “tighter management of the wage bill and a freeze on all categories of total employment,” particularly as there is a “Post-Operation Committee to deal with exceptions to the freeze” (Testimonial).

**Strategic Coherence (2–3)**

In the absence of an overarching HR planning framework, the assessment of HR needs is driven by corporate plans and the budget exercise. This makes strategic coherence of HRM policies and practices problematic.

The MOU provides for a measure of financial control, but there is room to employ new recruits if the need arises in critical occupational categories. The rationalization of roles and functions is framed within the planning exercise, while the degree of match is limited to the extent of the strictures of the MOU.

**Basic Information (4)**

The census of public sector employees, which is integral to developing an information system to facilitate managerial decision-making, is reportedly imminent.

**Effectiveness (5–9)**

Bearing in mind that this subsystem is in transition and that relevant instruments are being developed, and given the existence of the MOU, staff or human resources cannot be correctly distributed among agencies nor can their distribution be optimized. In some instances, staff members indicated that their duties have expanded or they have taken on additional tasks. The additional tasks have sometimes proved to be onerous (Testimonials summarized).

**Administration (10–11)**

To the extent that managers engage in corporate planning exercises, they do have a voice in determining, even if only for indicative purposes, the
HR and other resources requirements of their agencies. Managers’ participation in the formulation and implementation of meaningful HRP forecasts is, to a certain extent, conditional on the establishment of HRMIS, which is a production model at the central level.

**Work Organization**

The Work Organization function establishes and specifies the contents of the tasks for each job and the characteristics of the people who will carry them out. It includes both the description of the activities, functions, responsibilities and goals assigned to each position (job description) and the definition of the competencies, skills and attitudes deemed key for the successful performance of each job holder (profile definition) (Longo 2002).

**Existence and Integrity of the Subsystem (12)**

The corporate planning framework provides, to some extent, a basis for deciding activities, functions and responsibilities. The PMAS specifically links the corporate/strategic planning processes (Civil Service of Jamaica – PMAS Guideline System and Reference Manual: Version 1, July 2004:2, Office of the Cabinet). In other words, the pilot agencies that have introduced PMAS are required to link their corporate plans with the Government’s priorities/ key objectives.

**Technical Quality and Flexibility (13–17)**

While a full-blown job evaluation was not done recently, job descriptions accurately reflect all the core elements, namely: job title, functions, responsibilities and competencies. Specifically, job descriptions also include “purpose of job,” “key output/deliverables,” “performance criteria,” “key competencies, “core competencies” and “dimensions, authorities and decision-making.” Functions are clearly defined and employees know what is expected of them. This is particularly true in the pilot agencies that have introduced performance management.

Positive developments are taking place within this subsystem as “all job descriptions are being revised to resolve an inherent weakness, namely: jobs are activity-oriented rather than output-oriented” (Testimonial, partially paraphrased). This exercise is being undertaken under the aegis of the Cabinet Office where the expertise for job description writing now resides. The linkages between effective job performance and job descriptions that incorporate personal profiles are recognized, and the revision exercise is precisely an attempt to address this. The revision exercise also aims at strengthening the interconnections between the Work Organization subsystem and the Professional Development Management and Performance Management subsystems (Testimonial paraphrased).

**Quality of Profiles Definition (18–21)**

A team of consultants developed a competency framework or template of twenty six core competencies, while specific agencies define technical competencies (Testimonial, summarized). Core competencies include oral communication, written communication, customer and quality focus, analytical thinking, problem solving, decision-making and technical skills, among others. Competency levels as well as attributes describing expected behaviors are stipulated and these requirements are being introduced in the pilot agencies for PMAS.

**Administration (22–23)**

Job descriptions are reviewed periodically, in tandem with job evaluation or re-organization exercises.

**Employment Management**

This subsystem ideally focuses on the policies, practices and procedures concerning an individual’s recruitment, selection, induction, mobility and separation from an organization. It is desirable that these activities and the policy frame-
work that guide them show transparency, equity and merit.

**Equal Opportunity and Merit (24–27)**

In the central civil service, emphasis is placed on maintaining professionalism and merit. The Office of the Services Commissions “remains impartial, retains its monitoring/audit function for HRM and continues its role as an appellate body” (PSRU July 16th 2004:3). Recruitment for all positions is open by law to all candidates who meet the requirements. A practice of recent vintage is to advertise in the press all senior posts including those of permanent secretaries and chief executive officers, who head executive agencies.

“Agencies with delegations advertise internally and among like agencies for all other posts. In ministries with delegated authority for recruitment, there are promotions committees that examine applicants, short list them and take decisions” (Testimonial).

Recruitment remains competitive and the selection committees generally reflect independence, technical competence and professionalism; there are established professional and technical criteria that recruits are expected to satisfy. The interconnection between this subsystem and the Work Organization subsystem is evident.

“Permanent secretaries have authority, under MoFP regulations, to appoint consultants. There has been a reduction in the number of political appointees, as advisors/consultants have now reverted to substantive position holders. The vision is to employ “political advisors,” short-term traditional consultants, as well as “specialist advisors” under the authority of the permanent secretary. The roles of designated political advisors will be clearly defined and guidelines for employment elaborated” (Testimonial, comments reportedly conform to the Report on Advisors/Consultants to Government July 2003). “Currently there are thirty-two posts of executive and special assistants to ministers. Each of the sixteen ministers is allowed to operate a total of two posts; executive assistants help ministers in relation to their portfolio activities while special assistants do administrative work /constituency activities” (Testimonial).

“Prospective employees are not generally discriminated against on the basis of gender, ethnicity, or on cultural grounds. There are, however, sometimes delays in finalizing recruitment procedures” (Testimonial).

**Recruitment and Selection Quality (28–32)**

“Jobs are generally widely advertised for senior positions (for the senior executive group), the response rate is good and the posts are generally filled. It is, however, difficult to attract persons to fill positions in the information technology and planning fields, which are highly competitive and existing salaries are an apparent disincentive” (Testimonial, paraphrased).

Selections are generally based on skills profiles. Selection at the CEO level relies on the “assessment centre methodology” and interviews conducted by the PSC. The PSC generally acts independently and with professionalism.

**Induction Quality (33–34)**

There is a void in terms of the existence of an induction process/program. The practice is that the Cabinet Secretary usually meets with new permanent secretaries. At the entry level for the administrative, technical and professional cadres, graduates participate, from time to time and after having been on the job between six months and two years, in a “Graduate Entry Programme”. But “the letter of appointment of a new recruit usually advises him/her to familiarize him or herself with the Staff Orders and the Public Service Regulations” (Testimonial).

**Mobility (35)**

“Usually on the advice of an agency (ministry or department), the PSC can act, transfer or redeploy an employee. Under delegation of authority, agencies may decide on transfers among the ‘delegated’ agencies. Individuals may also apply for transfers or appeal against transfers” (Testimonial).
Absenteeism and Discipline (36–37)

Absenteeism indices are not maintained. Supervisors working with their agency’s HR section may resort to counseling, reprimand or giving assistance. “In practice, chronic absenteeism may lead to retirement in the public interest” (Testimonial).

Disciplinary procedures are set out in the Public Service Regulations, but in the interest of due process there are sometimes delays in the resolution of issues. “Decisions made on the basis of these procedures are rarely challenged successfully” (Testimonial). Arguably, there is a perceived need to strengthen the procedure relating to the enforcement of discipline to facilitate timeliness and improve the perception of equity.

Separation (38–41)

Generally, only ministers’ advisors or consultants leave their offices when there is a change in the administration. Dismissals/terminations follow set disciplinary procedures: when there is “abolition of office or when there is reorganization and posts are deleted, then individuals are retired on the ground of abolition of office if a similar position cannot be found elsewhere, or on the grounds of reorganization” (Testimonial).

“Persons are not disciplined for poor performance or incapacity; they are generally terminated. In exceptional cases where poor performance is due to personal problems termination is not considered to be the appropriate response” (Testimonial).

Performance Management

This subsystem provides guidelines that are based on organizational goals, against which performance is measured. A performance appraisal instrument that facilitates feedback to employees regarding their performance and that provides them with a benchmark to engage in professional development is also integral to this subsystem.

Performance Planning and Follow-up (43–45)

This subsystem is in transition, evidencing positive developments, such as the development of a performance management policy and the introduction of a Performance Management and Appraisal System (PMAS). Since July 2003, six pilot agencies—the Ministry of Finance, Office of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Office, Office of the Services Commissions, Ministry of Transport and Works and the Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Works—have introduced the PMAS. “All other ministries will ‘come on stream’ in April 2005” (Testimonial).

This subsystem is formalized at the permanent secretary level and in six of sixteen ministries permanent secretaries are assessed annually on the basis of established criteria outlined in their performance contract. “The Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Works is no longer a pilot agency effective April 2004” (Testimonial).

The process of specifying performance guidelines to employees is in progress in five pilot agencies. Individual work plans linked to the agencies’ corporate/strategic plans and to division/unit plans are being developed.

Training in performance management is being carried out service-wide in support of the formalization of this subsystem. “The Cabinet Office trained individuals in pilot agencies to prepare work plans. Work plans stipulate output, standards and competencies. Performance standards are specific and are developed by the employee and his or her supervisor” (Testimonial). Performance is to be rated against standards, while pay is now linked to performance in the pilot agencies.

The perception is that “people feel that the PMAS can work and will reduce subjectivity inherent in performance appraisal” (Testimonial), suggesting some level of trust in PMAS.

Administration (49)

It is evident that while managers may trust PMAS there is a perception that “managers have some
level of discomfort with their new role” (Testimonial). Given the fact that the effectiveness of PMAS depends on managers dedicating significant amounts of time to the task of performance planning, standard setting, providing continuous feedback, among other aspects, it is understandable that the process of reorientation to assume a relatively new role will take time.

There is no basis for assessing the timeliness with which managers complete performance appraisal forms, bearing in mind that PMAS is a recent initiative.

**Compensation Management**

This subsystem balances employees’ contributions and rewards. The monetary and non-monetary benefits offered by the organization to its employees ideally compensates them equitably for their contribution to achieving the organization’s objectives vis-à-vis others performing similar tasks within and outside the organization. This subsystem should be connected with the Work Organization and Performance Management subsystems.

**Compensation Strategy, Internal and External Equity (50–57)**

While the wage structure and payment policies generally follow a set of priorities and objectives, there is some evidence of reactivity attributable to a number of factors, namely: “relative job worth, wage negotiation/bargaining, fiscal policy—the MOU that freezes wages, the market value of the job that affects some categories, including legal (lawyers) and medical occupational groups—and pay linked to performance” (Testimonial paraphrased).

Salaries are considered to be competitive at lower and middle levels but not at top levels. This is reflected in the compression measure. Vertical wage compression of salaries is a measure of the difference between the total pay received by employees at the top wage level and those at the lowest level of the wage scale. The ratios calculated, 1:15.3 and 1:16.4, were examined against the range 1:7 and 1:20. Overall, the ratios are within the range and suggest that there is relative internal equity in the compensation structure.

In an effort to retain staff and to provide a decent living wage as well as internal equity, the GoJ has brought salaries up to 40% of market.

In terms of external equity, the intent is to bring salaries to 80% of market, but this is constrained by fiscal policy, specifically the MOU.

**Effectiveness of Compensation Policies and Wages Administration (58)**

While compensation aims to attract and motivate, this is not necessarily a perception shared by all staff members. There is the view that this perception is likely to change when the PMAS is institutionalized service-wide. “The more we move toward performance-linked pay, the more employees will appreciate the equity in the pay structure” (Testimonial). The formalization of PMAS will also provide the information for variable payments.

**Wages Administration (59–61)**

No abusive practices in wage decisions are evident in the central government. The MOU guides the transparency of the pay regime. While the wage range appears to be reasonable, wage costs are arguably excessive in the health sector “which contributes to 18.37% of the current wage bill” (Ministry of Finance, undated, “Contribution of Sectors to Wage Bill 2003/04”). Another source asserts that excessive salaries in health result from “the level of overtime paid to persons in that occupational category” (Testimonial).

As for equity and transparency, persons on fixed-term contract, for example permanent secretaries, are all paid the same salary. “Permanent Secretaries recruited from outside the civil service are on fixed contract” (Testimonial).

**Other Benefits (62–64)**

In addition to wages and non-contributory pensions, employees receive other benefits, including
contributory health schemes and transportation allowances. Although pension is not considered adequate and the payment of this benefit is reportedly subject to long delays, it is protected by law.

Longtime service awards are the norm whereas non-monetary benefits are not institutionalized. Contemporary HR practice has shown that non-monetary incentives serve not only to recognize and reward but to motivate employees as well. Consideration may be given to introducing these benefits service-wide.

Congruence has been found between this subsystem and the Work Organization subsystem.

**Development Management**

This subsystem focuses on the organization’s efforts to promote staff development and learning. These efforts are framed within defined “career paths that match the organization’s needs with the individual profile” (Longo 2002:34). The effectiveness of this subsystem is largely dependent on the extent to which appropriate career, promotion and training policies are adopted.

**Effectiveness of Promotion Policies and Career Design Quality (65–70)**

There is a vision of career paths, but this has minimal impact, with the exception of some occupational categories in the fields of law and medicine. Performance is the main criteria for promotion and, in general, organizations manage the process flexibly, particularly those agencies with delegated authority for the employment function.

Alternatives to hierarchical promotions are not formalized, but there are opportunities for horizontal promotions and the practice bears this out. Indeed, professional and technical personnel move into top management/corporate management levels. Instances may be cited where engineers, health professionals and lawyers were promoted to positions of permanent secretaries or chief executive officers.

**Individual and Collective Learning Management (71–76)**

Reportedly, it is difficult to say whether training is adequate. People who are specifically targeted under the current modernization (reform) program are likely to receive adequate training. Training programs, under the aegis of the Cabinet Office, were targeted to individuals working in the following areas: information technology, human resource management and corporate planning.

But training offerings may not be adequate in general, as most requests are focused on individual development needs rather than on satisfying the organizational needs or objectives. Nevertheless, it is felt that training improves the capacity of the organization to solve problems as well as enhances the mobility of trainees.

The current priority lies in the development of a training policy and plan to facilitate central government employees’ professional development. The plan is required under the terms of the MOU (February 16th, 2004–2006), according to which “a training plan must be provided by the Government to the partners—the Jamaica Confederation of Trade Unions (JCTU)—within twelve months of signing the MOU” (MOU 2004: 7).

Instruments for training needs analysis, training needs assessment, evaluation and impact evaluation were developed to facilitate training management and development efforts. Agencies with delegations are empowered to conduct training needs analyses and impact assessments. The needs analysis instrument was “tested” in the Ministry of Finance: in 2003–2004, questionnaires were sent in an effort to secure a sense of the training needs of the civil service. However, the response rate was poor. What was evident was the need to train HR personnel to conduct needs analysis so as to be able to identify the skills needed in a modernizing ethos.

There is a vision to conduct needs analysis service-wide. The products of this survey will, in all likelihood, inform the training plan (Testimonial paraphrased).
There is an apparent link between this subsystem and the Employment Management subsystem, although this is constrained by current limitations on promotion and employment opportunities. There is also a career planning/succession planning deficit.

The integrity of this subsystem will be enhanced with the implementation of the training needs analysis, the development of a training plan and the evaluation of investments in training.

**Human and Social Relations Management**

This subsystem focuses on the relations between the organization and its employees. Emphasis is placed on the extent to which the organization evaluates its work climate and adequately addresses labor relations issues as well as institutionalizes adequate social policies.

**Work Climate (77–78)**

There are no specific instruments for evaluating the organizational climate. “Human and social relations management in the CSS in Jamaica is perceived as fulfilling its purpose when managers encourage a culture of concern. Managers require personal competencies to do this. Innovative approaches to managing the organizational climate that encourage staff and improve their satisfaction sometimes clash with the traditional civil service culture that tends not to encourage the use of specific communication instruments that reinforce employees’ involvement and feelings of being valued” (Testimonial).

In the field of social policy-making, the Public Sector Assistance Program constitutes a best practice and is preeminent among existing social policies and practices that provide benefits and assistance to central government employees.

**Communication Effectiveness (79–81)**

The OSC in its HRM auditing capacity, the Staff Associations and Unions and the shift from a “personnel culture” to HRM collectively contribute to providing an informal assessment of the work climate in the absence of formalized techniques. (Isaacs 2002:36)

**Labor Relations Balance and Quality (82–85)**

The MOU, to which the Government of Jamaica and the Unions representing central government employees are signatories, is an evidence of an approach to labor relations management that reflects accommodation. It has been argued that “since the MOU, labor relations have not been adversarial” (Testimonial).

MoFP’s Industrial Relations Unit hosts workshops on industrial relations with HR practitioners from the central government, which are held bi-annually for the purpose of enhancing good industrial relations practices. “Resource persons include union officials, academics and in-house personnel” (Testimonial).

**Labor Conflict Management (86–88)**

Readily resolved conflicts focus on salaries, allowances, training issues, new initiatives in training, non-monetary benefits (for example, the transportation service for civil servants arose from a union agreement), improved conditions of service, improvements in the work environment. Instead, conflicts relating to job evaluations usually prove difficult to resolve, arguably “because of the unions’ perception in terms of what value to place on jobs” (Testimonial).

The MOU is considered to be an effective instrument for resolving conflict. Under the purview of the MOU there is a monitoring committee comprised of both union leaders and MoFP officials, thus reinforcing the effectiveness of the mechanism.

**Social Policies Management (88–89)**

Staff Orders 2004 specify health and safety requirements for the central civil service and a policy-making role for the agency with responsibility for the public service. Moreover, they stipulate a role for permanent secretaries and heads of departments to ensure the implementation of...
related policies, by providing a “working environment, which is safe, environmentally friendly and accessible to persons who might be physically challenged” (2004:59) and by designating a senior member of management with responsibility for related matters. “These orders need to be fleshed out” (Testimonial).

Social care and benefits received by civil servants are considered to be on par with existing benefits in the private sector. Civil servants are eligible for a range of leave facilities, including sick, departmental, vacation, maternity, no-pay leave as well as pension benefits. There is the view that “the old leave regime (before 2004) was arguably more generous than the private sector practices existing then” (Testimonial).

“A pensions working group examined existing pension’s policy, legislation, schemes and administrative operations in the public sector to make recommendations for changes in the systems. These changes are to optimize benefits to employees, ensure consistency and equity within the sector, and simplify and modernize administration of the schemes for greater timeliness and efficiency in payments. A White Paper on the reform of the Public Sector Pension System is scheduled to be tabled early in the financial year 2004/2005” (Public Sector Reform Unit, Cabinet Office July 16, 2004:8).

The Organization of the HR Function

This function analyzes the extent to which HRM responsibilities are unified or fragmented as well as the locus of decision-making concerning personnel, i.e. whether relevant decisions are centralized or decentralized.

The PSC, the Cabinet Office and the MoFP are key actors among the central agencies responsible for the CSS. Save for these agencies that have delegated authority, managers in line agencies have a limited decision-making role relative to HRM. The perception is that these central agencies add value.

Symbolic Valuation of the Human Resources Subsystems

The following chart shows a graphic representation of the level of development of each of the subsystems previously analyzed.
HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEMS

STRATEGY

Planning [+/-]

- Work Organization
  - Job description
  - Profiles definition
  [+]

- Employment Management
  - Recruitment
  - Mobility
  - Separation
  [+]

- Performance Management
  - Planning
  - Evaluation
  [+/-]

- Compensation Management
  - Monetary and non-monetary payment

- Development Management
  - Career and promotion
  - Individual and collective learning

Human and Social Relations Management

[+/-]

- Work Climate
- Labor Relations
- Social Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>The subsystem is fully developed or at a maturing stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[+ ]</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>There are still aspects to develop, but the tendency is positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[+]</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>The subsystem is very weak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


IV. INDICATORS

IV.1. Quantitative Indicators

1. Number of Political Appointments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of political appointments</th>
<th>32</th>
<th>PSRU, Cabinet Office (July 2004)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of positions for the civilian central Government</td>
<td>32,067</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance (August 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political appointments rate</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentage of politically designated positions is negligible, indicating a professional, merit-based civil service. The number of posts for designated “political advisors” has not yet been established.

Fiscal Weight of Public Employment

2. Central Government Wage Bill/Gross Domestic Product

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central government wage bill (in million dollars)</th>
<th>886.2</th>
<th>Ministry of Finance (August 2004) (59,079 Million JMD x 0.016)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (in million dollars)</td>
<td>6,548.6</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance (August 2004) (436,573 Million JMD x 0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government wage bill/Gross Domestic Product</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is a measure of the extent to which the cost of public employment is a burden on the economy. The wage bill excludes training grants and non-contributory pensions. This indicator is within the range using the World Bank comparator of 5–25%.

Civil Service Incentives

3. Vertical Wage Compression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Higher salary of civilian central Government (in dollars)</th>
<th>58,860</th>
<th>Total pay received by employees at the top wage level 3,924,000 JMD x 0.016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II. Lower salary of civilian central Government (in dollars)</td>
<td>3,588</td>
<td>Total pay received by employees at the lowest wage level (239,200 JMD x 0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/II. Vertical wage compression</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ratios calculated were examined against the range 1:7 and 1:20. Overall the ratios are within the range and suggest that there is relative internal equity in the compensation structure.

Civil Service Incentives

4. Average Central Government Wage/Per Capita GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Average central government wage (in dollars)</th>
<th>Not available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II. Per capita GDP by month (in dollars)</td>
<td>114.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average central government wage/Per capita GDP</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 All figures expressed in US Dollars. 1JMD = 0.0150 US Dollars (Source: www.xe.com Universal Currency Converter)
(continued)

5. Average Central Government Wage/Average Private Sector Wage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Average central government wage (in dollars)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Average private sector wage</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average central government wage/Average private sector wage</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civil Service Employment Figures
6. Total Number of Central Government Employees/Total Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Total number of central government employees</td>
<td>32,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Total Population</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of central government employees/Total population</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Central Government Expenditure (excluding pensions and debt service)/Total Number of Central Government Employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Central government expenditure (in million dollars)</td>
<td>886.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Total number of central government employees</td>
<td>32,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/II. Central government expenditure (excluding pensions and debt service)/Total number of central government employees (in dollars)</td>
<td>27,635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV.2 Indices for the Evaluation of the Civil Service System

Table of Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Index value (scale: 0–20)</th>
<th>Scale Percentage</th>
<th>Sub-Index</th>
<th>Sub-index value (scale: 0–10)</th>
<th>Scale Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(E) Efficiency</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>(STC) Strategic Coherence</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M) Merit</td>
<td>14.92</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>(DC) Directive Consistency</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SC) Structural Consistency</td>
<td>11.49</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>(CP) Consistency of Processes</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(FC) Functional Capacity</td>
<td>11.58</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>(COM) Competency</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CI) Integrating Capacity</td>
<td>11.65</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>(IE) Incentive Effectiveness</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(FL) Flexibility</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elaboration of the Indices

The indices and sub-indices listed above were constructed on the basis of the analysis of 93 critical points that reflect key elements of HRM subsystems and of the comparability of the CSS in Jamaica. Appendix A lists the valuation of such critical points and their corresponding number to which these values relate.

Efficiency: [10]

The Efficiency index, linked to 13 critical points, measures the degree of optimization of the investment in human capital identified in the CSS of Jamaica, in particular the capacity of the institutional framework for planning to proactively facilitate accurate and timely forecasts of HR requirements. This index also values the alignment of the CSS with the scale of fiscal policy and its reference markets. Specifically, the index is interconnected to the fiscal weight of public employment relative to the state of the economy, to the evidence of evaluations of costs and benefits of training, to non-monetary benefits, the adequacy of pensions and social care benefits. A number of these elements require further development.

Merit: [14.92]

This index assesses the extent to which policies and practices incorporate professional criteria. Employment and wage decisions do not generally reflect nepotistic practices. This index is linked to 10 critical points.
Structural Consistency: [11.49]
The Structural Consistency index evaluates whether the core building blocks required for an efficient CSS are in place. This index is linked to three sub-indices, namely: Strategic Coherence, Directive Consistency and Consistency of Processes, and to 29 critical points.

Strategic coherence [4.71] measures the alignment of HRM policies and practices to strategic government priorities.

Directive consistency [5.57] values the extent to which the directive function is developed in the CSS “with special attention to the relationship between the central techno-structure and the line managements.”

Consistency of processes [5.42] values the capacity of the CSS to sustain an integrated HRM system. This index is related to 29 critical points that are linked to elements of the HR Planning, Work Organization and Performance Management subsystems. The HR Planning subsystem is yet to be formalized. The Performance Management subsystem has been formalized in pilot agencies, while the Work Organization subsystem is being strengthened.

Functional Capacity [11.58]
This index, linked to 41 critical points, measures the extent to which the CSS in Jamaica promotes behaviors that are in line with the organization’s priorities and lead to improved public services. The index is related to three sub-indices: Competency [6.00], Incentive Effectiveness [5.23] and Flexibility [5.64].

Integrating Capacity: [11.65]
This index is related to 19 critical points and values the effectiveness with which the CSS harmonizes expectations and interests of internal and external stakeholders, empowers them and reduces conflict. The MOU (February 2004–2006) signed by the Government and the unions representing the civil service is of significance.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of Causal Areas

The HR System: the existence of an integrated HRM system is critical for an efficient CSS. Although the organizational design of the CSS emphasizes professionalism and positive developments are taking place, the HR system is still fragmented.

The Performance Management and Work Organization subsystems are developing positively; reforms to the Professional Development Management and HR Planning subsystems are envisaged; however, the Compensation Management, Employment Management and the Human and Social Relations Management subsystems require strengthening.

The development of a training policy and plan, as required by the MOU—specifically a plan based on a reliable needs analysis to be ultimately evaluated in terms of costs and benefits—is likely to increase the efficiency of the CSS in Jamaica.

The CSS presents a void in the career/succession planning in the Professional Development subsystem. In turn, the Employment Management subsystem evidences a weakness: there is no induction program in place. Finally, the non-monetary benefits are not institutionalized, while the Human and Social Relations Management subsystem needs to be strengthened in order to include an instrument for evaluating the organizational climate.

Internal and External Factors

The legal framework and organizational culture influence the efficiency of the CSS. The existing legal framework—made up of Acts and Regulations, including the Public Service Regulations (1961) that “govern the conduct of public servants”—does not address the HRM system holistically. The modernization of the Staff Orders to facilitate timely disposal of cases involving breaches of the disciplinary “code” is in progress.
The “entire question of reform has been accompanied by a steady battle to create an acceptance, commitment and culture of change in order to win the confidence and patronage of all stakeholders, especially the unions, which have been wary of the recruitment and displacement issues associated with the reform” (CARICAD, March 2001: 15).

Socio-economic factors and local perceptions continue to exert an influence on the CSS. The labor market is competitive. Professionals, in particular, lawyers, health professionals and teachers continue the migration trend. The absence of a well-developed labor market information system reinforces the need to formalize the HR Planning subsystem that is supported by accurate and timely HRMIS.

In spite of the Government of Jamaica’s concerted efforts to address the public perception that agencies lack transparency in their operations and need to improve accountability through the enactment of the Public Bodies Management and Accountability Act and the Access to Information Act, the perceptions still persist and influence the CSS.

Main Conclusions

“Public sector reform is driven at the highest level in Jamaica, as the Prime Minister is involved” (CARICAD, March 2001:15). The reform agenda incorporates the modernization of the legal framework for the CSS with the purpose of facilitating a less centralized management of HR, the formalization of select HR subsystems and the strengthening of others. However, these reforms to the CSS are not framed within an integrated HRM system.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

The reason why there is no integrated HRM system for CSS in Jamaica lies in the fact that the CSS lacks the fundamental connections that must exist between the subsystems. In particular, the succession planning void limits the interconnections between the Professional Development and Performance Management subsystems and ultimately limits the integrating capacity of the CSS. Furthermore, as HR Planning is linked to Employment Management and Work Organization, in the absence of an accurate, timely and relevant information base, determining the qualitative and quantitative requirements of human resources would turn out to be ineffective. HR Planning informs other subsystems and related processes, such as recruitment, selection, induction, mobility. Furthermore, availability optimization is constrained in the absence of HR Planning.

Moreover, improvements in optimization and the introduction of attitudinal and structural changes are critical to the Government’s mandate for economic growth.

Therefore, it is desirable that current efforts to improve the efficiency of the CSS be sustained, together with the formalization of the other HRM subsystems, namely Employment Management, Compensation Management and Human and Social Relations Management.

In the field of Employment Management in particular, it is desirable that the impulse to formalize the PMAS service-wide and revise all job descriptions to “make them output-oriented” is sustained.

As for the Compensation Management subsystem, the institutionalization of non-monetary benefits is likely to have merit, particularly in an ethos of cost containment. In addition, the capacity to assess the organizational climate is desirable, since no instruments are currently available for this purpose.

All these initiatives, if sustained, are likely to enhance the structural consistency and facilitate the integration process of the CSS in Jamaica. To sum up, with the existing limitations in mind, the following recommendations are made (a) develop an integrated HRM system; (b) formalize a service-wide induction program; (c) give consideration to the introduction of non-monetary benefits; (d) develop instruments for the regular
assessment of the organizational climate, and (e) sustain the efforts to develop an institutional framework for HR Planning and for strengthening the Work Organization Management, Performance Management and Development Management subsystems.

### VII. SUMMARY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories &amp; Subsystems</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Evaluator’s Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Background Analysis of the Institutional Context</td>
<td>Analysis of the Legal Framework</td>
<td>The Constitution (1962), the Public Service Law, Public Service Regulations (1961), The Staff Orders for the Public Service (1976), The Civil Service Establishment Act and the Pensions Act constitute the legal framework for the CSS in Jamaica. This framework does not address the HRM system comprehensively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Analysis of the Civil Service</td>
<td>Analysis of the Human Resources Organization function</td>
<td>The Cabinet Office, the PSC and the MoFP are main decision makers. Select agencies also have delegated authority for HRM. The central agencies add value in their auditing and monitoring roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyzed Quantitative Indicators of the CSS</td>
<td></td>
<td>The staff complement of the civil service in Jamaica is 32,067. Central government wage bill accounts for 13.5% of the GDP, evidencing a relative burden on the economy. The compensation structure reflects relative internal equity. Government salaries are at 40% of market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis by Subsystems</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>The MOU at the macro level as well as the corporate planning framework at the organizational level provide, to a limited extent, bases for HR Planning. A census of civil servants, a core building block for HR Planning, is imminent. HRMIS is a prototype and not a production model. The formalization of the HR Planning subsystem that incorporates a timely and accurate HRMIS will enhance the structural consistency of the core building blocks of a HRM system, namely: HRP, Performance Management and Work Organization subsystems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work Organization</td>
<td>Job evaluation has provided a basis for the development of output-oriented job descriptions that included competencies profiles. The exercise of developing appropriate job descriptions has begun in pilot agencies and is in progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment Management</td>
<td>While emphasis continues to be placed on insulating those responsible for employment management decisions from political influence, this subsystem evidences gaps in service-wide induction programs, and databases on staff turnover and absenteeism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance Management</td>
<td>The introduction, in pilot agencies, of PMAS—a recent initiative—evidences efforts to provide standards against which to measure performance as well as adequate instruments for appraising performance and developing employees. The formalization of this subsystem service-wide will provide the basis for variable payments and may serve to motivate high performers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compensation Management</td>
<td>The MOU dictates the overarching salary strategy. There is evidence of internal equity. A vision to create external equity is &quot;on hold.&quot; PMAS has been introduced to facilitate merit-based pay. A sharper focus on introducing non-monetary incentives is desirable in an ethos of cost containment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional Development Management</td>
<td>There is a deficit in career/succession planning. Advancement of individuals in the professional and technical occupational categories is based on professional criteria, with possibilities for horizontal mobility. Qualifications, experience, performance and, when all other factors are equal, seniority are criteria taken into account for other categories. In the absence of organizational training needs assessments, training is based on individual needs. Investment in training is not evaluated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDICES

Appendix A Critical Points Valuation – Comparative Table:

See Appendices section.

Appendix B Summary – Comparative Table:

See Appendices section.

Appendix C Report Technical Information

- **Report Dates**
  Diagnosis Dates: November 2004

- **Consultant**
  Dr. Hedy Isaacs

- **Acknowledgements**

**2004:**

Interviews were conducted with the persons whose names are listed:

Mr. George Briggs, Chief Technical Director/Head, PSRU, Cabinet Office, was interviewed July 29th, 2004.

Mr. Dennis Townsend, Acting Deputy Financial Secretary, Public Service Establishment Division, Ministry of Finance was interviewed jointly with Mrs. Maria Walters, Senior Pay Planning Officer, Compensation Officer, Compensation Unit, Ministry of Finance, on August 5th, 2004.

The consultant appreciates the information/documentation that these individuals shared.

**2007:**

Interviews were conducted with the persons whose names are listed:

Mr. Charles Jones, a retired Chief Personnel Officer (CPO) who held the position of CPO from 2000–2006, was interviewed on June 20th, 2007 from 10:a.m. to 12:00 p.m.

Mrs. Sherrill Oreggio-Angus, Programme/Implementation Manager, PMAS, Cabinet Office, was interviewed on June 22nd, 2007 from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.

Mr. Dennis Townsend, Deputy Financial Secretary (DFS), Public Service, Establishments Division, and Ms. Charmaine Stephens, Executive Assistant to (DFS) Mr. Townsend, were interviewed jointly on June 25th, 2007 from 10.a.m. to 11:30 a.m.

Telephone interviews were conducted with the persons whose names are listed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Evaluator’s Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human and Social Relations Management</td>
<td>A training policy and plan is being developed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The MOU represents a positive development that signals a labor relations ethos of accommodation rather than confrontation. The formalization of specific instruments to evaluate the organizational climate and sustain “new” relationships with internal and external stakeholders is desirable.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison with other analyses</td>
<td>The CSS in Jamaica is framed within the British model, which is based on recruitment systems and emphasizes the professionalism and independence of individuals responsible for the management of employment. The organizational design of the CSS also reflects elements from the systems model.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ms. Michelle Diaz, Director Planning and Research, Cabinet Office. The joint views that she presented were based on discussion with Mrs. Leonie Harris, Principal Director, Corporate Management and Development, Cabinet Office. Interview conducted June 27th, 2007.

Works Consulted

Documents

Memorandum of Understanding for the Public Sector, February 17, 2004.
Ministry of Transport and Works. Sample Job Descriptions for Senior Secretary in the Permanent Secretary’s Office, Office Manager, 2004.
Public Service Training Education and Development Policy [Draft]; undated Cabinet Office Kingston, Jamaica.
# List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Administrative Reform Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICAD</td>
<td>Caribbean Center for Development Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Civil Service Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoJ</td>
<td>Government of Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>Human Resources Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRMIS</td>
<td>Human Resources Management Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoFP</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC</td>
<td>Office of the Services Commissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSEAP</td>
<td>Public Sector Employee Assistance Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Service Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSRU</td>
<td>Public Sector Reform Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Main Conclusions

The twin island state of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is a former British colony. Draper, G. (2001), Mills, G. (1970 in Draper) and others argue that while institutional forms—collectively a legacy of the historical past—were transplanted and ostensibly embraced in terms of agreement “on the civil service neutrality and acceptance of the permanent professional public service,” there is apparent inconsistency between the conceptualization of institutional forms and their implementation. Draper (2001:5) argues that the major challenge to implementation is based, in part, on the difficulties of forging productive relationships between politicians and senior civil servants, specifically permanent secretaries, the administrative heads of the ministries of Government that constitute the central civil service. According to this author, the mistrust, anxiety, inadequate preparation of both parties, along with different management and organizational styles are “often grounds for tension, suspicion and unproductive behavior” (ibid).

While Civil Service Systems (CSS) may not preclude dysfunctional behavior from occurring, they may help ameliorate them. In these circumstances, an effective CSS is critical to facilitate governance and the delivery of public services. Commonwealth Caribbean countries with this legacy—and the twin island state is no exception—recognize the importance of the CSS.

The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is engaged in a program of reform that incorporates a vision for the modernization of human resource management (HRM) subsystems, namely Employment Management, Performance Management and Professional Development Management. These reforms are being reinforced by the strengthening of the institutional framework for HRM, specifically the restructuring of key agencies—the Personnel Department, The Services Commissions Department and the Pensions Division of the Ministry of Finance—while the Ministry of Public Administration and Information is to play an enabling role. The decentralization of the HRM function is a component of this reform vision.

While the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago “has been pursuing public service reform since 1992,” an apparent emphasis on HRM is evidenced in a “1997 White Paper on a Policy Addendum for the New Public Administration” (Draper, G 2001:19–20). The focus of the reforms that were articulated at that time to re-structure the public service—decentralize
the HRM function, and strengthen the Performance Management subsystem, by introducing a new performance appraisal system, information technology, labor and industrial relations and undertaking job evaluations—has not remained static. On the contrary, since then the reform agenda has included plans to strengthen elements of the Professional Development Management subsystem in order to facilitate the development of leadership. These plans “focus on succession planning for future Permanent Secretaries through targeted human resource development activities as well as a comprehensive hand over and mentoring period” (CARICAD 2001:13). HRM units have been set up in each ministry.

In addition, the introduction in 2002 of an automated human resource information system (HRIS) in the central personnel agencies, namely, the Public Service Commission Department, the secretariat to the Public Service Commission, and the Personnel Department, has provided a basis for the development of the Human Resource (HR) Planning subsystem. Although not fully functional as an HR planning tool, HRIS has been networked to line agencies by the Public Service Commission Department.

Other relatively recent developments are also likely to affect the CSS in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. The Public Service Reform Initiation Program was established in 2004 to develop related strategy, networks and capacity. The Public Service Transformation Division (PSTD) of the Ministry of Public Administration and Information, and the New Systems Facilitators, characterized as “dedicated staff to lead each ministry in change management issues,” are now in place. Even though the reforms articulated so far are undoubtedly of significance, they address only some elements of select HRM subsystems. These reforms are also formulated without the benefit of a strategic approach to public Employment and Human Resource Management that evidences sensitivity for clearly articulated HR priorities and objectives about which the views of government, civil servants and unions converge and for introducing an integrated HRM system.

The Service Commissions Department—mandated by the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago as the Secretariat to the Public Service Commission (PSC)—and the other three commissions, the Personnel Department, the Ministry of Public Administration and Information and the Ministry of Finance, are the main actors in the CSS. The Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (1976), the Civil Service Act Chapter 23:01, the Public Service Commission Regulations (1966) and the Pensions Acts collectively constitute the legal framework for the CSS.

The Public Service Commission (PSC) has a constitutional mandate to make employment management decisions relative to appointments, i.e. in the field of recruitment, selection, promotion, termination and the exercise of discipline. The structure and functions of the PSC conform to the Public Service Regulations.

The Civil Service Act addresses elements of the Human and Social Relations Management subsystem—specifically, procedures for disputes resolution as well as for negotiation and consultation, between the Government and civil servants or their representatives, i.e. the associations of civil servants.

The Personnel Department is responsible for negotiating and consulting with existing civil service associations on civil servants’ terms and conditions of employment. In addition to the management of benefits, the Department is responsible for job evaluations, salary administration, industrial relations and employee development issues.

The Public Management Consulting Division in the Ministry of Public Administration and Information is engaged in providing policy advice on position management.

The Pensions Branch of the Ministry of Finance is concerned with the administration of pensions, while the Treasury Department of the Ministry disburses compensation and other benefits.
The existing legal framework will require modernization as a response to the policy changes that will probably result from the reforms envisaged, particularly, the decentralization of the HRM function. It is argued that revisions are not likely “in the near future, as this will require a constitutional reform, which calls for a two-thirds majority in Parliament. The two-party system which is polarized along ethnic lines, however, precludes” the required consensus (Bissessar, A. 2002:22, partially paraphrased). Nonetheless, a strategic approach to HR is advocated, for which goal both political will and consensus on HR priorities and objectives among internal and external stakeholders should be in place.

Finally, with regard to the organization of this report, it should be pointed out that this chapter builds upon the author’s 2004 report to the Inter-American Development Bank entitled “Short Form for Institutional Assessment of Civil Service Systems: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago,” which basically offered an overview of the CSS in the country at that time. In addition, the analysis of each of the seven HRM subsystems is more in-depth to reflect a sharper focus on each of the ninety-three critical points for assessing CSS. In general, this revised work conforms to the original methodological framework provided by Longo, F. 2002. Other elements of the 2004 report were retained, namely: the indices for the evaluation of the CSS, the internal and external environments, the critical points valuation, the summary table of preceding sections, and the conclusions of the diagnosis.

II. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Initially, the influence of the Westminster-Whitehall politico-administrative system initially resulted in a parliamentary political system, but this was later replaced. In 1976, Trinidad and Tobago relinquished its status as a constitutional monarchy to become a republic. The former Head of State, Queen Elizabeth II of England, was “replaced with a President who was elected by an electoral college composed by members of Parliament. Executive power resides with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet” (Bissessar, A. 2002:10).

At the time of its independence, the country had established a Public Service Commission (PSC) with executive power to make appointments. When the country attained republican status, the power of the PSC to appoint public officers and its new responsibilities for their promotion, transfer, and termination as well as the exercise of discipline were vested in the Constitution (1976). A ministerial system was also established, whereby ministries and ministers were assigned specific portfolios, including education and finance.

The influence of the colonial past was apparently not as pervasive in the political domain as in the administrative sphere. This heritage made an impact on the administrative systems of the civil service as decision-making processes were centralized.

It has been argued that factors in the political arena, including ethnic cleavages and the lack of political will and stability have undermined the efforts to reform the public sector. Political parties are reportedly based “primarily along ethnic lines” (ibid), so it is only natural that these ethnic cleavages had a bearing on the operations of the public sector. According to Hansard records, during the period of the People’s National Movement (PNM) dominated by Afro-Trinidadians many of the top positions within the public services, statutory authorities, police, armed forces and state-owned enterprises, were held by Afro-Trinidadians. The PNM held office from 1956 to 1986 and again in the 1991–1994 period. The PNM Government in 1991 “established the Centre of Ethnic Studies whose major mandate was to investigate the extent of ethnic imbalances in both the public and private sectors” (ibid).

When the PNM demitted office in 1994, the United National Congress (UNC) the East Indian-based political party, and the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR), a coalition party, assumed government until 2000. The UNC and
the PNM formed the next Government until 2002, when the country returned to the polls and the PNM took office. NAR also held office for one term, only from 1986–1991, and “introduced a number of austerity measures, including the reduction of salaries” (ibid:6, partially paraphrased). It is said that “the lack of emphasis on reform is due to a lack of political will but an important factor too has been the lack of stability in the political arena during 1986 to present” (ibid:7).

In the field of economic development, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its Report No. 03/232 (July 2003:20), indicates that “Trinidad and Tobago has enjoyed an extended period of positive growth, low inflation and a steady decline in unemployment, but challenges remain. The authorities are commended for their prudent management of the economy in recent years despite the global and regional slowdown.” While the country was congratulated for the prudent management largely of its oil and gas wealth, “the overall fiscal position of the central government weakened somewhat in FY 2001–02 with an overall deficit of nearly one and a half percent of GDP, reflecting lower tax collections and a steady decline in the buoyancy of non-energy revenues” (IMF Public Information Notice - PIN No. 03/85, August 13, 2003:1).

**Background**

Public sector entities comprise central Government, statutory bodies and staff of independent authorities including, the Office of the President, the Auditor-General’s Department, the Judiciary and the Industrial Court (Bissessar 2002:3). According to the Ministry of Public Administration and Information (2004), the total staff complement of the central civil service amounts to 30,000.

While reforms to the civil service have reportedly been ongoing since Trinidad and Tobago became independent, a more focused approach to reforming the CSS is said to have been taken since 1992. Some problems that have affected the CSS over time include over-centralization, human resource management issues related to training and development, performance appraisal and discipline (ibid:13, paraphrased). Reforms undertaken during the 1986–1991 period were not as sharply focused on these problems as they were on “conforming to structural adjustment conditions” (ibid.). Hence, it may be stated that the external dynamic for reform has diluted the *a priori* focus.

According to Bissessar (2002), the reforms introduced under the aegis of SAPS addressed a reduction in civil service salaries, the establishment of a civil service data bank and changes to the existing budgetary system. Other reforms undertaken by the administration were a job classification exercise, the introduction of performance management and appraisal systems, and the creation of new human resource agencies (ibid:13, partially paraphrased).

**Legal Framework**

The main building blocks of the legal framework are the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (1976), the PSC Regulations and the Civil Service Act (1965). The powers of the PSC are laid down in constitutional provisions: it has executive powers for recruitment, selection, promotion and discipline. Although the focus is on the PSC, it is noted that there are four other Commissions, namely, the Teaching Services, the Police, the Judicial and Legal Services and Statutory Authorities Services.

The PSC Regulations provide for the structure and functions of the PSC, which are mainly concerned with the Employment Management subsystem and include recruitment, selection, promotion, termination and discipline of civil servants and set out the procedures to put its functions into effect.

Given the influence of the Westminster Whitehall (WW) model on administrative structures and functions of the PSC, specifically the requirement for impartiality, the PSC is expected to be politically neutral.
As for its structure, a maximum of six and a minimum of four persons, including the chairman and deputy chairman, constitute the membership of the PSC, who are appointed by the President after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition.

The Civil Service Act (1965) makes provision for the “establishment and the classification of the Civil Service, for the establishment of a Personnel Department, for the establishment of procedures for negotiation and consultation between the Government and members of the civil service, for the settlement of disputes and for other matters concerning the relationship between the Government and the civil service” (ibid:16).

As stated above, the Act provides for the setting up of the Personnel Department, which is headed by the Chief Personnel Officer, who is empowered to negotiate on the Government’s behalf with the unions that represent civil servants.

Even though the Act provides for the civil service establishment—in general the permanent establishment—, Draper (2001:15) distinguishes between permanent hiring and other hiring regimes, including daily paid employment, hiring for a limited time period as temporary staff and the use of service or term contracts. Many of the contracts for limited time periods tend to relate to special projects. In Trinidad and Tobago, civil servants may be contracted for projects while being given leave from their substantive posts. According to Draper, the growth of project-related contract employment is due to the increasing use of program budgets and the growing role of international agencies in the financing of programs and projects. Draper’s assertions point to the dysfunctions inherent in the practice of the contract regime as it adversely influences the Employment Management and Compensation Management subsystems of CSS.

The Ministry of Finance is the body responsible for disbursing compensation (wages, salaries and other benefits) to civil servants.

In addition, there are concomitant rules regarding disclosure at the leadership level in the civil service: for example, permanent secretaries as well as chief technical directors must declare their assets to the Integrity Commission under the Integrity in Public Life Act (2000).

III. ANALYSIS OF HRM SUBSYSTEMS

The analysis of the HR subsystems presented in this section follows the ninety-three critical points established by the methodology used in this study (Longo 2002), which are listed with their corresponding valuation in Appendix A. For each subsection, the corresponding critical points are indicated between parenthesis, and a brief introduction is provided about the HR decisions and practices associated with each subsystem.

Human Resources Planning

This subsystem provides the linkages between HRM policies and practices and the organization’s priorities, which becomes evident in the timely provision of the desirable quality and quantity of staff in accordance with the needs of the organization.

Existence and Integrity of the System (Critical point 1)

The Human Resource Planning subsystem is not yet formalized. The phased introduction of the computerized HRIS is indicative of the recognition of the significance of having timely and accurate information to identify HR deficits and surpluses. In 2002, HRIS was introduced “in three pilot agencies, namely, the Service Commission Department, the Personnel Department and the Treasury Division, Ministry of Finance” (Bissessar A. 2002:21), of which the designated central agency to “provide advisory and technical support services” to line agencies is the Personnel Department. Since the HRIS has been introduced, it has “been networked to line agencies” (Testimonial, paraphrased), but in reality, this is a work in progress. In the absence of
an institutionalized HRIS, the common practice is that the different ministries and departments make requests for staff to the PSC when vacancies occur.

**Strategic Coherence (2–3)**

HRIS is not a planning tool. Hence, strategic coherence between this subsystem and the Employment Management subsystem is still constrained.

**Basic Information (4)**

Because HRIS is being implemented, it does not currently facilitate managerial decision making. The importance of the HR Planning subsystem, however, resonates within the policy planning arena at the macro level where, to its credit, the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago has embarked on an e-government program. The vision is that by “2005, 60% of all ministries and agencies will be at an advanced stage in terms of having in place Government-to-Government applications that enable the sharing and integration of national and local government agencies and those that bring best practices in key government operations, e.g. [...] human resource management.”

**Effectiveness (5–9)**

HRIS will no doubt facilitate the optimization of civil service staff when it is fully functional. In its absence, it is challenging to control employment costs and facilitate adequate staff skills.

**Administration (10–11)**

As already stated, the networking of the HRIS system is underway; this limits the extent to which managers may participate in the formulation and implementation of HR forecasts.

**Work Organization**

The Work Organization function establishes and specifies the contents of the tasks for each job, and the characteristics of the people who will carry them out. It includes both the description of the activities, functions and responsibilities assigned to each position (job description) and the definition of the competencies, skills and attitudes required for the successful performance at each position (profile definition) (Longo 2002).

According to Longo (2002:20), the Work Organization subsystem reveals the “HRM policies and practices that define the characteristics of and conditions for performing the tasks concerned.”

**Existence and Integrity of the Subsystem (12)**

Job classification is, in general, the basis for job descriptions in the central civil service. However, there has been a lapse in time in terms of the previous job evaluation of the civil service, since “the last job classification was done in 1966” (Bissessar, A. 2002:22). Currently, an incremental approach to job evaluation is apparently being adopted in the central civil service.

The Work Organization subsystem is being formalized initially at the leadership level. To combat the succession planning void at the level of permanent secretaries, a deputy permanent secretary cadre was developed, a job evaluation exercise undertaken and job descriptions developed. “These job descriptions, including competencies profiles, will provide the bases for the recruitment of persons to the new posts. In 2003, a job evaluation exercise was also undertaken for the Police and Teaching services and a similar exercise is currently being undertaken for the central civil service” (Testimonial). Job descriptions have not been regularly updated over the years. The job descriptions prepared in 1966 did not include personal profiles. This deficit limits the interconnections between the Work Organization subsystem and the Employment Management and HR Planning subsystems.

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Technical Quality and Flexibility of Job Design (13–17)
Only the permanent secretaries’ job descriptions reflect competencies. Instruments related to other job categories are generally broadly framed to reflect job title, activities, responsibilities and academic qualifications.

Quality of Profiles Definition (18–21)
A core element that is integral to the accuracy of a job description is the competency profile. The absence of this element in most job descriptions represents a deficit.

Administration (22–23)
The job evaluation exercise being currently undertaken for the central civil service will provide sharper focus on the quality of persons required in terms of skills and competencies; this will contribute to a more effective management of the Work Organization subsystem.

Employment Management
This subsystem ideally focuses on the policies, practices and procedures relating to an individual’s recruitment, selection, induction, mobility and separation from an organization based on such values as merit, transparency and equity.

Equal Opportunity and Merit (24–27)
The “criterion used for the selection and entry of employees in the public administration” is described as relying on the “generalized use of selection procedures based on competition (open or closed), objective and transparent criteria, tests, competent neutral selection panels, and other guarantees to ensure that the best candidates are hired” (Draper, G. 2001:14). There are, however, conflicting views regarding how the subsystem actually operates.

Despite the presumed equality and merit present in the enrollment process, the “under-representation of one of the two dominant ethnic groups has been perceived as discriminatory” (Bissessar A. 2002: 27–28, paraphrased). Although the number of political appointees was not established, ethnic cleavages along political party lines is said to be sometimes reflected in the management of this subsystem (ibid).

Recruitment and Selection Quality (28–32)
According to Draper, G. (2001:14), selection and entry of employees in the public administration of the country incorporate all the mechanisms described above to ensure that the best candidates are hired. However, apparently these measures are not consistently applied.

Induction Quality (33–34)
Induction programs are deemed important, but related programs are not yet in place. To date, a probationary period of a year has helped facilitate the process of socialization.

Mobility (35)
Some level of horizontal occupational mobility is possible, but “this tends to be limited within the same sector. Geographic mobility is possible if required by the organization,” according to Draper, G. (2001:16).

Absenteeism and Discipline (36–37)
Generally, there “tends to be significant job security in the public service. Employees’ services may be terminated if regulations are breached. Nevertheless, these regulations are “seldom applied and the process for their application is too long” (ibid:15). It is also argued that “many cases of indiscipline are overlooked” to avoid job loss. Cultural factors also preclude the imposition of sanctions for breaches of the disciplinary procedures” (Bissessar A. 2002: 29, partially paraphrased).

Absenteeism indices are not maintained.

Termination (38–41)
There is no evidence to suggest that rank-and-file civil servants are arbitrarily dismissed with a change in administration. Overall, while there is
professionalism in the recruitment and selection process, there is room for strengthening the other elements of this subsystem.

**Performance Management**

This subsystem articulates performance guidelines based on organizational goals, against which performance is measured, and a performance appraisal instrument that basically serves as a developmental tool for providing feedback to employees concerning performance and direction to employee development.

**Performance Planning and Follow-up (43–45)**

Positive developments are taking place within this subsystem, which is being “formalized at the permanent secretary level” (Testimonial). A Performance Management subsystem is planned to be introduced throughout the civil service.

**Performance Evaluation (46–48)**

The existing performance appraisal tool tends to be uniformly applied “to give employees ratings on the higher end of the scale” in order to avoid internal conflict. In these circumstances, their usefulness for HRM decision-making purposes is seriously compromised. “There is no merit pay system in place” (Draper, G. 2001: 16).

A previous report on the institutional assessment of the CSS in Trinidad and Tobago also makes reference to the introduction of a “performance management and appraisal system” in the 1990s that focused on performance planning, performance appraisal and feedback. The report also highlighted factors that confounded the successful implementation of the system, namely: the absence of job descriptions, the difficulty with setting standards, as well as other constraints “when the objectives of Government are constantly being changed” and there is “distrust among the two races” (Bissessar, A. 2002:33, partially paraphrased).

**Administration (49)**

The formalization and strengthening of this subsystem will facilitate the necessary linkages with the Compensation Management and Professional Development subsystems, interconnections deemed critical for an integrated HRM system.

**Compensation Management**

Central to this subsystem is the contribution that an employee makes towards the achievement of the organization’s objectives relative to the rewards received for making such contribution. Specifically, it is desirable that the monetary and non-monetary benefits that employees receive from an organization compensate them equitably relative to others performing similar tasks within and outside the organization.

**Salary Strategy, Internal and External Equity (50–57)**

This subsystem does not reflect nepotistic or abusive practices, as there is emphasis on “equal pay for equal work” (Draper, G. 2001: 17). There is generally an element of reactivity in the compensation strategy as the civil service responds to the demands of the Public Services Association of Trinidad and Tobago, as well as to other recognized unions that represent the civil servants.

**Effectiveness of Compensation Policies and Wages Administration (58)**

While the salary structure aims to attract and retain new recruits, it is reportedly not competitive, particularly at the senior level. The measure of the difference between the total pay received by employees at the top wage level and that received at the lowest level of the wage scale evidences tight compression. The ratio calculated was examined against the range: 1:7 and 1:20. The ratio derived (1:4.71) is outside the range and reflects tightly compressed salaries.

It is also argued that since the appointment of serving officers to fill posts under a contract—currently a common practice—is usually accompanied by their receipt of higher salaries, wage
administration is often distorted and morale becomes adversely affected (ibid:15).

The current job evaluation exercise will in all likelihood facilitate the classification of roles and positions linked to pay and a salary structure design that balances employees’ relative contribution to the organization’s results with applicable salaries in the market.

In addition, civil servants receive incentives.

**Wage Administration (59–61)**

In general, the salary regime is transparent. “In Trinidad and Tobago, the Public Sector Salary System covers the civil service, statutory authorities and protective services and the principle of equal pay for equal work is applied across the services” (ibid:17). The methodology used to maintain internal equity in the civil service is the position classification method.

The growing trend in project-related contract employment lends itself to atypical salaries (ibid:15, paraphrased).

**Other Benefits (62–64)**

In addition to salary, civil servants also receive non-monetary incentives. These benefits, according to Bisessar (2002:35), “include recognition and awards, family days, and the introduction of the ‘Public Service Week’, Wage, which comprises other benefits such as a cost of living allowance and incremental payments that are paid on the officer’s anniversary date. Some categories of officers are also entitled to traveling allowances, housing allowances and at higher levels entertainment allowances.”

Of significance is the Prime Minister’s Innovating for Service Excellence Award Scheme, which was introduced in April 2004 to “reward and recognize innovative initiatives, encourage innovation in the public service and improve the image of the public sector” (The Newsletter of the Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management CAPAM 2004:15, Vol. 10, No. 3).

Civil servants also receive pension benefits. Even though the “perceived” adequacy of pension was not established through testimonials, an International Monetary Fund Report (2003: 20) asserts that this benefit is “generous.”

While positive developments are taking place within this subsystem, the updated valuation instruments will facilitate role classification linked to pay and ultimately strengthen the subsystem.

**Development Management**

This subsystem ideally evidences organizational efforts to advance staff development and learning. These efforts are undertaken with an eye to complying with the idea of encouraging “learning and defining career paths that should match the organization’s needs with the individual profile” (Longo 2002:34). The effectiveness of this subsystem is dependent on the extent to which appropriate career, promotion and training policies are in place.

**Effectiveness of Promotions and Career Design Quality (65–70)**

This subsystem is being formalized and does not currently reflect strong linkages with the Employment Management, Performance Management and the Compensation Management subsystems. In terms of career design quality, “seniority is generally acknowledged as an important factor in promotion decisions” (Draper 2001:15). The results of training are not necessarily taken into account (ibid., paraphrased). There is also a career planning void.

The former Central Training Unit—within the Ministry of Public Administration and Information—, which has been re-structured and renamed the Public Services Academy, has as its vision corporate training and policy-making regarding this subsystem. The Human Resource Units that were established in respective line agencies, as part of the thrust to decentralize the HRM function, are expected to undertake relevant in-house training.

The Personnel Department is responsible for developing training policies. It is desirable that these policies be “aimed at ensuring the indi-
vital and collective learning required to attain organizational objectives, at developing competencies among employees, and at stimulating their professional progress” (Longo, F. 2002: 34). The Personnel Department aims to revise existing policies.

**Individual and Collective Learning Management (71–76)**

The training conducted is not based on needs analysis and the investment in training is not evaluated in terms of costs and benefits. There was an apparent hiatus in departmental training during the period 1997–2002, with the “exception of training in performance management systems.” Apparently funding constraints was the major contributory factor (Bissessar, A. 2002:37, partially paraphrased).

Although it is evident that training and development are recognized as important, this subsystem requires formalization to facilitate the delivery of training based on a needs analysis that satisfies service specific needs. In other words, a “training system must be designed to serve the organizational strategy” (Longo, F. 2002:36).

**Communication Effectiveness (79–81)**

The Public Service Employee Survey that was administered in partnership with the Public Service Union, in March 2004, is a step in the direction to learn employees’ opinions, requests and initiatives.

**Labor Relations Balance and Quality (82–85)**

Labor relations are characterized as adversarial. Conflicts concerning wages and accommodation are generally more readily resolved than conflicts related to job evaluation or the value to be placed on jobs in the civil service.

**Labor Conflict Management (86–87)**

Concerning labor relations management, there are well established mechanisms in place to facilitate collective negotiation of pay and working conditions at the national level. Relations between the union and the Government are arguably adversarial: “generally the environment between union and government is adversarial, and many of the disputes by the union are reactive and centre mainly around the issue of wages or accommodation” (Bissessar, A 2002: 38).

Within each government agency there is a shop steward that represents the daily paid employees and who facilitates the airing and resolution of concerns of this category of employees. It is stated that there is room for improving the quality of communication and interaction between the Government and the unions, as this is likely to reduce resistance to reforms. “The union has resisted attempts by the Government to introduce new systems. For example, the delay experienced in implementing the job classification exercise was due to the fact that the union instructed public officers not to fill out the re-
quired forms since it may lead to downsizing in the organization” (ibid).

Maintaining high morale is sometimes an issue in the CSS of Trinidad and Tobago. This feature is usually linked to the convention of “special hiring regimes” including daily paid employment and service and term contracts. As already stated, “in Trinidad and Tobago, civil servants may be appointed to projects on contracts while being on leave from their substantive posts. The appointment of serving officers on a contract basis is usually accompanied by their receipt of higher salaries. This very often adversely affects morale. Many contracts tend to be for three to five years. In some cases, renewal of contracts may be granted even after the original justification for the contract has passed” (Draper, G. 2001: 15).

Positive developments are taking place within this subsystem; however, there are also elements that require strengthening.

Social Policies

Civil servants receive a pension that the IMF has described as “generous.” The IMF has also recommended that “pension reform in the public sector is needed to harmonize benefits and protect against a build-up of unsustainable liabilities as the population ages.” Specific related recommendations include “the introduction of a fully-funded pension scheme to replace the current advance-funded program; a gradual increase in the retirement age to 65; and a reduction in the generosity of civil service pensions for new hires” (IMF Country Report No. 03 /232 2003:20). Other benefits include old age pension and a national insurance scheme.

The Organization of the HR Function

The description of each subsystem forming part of the HRM presented above is complemented in this section with the analysis of the mechanisms used for the management of the system, particularly the distribution of personnel decisions among the different responsible parties (Longo 2002). This dimension addresses the extent to which HRM responsibilities are fragmented or unified as well as the degree of centralization or decentralization of the decision-making process concerning personnel-related issues.

Autonomy and Capacity of Supervisors (90–92)

Managers in line agencies have limited autonomy in making decisions on HRM-related matters. While decisions regarding training and routine decisions concerning employment management and human and social relations management are made by managers in line agencies, other HRM decisions are made at the central level. Decisions made by line managers relate to the approval of acting appointments for designated offices, maintaining records of appointments and separations, “dealing with all disciplinary matters of a minor nature, leave administration, some aspects of benefits administration and some aspects of grievance handling” (Bissessar, A. 2002: 38–39, partially paraphrased). Decision-making in the CSS is inherently highly centralized. Line managers would also benefit from training in HRM.

Central HR Administration (93)

Four central agencies—the Services Commission Department, the Personnel Department, the Pensions Division of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Public Administration and Information—are the major HR actors; hence, HRM is fragmented. However, there are no explicit inter-agency power struggles and the agencies are perceived to add value.

Symbolic Valuation of the Human Resources Subsystems

The following chart presents a graphic representation of the level of development of each of the subsystems previously analyzed.
HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEMS

PLANNING [+/-]

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<th>Work Organization</th>
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<th>Performance Management</th>
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<td>Planning</td>
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<td>Profiles definition</td>
<td>Mobility Separation</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
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COMPENSATION MANAGEMENT [+/-]
- Monetary and non-monetary payment

DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT [+/-]
- Career and promotion
- Individual and collective learning

HUMAN AND SOCIAL RELATIONS MANAGEMENT [+/-]
- Work Climate
- Labor Relations
- Social Policies

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<th></th>
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<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Negative</th>
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<td>The subsystem is fully developed or at a maturing stage</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ -</td>
<td>There are still aspects to develop, but the tendency is positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>The subsystem is very weak</td>
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IV. INDICATORS

IV.1. Quantitative Indicators

1. Number of Political Appointments

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of political appointments</th>
<th>Not Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of positions for the civilian central Government</td>
<td>30,000 Ministry of Public Administration and Information November 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political appointments rate</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fiscal Weight of Public Employment

2. Central Government Wage Bill/Gross Domestic Product

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central government wage bill (in million dollars)</th>
<th>GDP (in million dollars)</th>
<th>Central government wage bill/Gross Domestic Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMF Country Report No 03-232- Table 2 Page 24, Trinidad and Tobago: Summary of Central Government Operations International Monetary Fund Washington D.C.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is a measure of the extent to which the cost of public employment is a burden on the economy. The wage bill excludes training grants and pensions. Using the World Bank comparator of 5–25%, the fiscal weight of public employment is not a relative burden on the economy. [The percent quoted is a projection.] The same source indicates that overall central government expenditure as a percentage of GDP is 25.1%.

Civil Service Incentives

3. Vertical Wage Compression


III. Vertical wage compression 4.72

This is a measure of the difference between the total pay received by employees at the top wage level and that at the lowest level of the wage scale. The ratio calculated was examined against the range 1:7 and 1:20. The ratio derived is outside the range and reflects tightly compressed salaries.

---

2 All figures expressed in US Dollars. 1TTD = 0.16 US Dollars (Source: www.xe.com Universal Currency Converter – Oct 2006)
(continued)

Civil Service Incentives

4. Average Central Government Wage/Per Capita GDP

| I. Average central government wage (in dollars) | Not available |
| II. Per capita GDP by month (in dollars) | Not available |

Average central government wage/Per capita GDP Not available

5. Average Central Government Wage/Average Private Sector Wage

| I. Average central government wage (in dollars) | Not available |
| II. Average private sector wage | Not available |

Average central government wage/ Average private sector wage Not available

Civil Service Employment Figures

6. Total Number of Central Government Employees/Total Population

| I. Total number of central government employees | 30,000 | Source: Ministry of Public Administration and Information, November 2004 |
| II. Total Population | 1,300,000 | Source: Ministry of Public Administration and Information, November 2004 |

Total number of central government employees/ Total population 2.31%

The number of central government employees is low in relation to comparable international figures in the range 0-100 and suggests insufficient development of the central government.

7. Central Government Expenditure (excluding pensions and debt service)/Total Number of Central Government Employees

| I. Central government expenditure (in million dollars) | 2,363.8 | Source: IMF Country Report No. 03/232 Table 2, Page 24, Trinidad and Tobago: Summary of Central Government Operations International Monetary Fund Washington D.C. (14.774 Mill TT$ x 0.16) Note: This figure relates to the fiscal year October 1 to September 30 2002/03 |
| II. Total number of central government employees | 30,000 | Source: Ministry of Public Administration and Information, November 2004 |

I/II. Central government expenditure (excluding pensions and debt service)/Total number of central government employees (in dollars) 78,794
IV.2 Indices for the Evaluation of the Civil Service System

Table of Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Index value (scale: 0–20)</th>
<th>Scale Percentage</th>
<th>Sub-Index</th>
<th>Sub-index value (scale: 0–10)</th>
<th>Scale Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(E) Efficiency</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>(STC) Strategic Coherence</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M) Merit</td>
<td>11.85</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>(DC) Directive Consistency</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SC) Structural Consistency</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>(CP) Consistency of Processes</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(FC) Functional Capacity</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>(COM) Competency</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CI) Integrating Capacity</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>(IE) Incentive Effectiveness</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(FL) Flexibility</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elaboration of Indices

The indices and sub-indices listed above were constructed on the basis of the analysis of 93 critical points that reflect key elements of HRM subsystems. Appendix A lists the valuation of such critical points and their corresponding number to which these values relate.

Efficiency [9.00]

This index, related to thirteen critical points, values the existing HR planning framework, the cost of public employment relative to the state of the economy, adequacy of pensions and social care benefits, current efforts to assess the costs and benefits of training and the benefits of non-monetary incentives.

The HRIS, although not yet a planning tool, has been networked to the line agencies. Pen-
Strategic Coherence, Directive Consistency and Consistency of Processes, which are collectively associated to 29 critical points.

Strategic Coherence [3.86] values the linkages between the strategic priorities of the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and HRM policies and practices.

Directive Consistency [4.00] assesses the extent to which the directive function in the CSS in Trinidad and Tobago is developed. This sub-index is linked to 8 critical points.

Consistency of Processes [4.00] is linked to 14 critical points and measures the extent to which core processes, particularly planning, work organization and performance management, that underpin an integrated HRM system are in place in the CSS in Trinidad and Tobago. The information system that supports HR planning is in place. While the Work Organization subsystem requires formalization, the Performance Management subsystem has been formalized at the permanent secretary level.

Functional Capacity [9.66]
This index evaluates the extent to which the CSS in Trinidad and Tobago encourages behaviors that promote improvement in public services. This index is related to 41 critical points and three sub-indices, namely: Competency, [4.94] Incentive Effectiveness [4.31], and Flexibility [4.82]. The former, linked to 15 critical points, values the capacity of HRM policies and practices to furnish an adequate supply of skilled personnel. Incentive effectiveness evaluates the extent to which HRM policies and practices facilitate productivity, learning and improved service quality. In turn, the flexibility index values the responsiveness of the existing policies and practices to changes in policy priorities.

Integrating Capacity [10.00]
This index is related to 19 critical points and values the effectiveness of the capacity of the CSS to harmonize the internal and external stakeholders’ expectations and interests to empower them and reduce conflict.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of Causal Areas

The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago has a reform agenda that envisions the decentralization of the HRM function, formalizing the HR Planning subsystem and strengthening the Professional Development Management and Performance Management subsystems. These efforts are likely to affect the CSS positively. Nevertheless, there are other aspects of these and other HR subsystems that need to be developed.

With regard to the decentralization process, while each ministry has established its own the HR unit, it is argued that staff competencies require development for the units to work optimally. It is also argued that there is limited delegation of functions from the center to the line. “Training has been the only responsibility that has been fully devolved” (Bissessar 2002:39). Yet, the delivery of training has been stymied by resource constraints as well as lack of capacity.

Only routine aspects of the Employment Management and Human and Social Relations Management subsystems have been decentralized, namely: approving acting appointments for designated offices, maintaining records of appointments and separations, “dealing with all disciplinary matters of a minor nature, leave administration, some aspects of benefits administration and some aspects of grievance handling” (ibid:38–39, partially paraphrased).

Although HR Planning is recognized as a core building block of the HRM system, the existing HRIS is not yet a planning tool and this restricts any formalization effort of the HR Planning subsystem.

The development of the Performance Management subsystem focuses initially on the career
planning and developmental components for the leadership cadres, i.e. permanent secretaries and deputy permanent secretaries. The vision to strengthen the Professional Development Management subsystem incorporates the development of a training policy. There are deficits in other key elements of this subsystem, including the need to conduct an organizational needs analysis and to evaluate the benefits of investment in training.

Voids are identified in the Work Organization and Employment Management subsystems, limiting the optimization of human resources and the linkages between these subsystems. The current job evaluation exercise in the civil service is expected to address the deficit of job descriptions. The Employment Management subsystem will be strengthened with the institutionalization of induction programs.

The Public Service Employee Survey administered in March 2004 is important. Nonetheless, the development of structured instruments to assess the organizational climate on a regular basis would contribute to strengthening the Human and Social Relations Management subsystem.

The establishment of the Public Service Reform Initiation Program will provide the impulse for developing related strategy, networks and capacity. These efforts are supported by the New Systems Facilitators that lead each ministry in change management issues. The Service Commissions Department, the Personnel Department, and the Ministry of Public Administration and Information are designated as active participants and facilitators of the reform process. The focus on developing networks evidences recognition of the importance of engaging all stakeholders in the planning and implementation of reforms.

The initiatives undertaken by the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago reflect efforts to modernize systems and structures in the CSS. These modernization efforts are being undertaken without the benefit of a clearly articulated strategy for managing human resources and public employment and of an HRM system that should evidence connectivity among the seven subsystems.

**Internal and External Factors**

The existing organizational culture in the country, characterized by inertia, resistance to change, and mistrust, affects all efforts to improve the efficiency of the CSS. “There is resistance by the public servants, but others allege that there is resistance by the unions.” According to others, delays in reforming the CSS are “due to bureaucratic apathy” (Bissessar A. 2002:8). In turn, Draper (2001: 3) characterizes the ministerial permanent secretary interface as evidencing tension and mistrust. “In the mind of the senior public servant, trust issues emerge at times when governments change or even in the same government when ministers change” (ibid). Furthermore, it is said that mistrust, sometimes evident in the society and exacerbated by ethnic concerns, also resonates at other levels within organizations. Mistrust between the ministers and senior public officials is a source of delays in the implementation of reforms.

Political and legal factors influence reform efforts and ultimately the efficiency of the CSS. “Managers claim that there is a lack of political will and therefore they are unsure of the direction that should be taken by their ministries. There is no doubt that there is validity in these claims. Indeed, it should be recalled that for the past three years, Trinidad and Tobago went to the polls three times because of deadlock between the major political parties. During this time, reform of the public service was virtually at a standstill, since there was or could not be any clear directions from the political directorate” (Bissessar A. 2002: 8).

A related issue is the “distance” between the Government and the unions—elaborated on in the section of this report devoted to the human and social relations management subsystem—that affects the pace of reform.

The legal framework is not responsive to changes in policy priorities. Specifically, the vi-
sion to decentralize the HRM function will require fundamental changes in the existing legal framework for the CSS, since they are likely to be stymied by the politico-ethnic divide.

**Main Conclusions**

The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is pursuing a reform agenda that emphasizes the decentralization of the HRM function, the strengthening of the Performance Management and Professional Development subsystems and the formalization of the HR Planning subsystem. The decentralization of the HRM function is stymied by the legal framework, which requires modernization, as well as by the need to develop the capacity to manage a devolved function. The emphasis on strengthening the Professional Development Management subsystem by developing a training policy and plans does not take into account the need for addressing voids in career and succession planning. While there are plans to address the Work Organization subsystem, there are deficits in the Employment Management and Human and Social Relations Management subsystems that require attention and affect the coherence of the CSS.

Internal and external factors constrain the reform impulse to improve the efficiency of the CSS. Reforms are framed within an organizational culture that shows some resistance to change as well as mistrust. There is recognition of the need to develop networks of stakeholders and an ethos that engenders participation and empowerment. The commitment of stakeholders to the reform agenda, particularly at leadership levels in the political and labor relations arenas, is critical to sustaining the reform endeavor.

Proposed and current reforms are significant in terms of the positive impact that they are likely to have on the CSS. However, these reforms are neither framed within a clearly articulated HR strategy to which all stakeholders agree nor an integrated HRM system; indeed, these deficits affect availability optimization and the strategic coherence between the HRM subsystems.

**VI. RECOMMENDATIONS**

As explained, the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago has embarked on a reform agenda that incorporates an HRM component and addresses critical elements of HR subsystems. These reforms are not framed within an HR strategy and it is well known that a broad strategy capable of delineating related priorities and objectives and having the support of all stakeholders is consistent with contemporary human resource management practice and is the foundation for an integrated HRM system. In addition, reforms to the CSS are also constrained by the legal framework that does not readily respond to stated changes in policy priorities, in particular the stated thrust to decentralize the HR function.

Given these limitations, three recommendations are made: (a) articulate a broad HR strategy that all stakeholders agree to; (b) develop an integrated HRM system; and (c) modernize the legal framework to accommodate the current reform initiatives.

**Proposed Improvements**

Within the framework of the recommendations made, the HR strategy would serve as a guide to policy-makers, practitioners and other stakeholders and become a building block for an integrated HRM system.

Specific improvements to the HR subsystems are likely to include the formalization of HR Planning and the use of the HRIS as a planning tool. HR planning constitutes “the front door in any integrated HRM system and allows the definition of coherent policies in all the remaining subsystems to which it is connected” (Longo, F. 2002:14).

The optimization of human resources is generally facilitated by the inclusion of personal profiles in job descriptions to establish and specify the contents of the tasks and the specific characteristics of the individuals who will perform the tasks. This is a likely outcome of the current job
evaluation exercise and will serve to strengthen the Work Organization subsystem.

The integrated HRM system will probably address the ‘induction program’ void in the Employment Management subsystem.

A formalized performance management subsystem is likely to stimulate as well as plan and evaluate civil servants’ contributions. The strategic coherence between this subsystem and the Professional Development Management and Compensation Management subsystems will be enhanced.

The sustained use of structured instruments to assess organizational climate will help inform HR policies and programs. The Public Service Employee Survey undertaken in collaboration with the unions is a positive development in this direction.

In a dynamic reform ethos, engendering the internal dynamic to manage change in each central government agency is an important consideration. The New Systems Facilitators, “dedicated staff to lead each ministry in change management issues,” is a positive development that may lead to greater understanding about the change process and reduce the current resistance to change.

### VII. SUMMARY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Evaluators Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background Analysis of the Institutional Context</strong></td>
<td>Analysis of the legal framework&lt;br&gt;The Constitution (1976), PSC Regulations (1966) the Civil Service Act and the Pensions Act are the main building blocks. There is a vision to modernize the legal framework to facilitate decentralization of the HRM function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functional Analysis of the Civil Service</strong></td>
<td>Analysis of the Human Resources Organization function&lt;br&gt;The Service Commissions Department, the PSC, the Personnel Department, the Ministry of Public Administration and Information and the Ministry of Finance are the main actors. The CSS is epitomized by centralized decision-making. With the exception of the decentralization of training and some routine aspects of the Employment Management subsystem, managers in line agencies do not have autonomy to make HRM-related decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analyzed Quantitative Indicators of the CSS</strong></td>
<td>The civil service staff complement is 30,000. The staff complement is low relative to international comparators and suggests insufficient development of the central government overall. The central government wage bill accounts for 7.8% of GDP. The fiscal weight of central government employment is not a relative burden on the economy. There is evidence of tight compression in the compensation structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analysis by Subsystems</strong></td>
<td>Planning&lt;br&gt;IT infrastructure has been developed in three pilot agencies with HR decision-making function. While the HRIS is a production model in the central agencies and is networked to ministries and departments, this system is not yet formalized into a planning tool and limits access to information and related decision-making by line managers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>****</td>
<td>Work Organization&lt;br&gt;Job evaluation is being undertaken in the central civil service, after a hiatus of three decades. There is evidence of succession planning at leadership level with the development of the permanent secretary cadre. Job descriptions for this cadre include competencies profiles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **** | Employment Management<br>Employment decisions generally conform to professional criteria. Merit-based recruitment measures are sometimes contested when one of the two dominant ethnic
### Factors Evaluators Comments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Evaluators Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Performance Management</td>
<td>Performance management is formalized for the permanent secretary cadre, an initiative of recent vintage. Implementation of a performance management system introduced service-wide in the 1990s was problematic because of lack of job descriptions, difficulty with standard setting as well as the culture of distrust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation Management</td>
<td>The compensation strategy tends to be reactive in response to unions’ demands. The salary structure is not competitive at the senior levels. There is evidence of tight compression. Other benefits, including pension and non-monetary benefits, are in place and are adequate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Development Management</td>
<td>There is a deficit in career planning. Seniority is an important factor. The existing career planning void influences career design quality, as promotion decisions tend to rely on seniority rather than on the results of training. A training policy will be developed. Ideally, training management will emphasize training delivery based on needs analysis and evaluated in terms of costs and benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human and Social Relations Management</td>
<td>While the Government has had the vision to administer a Public Service Employee Survey in March 2004 in order to assess the organizational climate, the reportedly adversarial labor relations ethos as well as an apparent need to build social capital influences this subsystem adversely. Civil servants’ pension is considered generous. Other benefits include old age pension and the national insurance scheme. One source of disquiet that affects the morale of civil servants is linked to the convention of special hiring regimes that facilitate certain serving civil servants’ extended appointments to projects on contract, and at higher pay than their counterparts in service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison with other analyses</td>
<td>The system management model features prominently. The CSS in Trinidad and Tobago evidences integrated systems in which the “public employer appears to be highly centralized” (Longo, F. 2002: 59). Yet there is a conflicting trend reflecting the fragmentation of the system at the central level: four central agencies are the key actors. The professionalism and independence of persons in charge of selection are mandated in the Constitution, evidencing the recruitment system model.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
APPENDICES

Appendix A Critical Points Valuation – Comparative Table:

See Appendices section.

Appendix B Summary – Comparative Table:

See Appendices section.

Appendix C. Report Technical Information

• Report Dates
  Diagnosis date: November 2004

• Consultant
  Dr. Hedy Isaacs

• Acknowledgements

2004: The researcher relied heavily on documented sources as a collective frame of reference for analyzing the existing CSS, and developing recommendations.

I wish to express appreciation to Mrs. Jacqueline Wilson, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Public Administration and Information, and to Ms. Donna Ferraz, Director, Public Service Transformation Division (PSTD), of the same ministry, for sharing information regarding recent initiatives that affect the CSS in Trinidad and Tobago. I am grateful to Ms. Ingrid Carlson, Consultant to the Regional Policy Dialogue, Public Policy and Management Network, IDB Office, Washington, for providing a copy of the previous (2002) Institutional Assessment of the CSS in Trinidad and Tobago.

2007: Content analysis [Documentary sources]

Works Consulted

Documents


International Public Management Association for Human Resources (2002). “Human Resource Developments in the Public Service of Trinidad and Tobago.”

http://www.ipma-hr.org/index.cfm?id=57&navid=73&tcode=nws3

# List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPAM</td>
<td>Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICAD</td>
<td>Caribbean Centre for Development Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Civil Service Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRIS</td>
<td>Human Resources Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>Human Resources Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>National Alliance for Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNM</td>
<td>People's National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Service Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSTD</td>
<td>Public Service Transformation Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>United National Congress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART III

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
COMPARING THE CIVIL SERVICE IN FOUR ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE APPROACH

ANA LAURA RODRÍGUEZ GUSTÁ AND MERCEDES IACOVIELLO

INTRODUCTION

This final chapter has two objectives. It seeks to characterize and compare the civil services of Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Belize. The previous chapters have presented an institutional assessment of each country in detail, providing the basis for the cross-cutting analysis proposed here. This comparative analysis will serve to provide an overarching view of the development of the civil service in the region.

This chapter attempts to provide a flavor of the development and institutionalization of the civil service in the four countries vis-à-vis the larger Latin American and Caribbean region. As we will see, the four countries are unique in the weight they give to merits, the development of human resources information systems, the structure of the organization of the human resources function and other important aspects of the civil service structure and practice. In other words, there are differences among the four countries under analysis, for which reason the comparative lens should protect us from sweeping generalizations about the civil service development in the sub-region concerned.

The paper is organized as follows. First, we will very briefly present a dynamic overview of the reforms conducted in the four countries, describing their implementation stages as well as other countries’ features deemed relevant in order to understand the development of the civil services in the sub-region. Second, we will examine the quantitative information, by reviewing the countries’ scores on the subsystems. Then, we will enter into the core analysis of this chapter: the comparison and interpretation of the ratings of the five indices corresponding to civil service development. Finally, we will conclude by highlighting that the intermediate levels of the indices reflect both the changes recently introduced and the more historical emphasis on structural procedures concerning the management of the civil service. A more consistent set of reforms would probably increase the good development levels shown by the five indices discussed here, though these reforms should take advantage of the well-established merit systems in recruiting and promoting employees.

I. THE STAGE: MANAGERIALLY-INSPIRED REFORMS

Conducting an institutional assessment of the civil service in these countries is a relevant endeavor since the public sector is the largest employer, thus assuming a pivotal role in the labor market...
and the economy. The previous chapters suggest three distinct features of the civil service in the sub-region. First, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Belize are former British colonial countries, having inherited a merit-based employment management system. Overall, the civil service is protected from overt political interference, with some caveats. Additionally, according to their Constitutions, the responsibility for recruitment, selection, promotion, discipline, and termination of employment rests for the most part with the Public Service Commissions. These are professional and autonomous bodies that have protected the civil service from particularistic influences.

The four countries have been engaged in active reforms gearing towards modernizing their human resources instruments, practices, and systems since the early nineties. The New Public Management philosophy inspires these changes. Indeed, the reform efforts seek to instill a civil service based on results rather than formal rules, with a business rather than procedure orientation, and an emphasis on client satisfaction (see Table 1 below). In Jamaica, for example, the changes have led to the creation of Executive Agencies and to an attempt to reduce the size of the public sector employment or, at least, contain it. Yet, some aspects of the reform seem to reinforce the more classic bureaucratic aspects rather than introducing an ideal-type managerial reform. For illustration purposes, there is an emphasis on formalizing existing practices and transforming them into clear written rules instead of leaving them to the realm of customary practices, such as the formalization of performance management and human resources planning systems.

At the risk of oversimplifying the complexity of the current reform drives, the unifying

| Table 1. Selected Human Resources Management Initiatives |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------|
| **Country**     | **Initiatives in HRM**                   |
| Barbados        | • Introduction of information systems (SmartStream) |
|                 | • Performance Review and Development System in pilot agencies |
|                 | • Employee Assistance Programme          |
|                 | • Internal Reform Committees in each agency  |
|                 | • Job classification (system-wide) and performance management plans |
|                 | • Modernization of legal framework of Civil Service Commissions |
|                 | • Development of Strategic Plans          |
| Belize          | • Improvement of the financial management system |
|                 | • Introduction of information systems (SmartStream) |
|                 | • Job classification (system-wide) and performance management plans |
|                 | • HR development plan                     |
|                 | • Work climate initiatives                |
|                 | • Employee Assistance Programme           |
|                 | • Political and fiscal reforms            |
| Jamaica         | • Introduction of a human resource database along with a number of human resources policies including compensation, training, the introduction of performance standards and a performance appraisal system, and a new job classification system |
| Trinidad and Tobago | • Establishment of Human Resources Units in each Ministry |
|                 | • Introduction of an automated human resources information system (2002) in pilot agencies |
|                 | • Public Sector Reform Initiation Programme (2004) |
|                 | • E-Government                            |
|                 | • New job classification and compensation plans, and performance appraisal systems |
|                 | • “New System Facilitators” or staff dealing with change management in each Ministry |
|                 | • Public Employee Survey (with unions)    |

*Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)*
foci common to the four countries are the following:

- *Decentralization* of the human resources function
- *Formalization* of the human resources planning and performance management
- *Implementation* of job evaluation and employee monitoring
- *Strengthening* of leadership and constant learning
- *Development and update* of managerial functions
- *Development* of strategic plans within public sector organizations
- *Formalization* of multiple instruments for human resources management (job descriptions with competencies, modern training, reliable evaluations, etc.)
- *Introduction of changes* in the legal framework
- *Promotion* of customer and client satisfaction

Third, the previous chapters show that the four countries vary in how far the reforms have been implemented. As this chapter analyzes, the systems for managing public employment and human resources are in transition and as such, in a hybrid stage. Program implementation may occur in isolation, losing sight of the larger picture of an integrated human resources system. Additionally, there are tensions and contradictions: the impulse for more coordination across the various subsystems collides with the traditionally centralized human resources management. The five civil service indices developed by Longo (2002) reflect these tensions. This chapter will describe and explain such indices—efficiency, merit, structural consistency, functional capacity and integrating capacity—by comparing the results obtained for the four countries.

Before turning to such comparison, it will be helpful to refresh some selected aspects of each country’s situation in order to highlight the fact that they face tensions and contradictions mostly at the implementation level. Overall, in the region, the modernization efforts are not necessarily implemented within an articulated human resources strategy management system (see Table 2 below).

Trinidad and Tobago, despite its decentralization goal, has not truly transferred decision-making of human resources issues to the line level (except for training activities). The Prime Minister of Belize has reactivated the reform of the public sector, in light of the fact that many previous programs had been discontinued while others have not even been initiated. In Barbados, the internal dynamics of the reform have not taken root in the entire civil service, and public officers remain ambiguous about embracing the reform proposals. The reforms in Jamaica are implemented in a context of economic restrictions and cost containment, and they are not always articulated in a smooth fashion.

Why does the actual implementation depart in extent and scope from the original reform?

---

**Table 2. The Reform Evolution in the Four Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Belize</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Trinidad and Tobago</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Slow implementation</em></td>
<td><em>Partial implementation</em></td>
<td><em>Implementation, sometimes not interconnected</em></td>
<td><em>Slow and piecemeal implementation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Few reforms have been institutionalized system-wide</em></td>
<td><em>Low response rate by ministries</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Reform efforts seem to have lost momentum</em></td>
<td><em>Prime Minister reinforced reform thrust in 2003</em></td>
<td><em>Reforms are on-going within the cost containment strategy, which could eventually undermine reforms</em></td>
<td><em>Some efforts seem to have reached a standstill</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Broader stakeholder commitment required, particularly at the implementation stage</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)*
plans? Each country has its own reasons. Trinidad and Tobago faces clear political constraints, such as lack of political will and consensus, and a context of two political parties highly divided along racial lines (Isaacs 2004). To this we should add certain discomfort between the union and the Government to the point that the union has actively hindered some reforms (such as completing job classifications). In short, we may affirm that implementation in Trinidad and Tobago has been piecemeal, and slowly implemented.

By contrast, the reform in Barbados shows an overall smooth albeit slow pace implementation process. This has been possible due to the fact that the two major political parties are ideologically alike, thus bringing about political stability in the country. Yet, the reform packages have not necessarily been interrelated strategically and there are important efficiency losses. Not surprisingly, the reform in this country has “lost momentum”, as well as administrative and political leadership (Isaacs 2004).

In Belize, the involvement of the Prime Minister in 2003 has been pivotal in the continuity of the reform effort. There has been an explicit political will to establish a partnership body: the Public Sector Reform Council, formed by representatives from the Ministry of Public Service, the Ministry of Finance, unions, and the private sector. This Council should monitor the implementation of reform. Nonetheless, a major reform challenge consists in involving all ministries in the initiatives.

In Jamaica, the civil service reform is considered a pre-requisite for achieving the national goals for sustainable development and economic growth of this small and open economy. Despite the lack of a fully strategic and interrelated human resources management system, public sector reforms have been fairly continuous. In all likelihood, this occurs because of the strong political commitment of the Prime Minister as well as the trade union. This commitment is reflected in the Memorandum of Understanding, where the union agrees to accept some of the fiscal constraints under the expectation that the personnel-related reforms will benefit public officers. Still, the measures to control the fiscal deficit pose serious constraints to the human resources reforms, for instance, limiting promotion opportunities and not allowing public sector salaries to become truly competitive relative to the market.

Having provided this more dynamic overview about the recent historical conjuncture, let us now turn to the comparative analysis of the civil service organization. We will start by briefly describing the main functions of the civil service along the 8 sub-systems provided by the methodology (Longo 2002): human resources planning, work organization, employment, performance management, professional development management, compensation management, human and social relations management, and the organization of the human resources function.

II. A COMPARATIVE LENS ON CIVIL SERVICE DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE INDICES

An Overview of the Subsystems
In examining the scores for each subsystem proposed by the methodology, we observe the following facts. First, the employment function is the most developed subsystem in the four countries, whereas human resources planning is the most incipient. Second, when compared with Latin America, the four countries tend to score above the average for all subsystems, except for human resources planning (See Table 3 below).

The employment subsystem reveals the largest difference between the four countries and the rest of Latin America, mostly due to the former’s merit-based route for selecting and recruiting employees. This is not the rule in the rest of the region (Iacoviello and Zuvanic 2006).

On performance management, the four countries together score above the region’s average. Moreover, individually taken, Barbados and Jamaica have the highest scores of the whole region (2.9), except for Chile that scores 3.4. Despite this, performance management is incipient in the four countries examined here, though
## Table 3. A Subsystem Perspective: Regional and Sub-regional scores

| Human Resources Planning: constitutes the front door in any human resources management system, and enables an organization to evaluate its qualitative and quantitative needs of human resources for the short, medium, and long term in order to confront identified needs with its existing capacities and to identify any actions that need to be undertaken to bridge the gap. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Barbados | 2.1 | Belize | 2.0 | Jamaica | 2.2 | Trinidad and Tobago | 1.9 | Regional average | 2.0 | Latin America’s average | 1.9 |

| Work Organization: anticipates and specifies the tasks to be performed as well as the profile of the people qualified to carry them out. It includes both the description of the activities, functions, and responsibilities assigned to each position (job description) and the definition of the competencies, skills, and attitudes that are necessary for successful performance at each position (profile definition). |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 1.7 |

| Employment Management: involves personnel policies and practices concerned with managing the processes by which people enter, move within and leave the organization. It is central to the human resources management system, especially in the public sector, since it should be managed based on equity, merit, and quality principles. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 2.0 |

| Performance Management: refers to the process of planning and evaluating the contribution of employees to the organization. It should be managed so that individual and group performance is in line with the organizations’ priorities and kept at the highest possible level to enable sustained improvement of their contribution to the organization. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.9 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 1.5 |

| Compensation Management: entails the management of all types of monetary (i.e. wage or non-wage) and non-monetary benefits offered by the organization to its employees to reward them for their contribution to achieving the organization’s objectives. It should be based on internal and external equity principles, with a salary structure based on the valuation and classification of positions, and some kind of variable payment scheme that link rewards to performance or results (either at the individual, group, or institutional level). |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 1.7 |

| Professional Development Management: the policies and practices of development management aim at stimulating the professional development of the staff members according to their potential, encouraging learning and defining career paths that should match the organization’s needs with the individual profile. Promotion policies, career design, and training policies are the main processes included in this subsystem, which should be managed with a clear focus on the priorities and needs of the organization. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 1.6 |

| Human and Social Relations Management: is concerned with the management of the relations between the organization and its employees regarding personnel policies and practices when these acquire, in a given context, a collective dimension. It involves labor relations management, which includes the collective negotiations of pay and working conditions, the management of the organizational climate in terms of communication policies and practices, and social benefits that are offered to employees in general or to aid particularly needy groups or individuals. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 1.7 |

| Organization of Human Resources function: refers to the mechanisms used for the management of the system, particularly the distribution of personnel decisions among the different responsible parties. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 1.7 |

*Includes 18 countries’ scores, thus excluding the four countries of interest here. For details on the scores for each country, refer to Appendix E. Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)
there are observable developments at the higher managerial levels such as the performance assessments of Permanent Secretaries. In the rest of the region, by contrast, evaluations remain ceremonial even at managerial levels.

In Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Belize, we observe attempts to create job profiles that truly map job competencies and personality traits beyond formal education requirements—as it has been the tradition in the Work Organization subsystem. In comparison with the rest of the region, however, the four countries reflect a more developed situation given for the most part by their current updates of job profiles and classifications. Indeed, on work organization, only Brazil (2.9) has a score comparable to those of Barbados and Jamaica (2.8 and 2.9, respectively).

In the four Caribbean countries studied, the Compensation Management subsystem reflects the general principle of “equal pay for equal work” but it is not competitive with private sector salaries for the high-skilled jobs, at the top of the employment pyramid. By contrast, there is a generalized lack of internal equity in the region. Not surprisingly, these four countries’ average is higher than the region’s score. Individually, only Chile and Brazil obtain higher scores on this subsystem (2.9).

With regard to professional development, as with the rest of the region, Barbados, Belize, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, present some structural rigidities in the internal mobility and contract termination of public officers, due to the fact that mobility remains largely informed by seniority criteria (hindering strategic succession planning), to which we should add the absence of pay for performance practices. If compared with the whole region, in addition to presenting higher averages, these countries are amongst those with the highest individual ratings on this subsystem.

In relation to the Human and Social Relations Management subsystem, we also observe the subregion’s higher average ratings. The integration of unions—with varying degrees of conflict and trust—into the bargaining and negotiation system pulls the score up, in absence of institutionalized practices concerning the quality of the organizational climate. The institutionalization of labor relations and the incidence of unions on key aspects of the human resources management are precisely what makes the difference between these four countries and the rest of Latin America.

Lastly, the Organization of the Human Resources Function subsystem in the four countries shows an intermediate development due to the prestige and professional autonomy of the Public Service Commissions. Barbados and Jamaica obtain the highest ratings in this subsystem vis-à-vis the rest of the Latin American countries individually taken.

In short, an analysis of the four countries from the perspective of the subsystems reveals that their civil services have reached intermediate levels of development and in some cases, upper levels relative to the regional context.

An Analytic Note on the Use of the Indices

The methodology developed by Longo (2002) offers the possibility of looking at these eight subsystems transversally, by the use of indices. The indices are quantitative measures derived from the critical points used to evaluate the subsystems. Interestingly, these indices, as will be seen later on, actually reveal deeper differences between the four countries than a first glance at the subsystems would suggest. Before turning to the analysis of the indices, we have to be clear about how they are used for assessing the strategic development of civil services.

The indices, by design, require a quantitative reading because they are numeric summary measures. Indeed, they provide a normalized score ranging from 0% to 100%. We use these indices to compare the countries, and in this sense, the indices provide interpretations about the variation existing among them.

1 A score of 100% suggests the maximum development possible.
Because the 93 critical points evaluate ideal-type models of strategically-managed civil services, contrasting the indices ratings against this “ideally perfect” civil service model could be somewhat misleading if this is not placed into context. Taking into account this appreciation, we have compared the four countries’ results with the scores obtained for 18 Latin American countries. This could provide a more realistic appreciation of the extent of development and consolidation of strategic civil services in these four English-speaking Caribbean countries relative to the region.

Considering the rest of the region has led us to recode some of the original quantitative evaluations of the critical points, in order to ensure reliability and consistency in the comparison. In all likelihood, this reflects the richness and flexibility of the methodology employed here: its reference point may vary depending on contextual considerations.

Because the indices are quantitative summaries of rich and detailed information contained in the institutional assessments presented in the previous chapters, we utilize qualitative data in the analysis to give substance and nuance to the comparison. More importantly, the qualitative evidence provides substantive interpretations of the indices beyond their quantitative results.

The remaining analysis is organized as follows. First, we will describe each index and, if applicable, the sub-indices; then we will highlight the most significant quantitative outcomes in a comparative spotlight (taking the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole). Second, we will turn to the qualitative discussion by focusing on the most salient empirical issues underscored by the institutional evaluations. Finally, we will discuss in all cases the differences as well as the common traits along the stylized qualitative information.

II.1. Efficiency

Does the structure and practices of the civil service respond to cost benefit calculations? Are bureaucratic processes costly to the economy or are they within accepted boundaries? Are human resources used efficiently, timely and adequately in the civil service? These questions refer to the efficiency of the civil service.

Captured by 13 critical points, this index measures the optimal distribution and use of people and resources across organizations and sectors: it evaluates the degree of optimization of the investment in human capital detectable in the civil service system, its alignment with the scale of the fiscal policy, and its reference markets. Consequently, high efficiency scores would imply managing slack resources as well as preventing resource deficits. These are capacities usually associated with adequate planning systems, and its coordination with employment management, training investments, and compensation strategies.

The Latin American region presents an average of 32% of the scale on efficiency (see Appendix D). Chile, Brazil and Argentina are the three countries with the highest values (59%, 56% and 50%, respectively). The lowest index score is 8%. The four countries studied here score well above the region’s average (see Figure 1 and Table 4 below). Barbados obtains 53% of the scale, probably because of the implementation of a human resources information system, with its associated training given by the Office of Public Sector Reform. Belize and Jamaica follow, with 50% of the scale. Trinidad and Tobago scores slightly lower (45%), but still relatively high when compared with the broader region.

The efficiency scores indicate that the four countries have reached intermediate levels of development. The following empirical issues are highlighted by the institutional evaluations and deserve closer attention: a) the integration of planning and human resources management in order to assess the qualitative and quantitative needs of personnel and the distribution of work among units, b) the weight of the government wage bill on the economy, and c) the efficiency of the compensation structure and the investments in employee training.
Uncoordinated Planning: Effects on Efficiency

In the four countries, the civil service reform has instilled a conception of strategic approach to human resources planning. Still, the new instruments and systems have to take more grounds on the public sector as a whole. In Barbados and Belize, the efficiency in the use of these instruments and the consequent operations are midway from a full-fledged strategic planning.

As Isaacs (2004) observes, in Barbados planning remains “reactive.” Nonetheless, there is...

Figure 1. Efficiency Index

Table 4. Efficiency Index – Qualitative Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>• Advanced human information system for planning efforts</td>
<td>• Fiscal weight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>• Sound and digitalized fiscal information</td>
<td>• Fiscal weight • Deficit of skilled and surplus of unskilled officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>• Good implementation progress</td>
<td>• Fiscal weight • Migration of lawyers, health professionals and teachers to the private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>• Low fiscal weight of government wage bill in the rest of economy</td>
<td>• Implementation delays and obstacles • Small size of central government suggests insufficient development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The possible range of variation for the merit index is from 0 to 100%.

Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004), Iacoviello (2005)
evidence of promising developments. Indeed, the Office of Public Sector Reform (OPSR) has been assisting government agencies with strategic planning tools, though these tools are not yet institutionalized in the 18 ministries.

In Belize, planning is hindered by a climate of a low level of trust between ministers and senior public officers. There are no integrated human resources planning, which if added to the feeble information system, probably explains the observed shortcomings concerning employee redistribution and task allocation among units. Not surprisingly, Iacoviello (2005) identifies a deficit of skilled personnel, and a surplus of unskilled ones. Particularly at clerical levels, overstaffing is common while there is a shortage of specialized (technical and managerial) personnel. This leads, according to Iacoviello (2005), to a chronic “overwork” of qualified personnel.

Following Bissessar (2000), Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago seem to be opposite cases on this theme. Jamaica appears to move towards a quite articulated human resources management systems, while Trinidad and Tobago lags behind trying to cope with few implementation problems—some of them concerning employee resistance to the reform changes and the climate of little trust between ministers and senior public officers—as in Belize.

From the institutional diagnostics, there is no evidence of excessive staff turnover, probably associated with the fact of few designated political posts. Admittedly, there is an important deficit in some occupational categories in some countries such as Barbados, particularly those demanding more specialized personnel—namely: lawyers, engineers, land surveyors and information technology personnel. Jamaica and Belize also present deficits in some professional occupational groups. In Jamaica, certain high-skilled jobs are difficult to fill, such as corporate planners, human resources planners and office managers.

Fiscal Weight
In Belize, Jamaica, and Barbados salary expenditures seem to pose a burden on the public accounts. If we take Belize as an example, personal emoluments have held steady at around 50% of the total recurrent expenditures, a figure that increases to 60% when considering other indicators. Still, even beyond costs and size, efficiency in Belize is also affected by practices of rule-following and excessive bureaucratization of formalized procedures (Iacoviello 2005).

Yet, some efforts undertaken to control public expenditures are worth mentioning—Jamaica leads the way in these endeavors. The attempt to tightly manage salary expenditures has led to a freeze in employment and promotions, thus affecting other indices such as consistency and incentive capacity.

Fiscal weight, expenditures and public sector size should be read with caution. We admit that public sector size and the wage bill in particular affect the efficiency of the civil service in Barbados, Belize and Jamaica. Still, the small size of the civil service in Trinidad and Tobago is taken as a suggestion of an insufficient development of government functions (Isaacs 2004).

Compensations and Training Investments
On the items measuring efficiency in compensations, the tendency is that similar positions for established officers in different areas are similarly paid. Public sector salaries are higher than those paid in the private sector. Paradoxically, when it comes to specialized jobs, the salaries are not competitive enough among higher level jobs and qualified personnel. Other benefits seem adequate, with the exception of pensions but in most countries pensions are being revised.

For the most part, the costs and benefits of training are not evaluated. Also, training is yet to be based on planning and on a “needs

2 Inequalities are reported between tenured and on-contract employees in Belize and Barbados, since salaries are more favorable to the latter even with comparable tasks and responsibilities. This will be addressed later on.
analysis” and there is no reliable instrument to identify “skills gaps.” In Trinidad and Tobago, for instance, training has been discontinued for some years (due to budget constraints). In Belize, training is oriented towards the preferences of individuals and not to the strategic needs of organizations, although this issue is being addressed through an ambitious initiative to develop a national Human Resource Development plan (Iacoviello 2005).

Jamaica and Barbados seem the most promising countries on this point. In Jamaica, under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Congress of Trade Unions, a training plan is required. Also, the training needs analysis has been tested in the Ministry of Finance; training priorities have been placed on the medical and health areas. In Barbados, a training policy should be implemented in the short-term, with a training budget established by law. Yet, funds for training are limited, which is a feature that the four countries share.

Overall, the efficiency index is affected by the high costs of the public salaries, the low investments in strategic training and, above all, the weak planning tools mentioned earlier. A more qualitative look at this problem would lead us to argue that efficiency is negatively affected by the cumbersome rules inherited from the British system, which paradoxically favor merit, as we will see next.

Above all, efficiency seems to be affected by the actual transitional stage of the four countries, with reforms implemented half-way and programs incepted in isolation from each other rather than as a unified package. This is particularly so in Trinidad and Tobago (Bissesar 2002). About this country, Bissessar (2000) suggests that there has been a change in the name of managing human resources, calling it “strategic” but remaining very traditional in substance and, as such, losing efficiency.

II.2. Merit

Are recruitment processes fair? How are the most capable candidates selected from the pool of applicants? Is this a concern in the civil service practices and procedures? Are there political ties affecting important matters such as salary and promotion decisions, even access to bureaucratic jobs? The merit index addresses these questions. It evaluates the extent to which professional criteria are used to make employment decisions thus protecting employees from abuse, politicization and corruption.

Essentially, this index measures where there exist professional, technical and objective procedures in recruiting and selecting employees, promoting them, and terminating the employment relation. While low values in this index would suggest the presence of particularistic and non-technically based criteria, high values would indicate the presence of technical and professional criteria in employment management.

In the Latin American region, only Brazil and Chile present comparable merit indices, with 87% and 58% of the scale, respectively (see
Figure 2. Merit Index

![Merit Index Graph](image)

**Sources:** Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)

Table 6. Merit Index – Qualitative Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Merit Index Score</th>
<th>Index Qualitative Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
<td><strong>Weaknesses</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barbados</strong></td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>• Open system that operates upon available vacancies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Technical criteria for recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Personnel administration is highly technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• No political interference with promotions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Extremely few political jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belize</strong></td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>• Open system (even to CARICOM countries for some job vacancies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Personnel administration is highly technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Technical criteria for recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Extremely few political jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jamaica</strong></td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>• Open system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Personnel administration is highly technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Selection based on technical criteria and connected to specific job descriptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Extremely few political jobs (1% due to rounding)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trinidad and Tobago</strong></td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>• Personnel administration is highly technical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Technical criteria for recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Extremely few political jobs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The possible range of variation for the merit index is from 0 to 100%.

**Source:** Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004), Iacoviello (2005)
Appendix D). Overall, particularistic ties of all sorts affect the recruitment and selection of personnel in the region. By sharp contrast, the four English-speaking Caribbean countries examined here score quite well on this index, despite country variations (See Figure 2 and Table 6 below). For the most part, the index reflects the use of merit in recruiting and selecting personnel. Indeed, the merit index is the highest score in the four civil services studied here. In contrast with other Latin American countries, the absence of relations of political clientele as a mechanism for accessing public jobs is practically unheard of in these four countries.

Certainly, the weight placed on the assessment of merits at the recruitment stages relates to the famous Public Service Commissions, inherited from the British system. Stated in the countries’ Constitutions, these Commissions are independent and autonomous bodies that govern the appointment, discipline and removal of nearly all public officers (Draper 2001). However, given their high technical nature, they have more recently been questioned for instilling too much rigidity into the human resources management system, but they are pivotal in accounting for the high levels of merits in the four countries examined.

Jamaica presents the highest merit index in the English-Caribbean region (75%). Certainly, this score reflects the well-developed employment management system. We can observe a very low percentage of politically-driven posts (1% as per data provided by Isaac, 2002). In addition to an emphasis on professionalism for bureaucratic positions, the recruitment is open, universal and widely disseminated. Selection decisions are made on the basis of technical and proved credentials and on the basis of a job profile of the vacancy to fill. In essence, recruitment is competitive and the requirements are clear for different types of jobs rather than arbitrary or random. The selection bodies are representative, independent and autonomous from the political system. Consequently, employment decisions are transparent, accompanied by rigorous selection procedures that may include interviews and even examinations (Isaacs 2002).

In Barbados, merit reaches 71% of the scale. Briefly, recruitment is open by law and positions are filled according to established technical criteria whenever there is a vacancy available. In addition to basic qualifications, usually academic degrees, a job applicant may be interviewed (IADB 2002). The personnel recruiting bodies are of good technical quality. Political appointments beyond those legally stipulated are rare, with the notable exceptions of state-owned corporations and selected agencies such as hospitals and airports (IADB 2002). Basically, merit considerations in recruiting and selecting personnel are fairly respected.

If anything, inherited rigidities inhibit the merit index from being even higher, such as an over-reliance on too formal procedures in recruiting new public officers, which sometimes miss more substantive aspects of an applicant’s abilities. Yet, with the full implementation of the human resources software package (SmartStream), selecting employees will more actively incorporate abilities and competencies (Isaacs 2004).

The 68% of the merit scale found in Belize relates to a strongly developed employment management subsystem that has served to instill reasonable practices about how people enter the organization, move and leave. Consider some of the ten critical points in more detail. Public Service Commissions designate personnel, isolating employment decision from direct political maneuvers. Politics and discretion do not influence salary decisions or promotions. The distinction between bureaucratic and political appointments is institutionalized, largely guaranteed by an independent Public Service Commission.

There are some exceptions, for which the merit index is lower in Belize than in Jamaica or Barbados. Politically appointed CEOs (the functional equivalent of Permanent Secretaries) are empowered to recruit and select personnel for low administrative and maintenance jobs since year 2000. Still, the Commission monitors that the recruitment procedures be adequately employed.
A more problematic exception is the hiring of the so-called “open vote” workers—temporary assignments usually at the lowest classification levels—because this hiring decision directly depends on the will of the Ministers (Iacoviello 2005). Possibly, if these employees become used in excess, this may undermine the merit system due to the discretionary component of their administration. So far, there is no major evidence of abuse of this exceptional procedure.

Additionally, Belize includes procedures to overcome potential biases and discrimination at the recruitment stage—the composition of the recruitment panel is varied. Vacancies are well advertised. In some cases—when no applicant fulfills the job requirements—the vacancy is then opened for the whole set of CARICOM countries. Yet, it is difficult to overcome a situation of structural discrimination, beyond the institutional capacities of the State: half of the population in Belize is not fluent in English, a requisite for accessing jobs in the public sector, in addition to low levels of overall literacy.

The selection instruments and procedures are quite sound: they are detailed and there are high levels of compliance with them. Nonetheless, a major drawback seems that formal credentials and “paper qualifications” take precedence over more dynamic considerations about a candidate’s competencies and his/her intangible job abilities. Still, the expert panel making personnel recruitment decisions is of high technical quality.

Lastly, in Trinidad and Tobago merit comprises 59% of the scale. This value reflects the professionalism at the moment of recruiting personnel, as well as the solid background and history of the recruiting organizations, such as the Public Service Commission. There are competitions based on objective criteria, tests and examinations (Draper 2001).

Yet, the existence of an unequal representation of ethnic groups in the civil service pulls the index down, for it suggests possible forms of discrimination or unintended biases at the selection stage. Indeed, Afro-Trinidadians are more favored than Indo-Trinidadians, an imbalance reported by the Centre for Ethnic Studies of the University of West Indies in 1994 (Bissessar 2000). Not surprisingly, there have been efforts to establish an Equal Opportunities Commission.

To summarize, Barbados, Belize, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago present well-developed employment subsystems, whose major contribution is the enforcement of merit considerations when selecting public officers. These four civil services have solid recruiting bodies that are independent from political pressures. The country’s evaluations do not present evidence of major political interference in the human resources management of employees.

II.3. STRUCTURAL CONSISTENCY

Are the various mechanisms, practices and procedures of human resources management integrated? Do organizational structures and procedures converge into a consistent public employment system? What about the consistency in attitudes and behaviors of those in charge of managing public employees? The structural consistency index measures all these important questions and it is, in turn, divided into three sub-indices adding up to twenty nine critical points altogether: a) strategic coherence, b) directive consistency and c) consistency in processes.

II.3.1. An Overview of the Structural Consistency Index

In the Latin American region, the structural consistency index reflects a general lack of coherence among the different aspects concerning the strategic management of human resources. Exceptions to this are Brazil and Chile, with 58% and 65% on the structural consistency index, respectively. The country average is 30, with a range from 9 to 65 (see Appendix D).

By contrast, the four countries studied here reflect relatively higher degrees of internal consistency in their civil services, for they take the following values: Barbados 56%, Belize 51%, Ja-
maica 57%, and Trinidad and Tobago 43% (see Table 7 below). What are the characteristics of the structural consistency of these civil services? Additionally, what accounts for the differences between them? To answer to these questions, we must examine each sub-index individually.

Clearly, most of the problems affecting the mechanisms and practices concerning strategic coherence in all the countries are found in the civil service, thus impacting negatively on the structural consistency index. Some countries have their structural strengths in the consistency of managers and directive lines, such as Barbados and Jamaica. Others, such as Belize, have instead their structural strengths in the consistency of their processes, while they show clear weaknesses in the strategic coherence of civil service processes and mechanisms. Other countries, such as Trinidad and Tobago, score evenly across the sub-indices.

II.3.2. Strategic coherence

We will start with strategic coherence, which refers to the extent of connection between the organization’s employment and human resource-

Table 7: Structural Consistency: Sub-indices Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Strategic Coherence</th>
<th>Directive Consistency</th>
<th>Consistency of Processes</th>
<th>Structural Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)
Comparing the Civil Service in Four English-Speaking Caribbean Countries: A Quantitative and Qualitative Approach

Disjointed Planning
As observed for the rest of the region, the main shortcoming of strategic coherence is the lack of connection between each government’s plans and the organizations’ human resources planning. Forecasts on personnel needs, qualitative and quantitative projections, and organizational priorities are separate tasks rarely informing each other. As a result, the expected strategic coherence turns out to be a set of uncoupled decisions and plans about human resources management.

In the four cases examined here, these observations are true but these countries are in a state of transformation towards more consistent interconnections between the overall plans and organizations’ lower-level planning. In fact, these interconnections have largely improved with the New Public Management reforms experienced since the late 1980s, simultaneously aiming at developing strategic plans and conducting organizational reviews. Paradoxically, in many cases, these plans have not further prospered because the different initiatives have been introduced in isolation (IADB 2002), reinforcing in many cases the previous lack of connection between the various dimensions of the human resources management.

 Particularly in Barbados, “reformers failed to conceive of Public Sector or Human Resources Management reform as an integrated system” (IADB 2002: 9). The Office of Public Sector Reform (established in 1997) has been attempting to introduce and institutionalize planning mechanisms for the management of human resources.

### Table 8. Strategic Coherence Sub-index – Qualitative Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Strategic Coherence</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>• On-going strategic planning with organizational reviews</td>
<td>• Implementation in isolation, uncoupled from other human resources practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Pilot projects on performance measurement</td>
<td>• Wage plans for compensations are not necessarily strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>• There is a National Plan at the macro level, from which specific organizational plans could be derived consistently</td>
<td>• Each minister establishes priorities and strategies without considering the National Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Salary reviews are relatively frequent, reinforcing coherence in compensations</td>
<td>• No strategic plan to address skills gaps and employee training needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>• Corporate planning process with an emphasis on budget needs</td>
<td>• Human resources planning lacks formal instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Performance contracts and evaluation of upper level managers</td>
<td>• Strategic performance targets are not widespread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>• E-Government initiative will serve to integrate different agencies</td>
<td>• Lack of formal instruments as well as widespread information systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• On-going efforts at performance planning</td>
<td>• Reactive compensation structure and lack of performance indicators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The possible range of variation for the index is from 0 to 100%.

Paragraphs in italics refer to the critical points concerning planning. Paragraphs in regular font refer to strategic coherence in performance, compensations, and development management.

Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)
It is due to these efforts and the shortcomings just mentioned that the strategic coherence index reflects what we could call a “transitional stage.”

On the one hand, a Strategic Plan at the government’s level is lacking. To this we should add the incipient institutionalization and diffusion across all ministries of the human strategic management systems introduced by the managerial state reform just mentioned. The planning subsystem, according to Isaacs (2004), remains reactive. On the other hand, Barbados’ civil service is promising due to the current implementation of modern planning systems. These systems allow organizational diagnostics of their needs and priorities, including budgeting and human resources planning by means of computerized information records.

In connecting the government’s priorities with the organizational human resources needs, Jamaica has developed some strategic planning but with shortcomings. Indeed, as Isaacs points out (2002), there is a corporate planning process that operates as the overarching planning framework, on the basis of the national priorities and the budget process. By contrast, the human resources planning process is not formalized, happens de facto and ends up being idiosyncratic for each organization. Testimonial evidence suggests, though, that there is awareness of the importance of strategic human resources planning.

In Belize, strategic coherence reflects a still weak strategic planning system in human resources management. There is no organizational process by which the amount and type of personnel needed is actually calculated and projected. The strategic planning “at the macro level is not layered down” (Iacoviello 2005). Ministers, then, “capriciously” make their human resources planning.

Further, the budget release process undermines any planning effort. Rather than releasing funds on the basis of needs and priorities, the “cash flow” management system means that the Ministry of Finance dispenses one twelfth of the approved annual budget on a monthly basis (Iacoviello 2005), irrespective of the actual needs of an organization. So far, efforts towards rationalizing roles and functions have not been implemented, for which the critical points measuring the strategic coherence of human resources planning obtain very low scores.

We should also take into account the political underpinnings of the reform process. The concentration of responsibility has been in the hands of the Ministry of Public Service—and more recently in the Office of Governance—without actively engaging the ministers in the various initiatives. This precludes organizations from integrating the design of the changes themselves, an aspect that in all likelihood affect the planning of human resources.

In Trinidad and Tobago, as Isaacs (2004) observes, the human resources planning is not yet formalized, and important aspects, such as the information system, have been implemented in pilot organizations only. Still, as with the rest of the four countries, the interconnection between the government’s priorities and organizational human resources strategies and needs is in transition towards a more developed stage. Under the E-Government program, the expectation is to integrate all agencies for sharing information and emulating best practices in selected operations.

**Strategies in Compensation and Performance Standards**

Whereas it is a fact that strategic coherence is largely determined by the quality of human resources planning (four out of seven critical points refer to this subsystem), we must take into account strategic coherence in compensations, performance management and training to get a full panorama on this index. Overall, all four countries are affected by shortcomings in the human resources planning, as is the case with the rest of the region, thus reducing the degree of strategic coherence.

In Barbados, there are pilot projects for performance review and development systems that suppose strategic organizational plans vis-à-vis individual performance evaluations. Yet, while
compensations do respond to wage plans, these plans are not necessarily strategic. Lastly, training plans designed beforehand for devising training needs are scarce, getting the lowest score of the items of the sub-index.

In Jamaica, the performance measures of public managers (e.g. Permanent Secretaries and administrative heads) increase the value of the index. This is worth mentioning because, despite the shortcomings of having only a process of corporate planning, this process allows for performance guidelines to become an integral part for monitoring the work of high-ranking positions.

In Belize—probably associated with a weak planning process—there are no clear organizational performance targets in place, which could serve to guide and evaluate individuals’ work contributions. In the same line, there is a shortage of planning concerning the skills gaps and employee training needs, for which investments along these lines might be erratic or at least less consistent. About the strategic coherence in compensations, the Belize’s civil service offers similar salaries for similar positions for established officers. Salary reviews are conducted when requesting appointments and promotions. No discretionary practices are observed, as the responsibility of fixing salaries remains in highly professional bodies.

Finally, in Trinidad and Tobago, many personnel policies have not actually translated into actual practices (Bissessar 2000). Other issues affecting strategic coherence refer to the reactive compensation structure and the lack of appraisal systems and performance indicators.

Despite shortcomings in the instruments and practices of human resources planning, in incipient stages, the four countries do show a transitional stage towards more formalized, integrated, and strategic human resources planning. This makes them different from the rest of the Latin American region, where such tendency is unclear. In all likelihood, future measurements of strategic coherence in Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago should reveal higher scale values if current reforms actually consolidate.

II.3. Directive Consistency

Directive consistency is the second sub-index of structural consistency. For organizational structures to be handled strategically, managers and supervisors must play active roles and gain increased responsibilities. Precisely, directive consistency values the extent of development of the directive function in the civil service system. It includes eight critical points, most of them assessing the organization of line and central hu-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Directive Consistency</th>
<th>Index Qualitative Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>• Good image of central bodies in charge of human resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>• Professionalism of central bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The possible range of variation for the index is from 0 to 100%.
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)
man resources management and their leadership in administering human resources.

How does the region look like on this sub-index? Costa Rica (59%), Colombia (58%), Chile (53%) and Brazil (50%) are the countries with the highest values on the scale. On average, Latin America scores 30%. Country scores range from 7 to 59 (see Appendix D).

Barbados and Jamaica show civil services with high scores on directive consistency (see Table 9). Belize and Trinidad and Tobago present more intermediate levels of development in this index, although certainly above the average mean for Latin America.

**Excessive centralization but highly appraised central human resources bodies**

A common contradiction among the four countries is the good image of the central human resources bodies combined with a simultaneous tendency towards an excessive centralization.

In Barbados, Permanent Secretaries have restricted power to discipline officers. Furthermore, Draper (2001) observes that the operations of the Public Service Commissions have over-centralized the personnel function to the point that often public managers feel they have little control over employees.

Certainly, this is one major target of transformation and there are efforts aiming at decentralizing prerogatives to reach lower-level managers. Therefore, we can speculate that the directive consistency index seems to be affected by the continuing difficulties over the roles of the Public Service Commissions and public managers.

In Jamaica, the central human resources bodies are comprised by technical personnel and follow clear rules and standards, for which they have a good image in the public sector. Yet, these highly valued bodies are simultaneously criticized for not leaving enough room for organizations’ line managers to manage. Currently, there are continuous decentralization efforts to pass human resources monitoring to the organizations. In terms of assuming responsibility for their employees, line managers seem to conduct follow-ups and support their staff, though these activities are rarely formalized and weakly institutionalized. This is expected to change in the short term.

In Belize, a major constraint is the fact that the large bulk of personnel decisions remain centralized, thus leaving little participation and room for maneuver to line managers about their own personnel. In Trinidad and Tobago, decentralizing responsibilities to line managers has been extremely difficult, contrasting with Jamaica, for instance, where the process seems smoother (Bissessar 2002). Consequently, while key decisions remain in the hands of the Public Service Commission and the Personnel Departments, the human resources departments introduced in Ministries and line agencies during 1991 and 2001 still struggle to obtain more functions. If anything, both the Public Service Commission and the Personnel Department have increased personnel instead of reducing it (Bissessar 2000).

Returning to the regional comparison, a major aspect in which these four countries notably differ from the rest of Latin America is in the image of the central services. Indeed, Longo (2006) shows that in many countries the central human resources organizations have an impoverished image. By contrast, the central human resources bodies are usually valued in the countries examined here. Admittedly, this is not to deny that they may have too formalized or cumbersome procedures as well, but they are highly respected for their autonomy and professionalism.

**The changing role of line managers and supervisors: skills, training and prerogatives**

The responsibilities and managerial competencies of line managers and supervisors need to be reinforced in the four countries. Despite this common trend, there are differences concerning the degree of decentralization of decisions to line managers, the extent of development of a managerial function, and the skills needed
by supervisors under modern civil service contexts.

In Barbados, the emerging picture is one of transition from a more traditional style of leadership to one based on the involvement of managers and supervisors in the performance of their employees. On the one hand, managers and supervisors are currently encouraged to take more direct responsibilities. Specifically, they receive training in the management of the new Performance Review and Development System (PRDS). These actors tend to accept this system much more than previous ones, because they consider it to be more objective (IADB 2002). Also, the Internal Reform Committees established within each agency provide more of a flavor of the new impetus to assume true managerial prerogatives.

On the other hand, Isaacs (2004) mentions that supervisors and managers are still reluctant to assume the renewed responsibilities under the on-going managerially-oriented changes. In all likelihood, this occurs because managers are reluctant to disregard seniority and become more directly responsible for monitoring their employees’ productivity and performance. In many cases they are less prone to use modern technologies that could facilitate their managerial functions. Additionally, whereas supervisors and managers have a clear focus on their areas of responsibility, they do not necessarily hold a broader perspective related to the strategic considerations of the organization. For these reasons, IADB (2002) suggests giving more strategic time to these managers by reducing their routine tasks.

In Jamaica, directive consistency is the highest among the three sub-indices of structural consistency (59%), albeit second in this index if compared to Barbados. Framed within the current modernization initiatives, Isaacs (2002) indicates that a Senior Director of Human Resources Management typically heads the Human Resources Department of his/her organization. In turn, this Senior Director is also a member of the Ministry’s senior management team. Additionally, because these Senior Directors report to the Director of Corporate Services when preparing the corporate plan, they are likely to gain a more strategic role.

A drawback of this managerial development at the line level is the fact that whereas managers are adequately trained and educated, they may lack expertise in the more specific competencies for dealing with personnel (Isaacs 2002). Therefore, the evidence about the true managerial credentials among line managers remains inconclusive.

In Belize, given the context of excessive centralization, managers may not necessarily have the adequate skills or the responsibilities for the tasks of supervising and motivating people. In this context, line managers have reduced prerogatives over the employees under their span of control. We should add certain reluctance to actually enforce performance appraisals and ratings. It remains to be seen whether the constraining environment for supervisors will actually change given the recent decentralization of personnel functions to each ministry.

Trinidad and Tobago has the lowest value in directive consistency among the four countries, with 40% of the scale. Institutional centralization in decision-making seems difficult to erode. Additionally, top-down communications dominate (Isaacs 2004), replacing more dynamic flows of responsibilities across the various directive levels. Probably as a consequence of this, supervisors are benevolent when rating employees, to the point that performance ratings become ceremonial and supervisors lose actual leadership in shaping their employees’ quality of work. In addition, following Draper (2001), there is not yet a human resources management system by which high-level line managers (such as Permanent Secretaries) acquire the necessary competencies to function. There have been difficulties in forging productive relationships between ministers and senior public services in the region (Draper 2001), for which this may affect senior managers’ participation and knowledge in planning the human resources needs of the organization.
II.3.4. Consistency of Processes

Finally, we ought to consider the consistency of processes in order to have a complete picture of the structural consistency of the civil service. This sub-index values the degree of development and integration of the basic processes that sustain an integrated employment and human resources management system. Because processes are present in all subsystems, fourteen critical points provide the information about process consistency, which cross-cut human resources planning, work organization, performance, compensation, career development and human resources and social relations.

Comparative evidence from the Latin American region (Echebarría 2006) shows that consistency in processes is affected by incomplete personnel information systems, lack of reliable performance evaluation instruments and unjustified salary differences in compensation structures not informed by rational mechanisms. Brazil (68%) and Costa Rica (66%) have the most consistent processes. The region’s average is 32% and the lowest value is 11% (See Appendix D).

Our four countries show an upper-intermediate development in the consistency of the civil service processes, with Jamaica and Barbados having higher values than Belize and Trinidad and Tobago (See Table 10 below).

This index benefits from actual compliance with the stated procedures and a fairly reasonable compensation equity. Certainly, some critical points suggest that there are pitfalls in some human resources systems. Yet, in the four countries, seniority remains the regulatory mechanism informing promotions with exceptions. Succession plans (when designed) are not implemented. Whereas training has been based for the most part on agencies’ isolated needs, they are now gearing towards formalizing training evaluation to gain a better sense of training results and its associated costs. By contrast, training schemes are rather inconsistent, and there are problems with the availability of funds. To this, we should add that there is no overarching identification of needs informing training packages.

**Consistency in compensation**

One of the most striking features of the four national civil services compared here is the relative compliance with the principle of “equal pay for equal work.” A couple of exceptions are the higher salaries in Trinidad and Tobago and Belize when it comes to the “contract posts.” Still, the dominant rule is a relatively equitable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Process Consistency</th>
<th>Index Qualitative Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>• Human resources information system updated and quite complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>• Adequate wage compression ratio providing consistency to structural mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>• Job profiles • Bi-annual review of compensation structure • Adequate wage compression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>• Compensation structure rather consistent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The possible range of variation for this index is from 0 to 100%.

Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)
compensation structure with some selected changes.

In the four countries, job classification exercises are currently being conducted, renewing rational parameters for setting compensations. Overall, compensation equity tends to be strong despite the tight compression ratios in Barbados and Jamaica. Jamaica scores quite well in the consistency of compensation, given the fact that salaries are decent and competitive with the private sector, and are reviewed bi-annually according to set parameters.

**Human Resources Information**

With the exception of Barbados, the other three countries evidence shortcomings in the availability of digitized information for informing human resources decisions. In Barbados, some of the modules of the human resources software (*SmartStream*) are in place. The system provides individual-level information from hiring through contract termination, including personnel administration, payroll and benefits. This information allows a more precise description of needs and costs as well as a better knowledge of the individuals’ differential work situations.

In Belize, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica there is a deficit in the quality and quantity of information available: in many cases data are absent while in others information is not digitalized. Iacoviello (2005) observes that, in Belize, information is barely digitized and new information technologies are in their infancy. As an exception, financial information (including compensations) is updated and adequate.

**Job Profiles**

There is a tendency to have job descriptions and profiles, but with varying content and renewal in each country.

Jamaica has formal job descriptions, which actually include relevant job information: the role and core functions of the job, the required skills, the working conditions, the qualifications and experience demanded. The reverse of the coin is that these jobs descriptions are not routinely reviewed, nor do they tap into more substantive job aspects such as competency requirements, learning and behavioral capacities and personality traits (Isaacs 2002). While a major criticism can be raised about job descriptions and profiles being too rational-formal and less rational-substantive, we still argue that relative to the rest of the Latin American region Jamaica stands out.

Currently, Barbados’ civil service is witnessing the furthering of the consistency of processes associated with job classification schemes, job descriptions, and performance evaluations. In Belize, organizations do not have clear performance targets, and the lack of reliable instruments hinders establishing existing differences among employees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11. Two Versions of Contract Posts: Belize and Barbados</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belize</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Contract officers obtain higher salaries than public officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Usually occupy lower level jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Contract officers come from outside the public sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12. Compression Ratios (Lower: Highest salary)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trinidad and Tobago</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barbados</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belize</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jamaica</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)*
In Trinidad and Tobago, there is yet no integral process managing all aspects of the organization of work such as job descriptions and profiles. Job descriptions and evaluations are not widespread, and remain mostly confined to higher-ranking positions.

In sum, structural consistency in these four countries civil services presents good development levels. Certainly, most of the difficulties lie in the weak connections across the different planning levels and efforts. Additionally, human resources planning is barely strategic and coordinated. There is consistency in the managerial structures, but this is due to the high prestige of the centralized structures rather than to the dynamism of middle-level human resources managers. There is some way ahead before this managerial level becomes truly involved in employee performance. Overall, the information systems concerning human resources are weak as well, with exceptions (such as Barbados). Some improvements are seen in the relationship between employment and job profiles, where Jamaica is the most advanced of all by instilling more substance to the competencies required by individuals in performing their tasks. Still, structural barriers become exponential when weak planning systems combine with not updated or incomplete information, and when formal processes rather than substantive procedures take precedence over the management of people and jobs.

II. FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY

Are the civil service subsystems able to influence employees’ behaviors? Are there mechanisms and practices promoting the development of a work conduct and ethics capable of developing the priorities of the public sector? All these important themes refer to the functional capacity of the civil service. Thus, the index measures the capacity of the civil service to positively influence on employee behavior. Because such capacities are complex, the index seeks to account for three distinct types of capacities geared towards motivating employees: a) competency, b) incentive effectiveness and c) flexibility.

II.4.1. An Overview of the Functional Capacity Index

Evidence from the regions indicates that Brazil and Costa Rica obtain the highest scores: 61% and 57% of the scale, respectively. The region’s average is 30%, with a minimum value of 9 and a maximum of 61 (See Appendix D).

Comparatively, the English-speaking Caribbean countries score quite well on this index. Jamaica has the highest scale score (58%), followed by Barbados (54%), Belize (52%) and Trinidad and Tobago (48%) (See Table 13 and Figure 4 below). With regard to competency, the four countries consistently obtain the highest scores. As for incentive effectiveness, the civil processes and mechanisms tend to become the weakest. Exceptionally, Barbados is quite even across the three sub-indices, as summarized in the table below. On average, Jamaica is the country with the highest score on functional capacity.

II.4.2. Competency

Let us consider competency first. By means of 15 critical points, this index refers to the use of personnel policies and practices that most directly affect the design, supply, development and stimulus of employees’ capabilities or, broadly speaking, their “competence.” Nearly all of the critical points concern the work organization and the employment subsystems. The index suggests seeing a modern civil service as a knowledge system, with competent and technically-trained employees recruited with adequate procedures and receiving reasonable incentives to continue learning.

In this section, we will not discuss the issues concerning the quality of selection and recruitment, for they have already been addressed in depth when examining merit. Nevertheless, the reader should recall that the critical points measuring the inclusion of merit considerations in
employment management rank very high for the four countries studied. Consequently, a large bulk of the high scores of competency is actually accounted for by the professionalism in recruiting, selecting, and promoting employees (Four critical points concerning employment practices are shared by the competency and merit indices).

On average, the region scores 35% on competency. Brazil shows the highest score (78%), followed by the more distant score of 56% presented by Costa Rica. After Brazil, therefore, Jamaica has the region’s highest value in competency. The lowest range in the region for this index is 13% (see Appendix D). By sharp contrast, the lowest value among these four English-speaking countries is 48% (see Table 14). Consequently, we can assert that this subregion obtains outstanding results in the competency of their civil services relative to the rest of the Latin American countries.

We have organized the discussion into three empirical themes that directly affect individual and collective competencies to conduct work of increasing value: job descriptions and profiles, the compensation structure, training and collective learning.
### Table 14. Competency Index – Qualitative Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Competency</th>
<th>Index Qualitative Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>On-going review of job classification schemes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Managers provide input to job descriptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>More awareness of the need for increased flexibility in job profiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A cadet system as a cadre of officers providing support to senior managers on new methodologies and perspectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>Revision of job descriptions to be more activity-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Special compensations for categories exposed to market pressures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>Substantive job descriptions for upper level management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weaknesses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td></td>
<td>Compensation structure not very competitive vis-à-vis the private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td></td>
<td>Job descriptions with emphasis on formal aspects alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Need for personnel with problem-solving skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td></td>
<td>Private sector competitive pressures not accurately mapped into current compensation structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not updated job profiles for most of the public structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Current salary structure does not take into account private salaries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The possible range of variation for the index is from 0 to 100%.

*Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)*

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**Job Descriptions and Profiles**

The four countries are engaged in a review and update of job profiles and classifications. Many of the national differences occur due to the stage of the process implementation. Current efforts show that authorities are aware that personal skills and competencies should be integrated into the job descriptions, and these should not be confined to formal credentials or other measurable qualifications (such as knowledge or experience).

Coinciding with its high score, Jamaica is the most advanced in process implementation. Currently centralized in the Cabinet Office, all descriptions are being revised to become more activity-oriented (Isaacs 2004). In Barbados, with the involvement of line managers giving input to job descriptions, tasks and skills are added to pre-

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**Table 15. A Transitional Stage: An Illustration from Jamaica**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old job description system</th>
<th>Intended job description system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus on technical specialties: technical skills educational credentials knowledge experience working conditions role and core functions of jobs</td>
<td>Additional focus on personal competencies: learning capacities behavioral capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrow managerial profiles</td>
<td>Broader managerial profiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise centralized</td>
<td>Expertise led by Cabinet Office but input from line management at each organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004)*
viously formal job descriptions concerning only formal qualifications and professional requirements. In Belize, job profiles emphasizing formal credentials persist, but there is an increased awareness that they should be more flexible and adaptable. In Trinidad and Tobago, more substantive job descriptions are being made for Permanent Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries, but the implementation for the entire civil service is slower and many job descriptions date back to 1966 (Isaacs 2004).

The compensation structure as a motivating force
As nearly all the countries in the region, the compensation structure is less competitive with the market in the higher level jobs. Relative to their private counterparts and even in some technical categories, public officers are paid less. Such competition does not occur at the entry or middle levels.

In Barbados, the on-going revision of the job classification schemes could eventually change this situation. The current compensation structure has partially led to a shortage of lawyers, engineers, surveyors and information technology specialists. In Jamaica, the groups exposed to market competitive pressures receive special compensations (including teachers and nurses). We also observe brain-drain to the private sector in Belize’s civil service. Actually, there is a need for personnel with problem-solving skills, critical as well as creative thinking in order to provide just-in-time responses (Iacoviello 2005). Yet, these skills do not necessarily abound among line public officers.

Similar processes happen in Trinidad and Tobago. Unfortunately, in designing the compensation structure through the recent Position Classification Method (Draper 2001), private sector salaries have not been taken into account.

Training and collective learning
Training operates as an instrument for increased competency insofar as it encourages constant learning, and individual’s educational investments are translated into collective work. The four countries present, however, a gloomy picture.

Consider Barbados. According to Isaacs (2004), middle level managers have actually received training and are willing to use their knowledge in renewing processes and systems at their individual organizations. Nonetheless, their training has been largely ignored in daily organizational practices. This gap undermines organizational capacities to both deal with new problems and provide fresh and efficient answers.

Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago face budget constraints for offering adequate training according to organizational needs. Belize reveals a lack of strategic direction in its training efforts and planning, thus not being necessarily tied to the competency needs of organizations. We may wonder if the currently required leadership skills over technical skills are truly satisfied with Belize’s ad hoc training efforts.

Still, Belize offers an interesting innovation promoting collective learning among their senior managers. For this, the government has implemented a cadet system, which offers to their qualified but not necessarily experienced middle managers on-the-job training opportunities with the aim of providing support to senior officers. In essence, the cadets should provide new insights and fresher methodologies to more experienced managers, thus complementing experience with novel perspectives and innovation.

### Table 16. An Implementation on Course: An Illustration from Barbados

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Resources Information System: Job Classification Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Creation of the jobs in the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Grouping of positions into jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Verification of positions in accordance to the budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Loading of position descriptions and skills required for each position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transference of all employees on the system to their correct position</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004)
II.4.3. Incentive Effectiveness

As its name denotes, by means of 14 critical points incentive effectiveness provides a picture of how personnel management policies and practices incorporate positive stimuli for productivity, learning and service quality. To this end, the critical points assess themes such as job enrichment, the adequacy of the corrective mechanisms, the organizational standards in place, and the like. Not surprisingly, six of the items refer to the performance management function, its mechanisms, incentives and actual practices.

With reference to this sub-index, the Latin American region averages 25% of the scale. Brazil and Costa Rica present the highest values, with 50% and 66% of the scale respectively. The minimum value is 5, this score belonging to a few Central American countries (See Appendix D). In the larger region, performance management instruments are rarely used, and if so, they only have ceremonial value. Also, the compensation structure does not offer enough incentives, for which material rewards are only weak motivational instruments in the civil services. Additionally, negative incentives given for the most part by disciplinary mechanisms and dismissal due to bad performance are not enforced for multiple reasons. Let us turn now to our four countries of interest. What are their scores for incentive effectiveness and why?

The four countries reveal upper-intermediate developments, presenting the following scores: Jamaica and Barbados reach 52% of the scale, while Belize and Trinidad and Tobago, 45% and 43% of the scale respectively (See Table 18 below). Two empirical themes emerge forcefully from the data presented in the country’s institutional assessments: the monetary and non-monetary compensations as non-linear systems of incentives, and the tendency of performance evaluation instruments to have ceremonial roles. All countries’ scores fall in this index as compared with competency and flexibility. This indicates that incentive effectiveness is probably one of the most challenging and difficult tasks for civil services.

**Monetary and Non-monetary Compensations: Positive Incentives?**

Salaries and social benefits are common incentives for employees of all kinds and across different organizations. When there are problems related to low salaries or inadequate social benefits, problems in organizational behaviors arise, such as absenteeism, unwillingness to work, apathy, industrial sabotage and above all, a deep sense of unfairness. More intangible benefits such as social recognition and support are increasingly seen as key work incentives as well.

Let us start with salary or wage compressions, a frequent scapegoat for the lack of incentives in the public sector, particularly in the middle and higher level positions. Recall from Table 12 above that vertical compressions are tight in Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, while they are reasonable in Belize and Jamaica. In principle, one would suppose that the wider the salary compression, the more the structure motivates individuals. Country-level evidence reveals a more complex picture, though.

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**Table 17. An Innovative Way of Promoting Collective Learning: Belize’s Cadet System**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who are the cadets?</th>
<th>Qualified officers, recently recruited, not necessarily experienced in the public sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is their position?</td>
<td>Middle management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are they trained?</td>
<td>Cadets are given on-the-job training, with intensive supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the aim of the system?</td>
<td>Provide improved support to senior managers by furnishing them with new methodologies and insights for the organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation based on Iacoviello (2005)
Indeed, other aspects concerning compensations largely influence how well incentives operate, beyond salary compressions strictly seen. Iacoviello (2005) indicates that there is a generalized perception that “they are not being effective for that purpose.” And she further adds that “the perception is that the structure of incentives attracts candidates that are less result-oriented.” In all likelihood, this explains why incentive effectiveness is the lowest index of the trio of functional capacity, reaching only 45% of the scale.

For some work categories, there are special monetary allowances, as indicated for example in the Flexibility Responsibility Allowance in Barbados, a kind of compensation granted to police, prison and nursing officers for their extra hours. How much these allowances actually motivate is unclear, but they are nonetheless adequate instruments for these professions that deal with more stressful human situations.

In essence, salary compressions matter, but their effects on incentive effectiveness cannot be separated from the remaining system of compensations and from the performance measurement instruments, to which we turn next. Still, it is surprising that Barbados and Jamaica have few non-monetary benefits aimed at collective recognition and intangible incentives.

---

**Table 18. Incentive Effectiveness Index – Qualitative Assessment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Incentive Effectiveness</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Barbados      | 52%                     | • Special money allowances for selected professions dealing with delicate situations  
• Pilot projects with performance management systems | • Deeply ingrained seniority criteria                                      |
| Belize        | 45%                     | • Cabinet has shown political interest in introducing performance appraisal | • Incentives attract candidates “less result oriented”                      |
| Jamaica       | 52%                     | • Performance evaluation of top-level managers                            | • Only informal monitoring of lower level of public officers’ work          |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 43% | • Presents a wide range of non-salary compensations | • Implementation obstacles                                                   |

Note: The possible range of variation for this index is from 0 to 100%.

Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)

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### Performance Evaluation Instruments and Practices: Real or Ceremonial?

Both Barbados and Jamaica are in a state of transition: performance evaluation mechanisms have not necessarily been effective in the past, but new procedures are being implemented.

Indeed, there is hope that the new performance management system will replace the

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**Table 19. Examples of Other Non-salary Compensations (excluding pensions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Non-monetary compensations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Trinidad and Tobago | • Recognition and awards  
• Family days  
• “Public Service Week”  
• Prime Minister’s “Innovating for Service Excellence Award Scheme” |
| Belize        | • Merit Award for Outstanding Service  
• Subsistence and travel allowances  
• Transfer grants (reallocations)  
• Mileage and maintenance allowance |
| Barbados      | • Travel allowances  
• Telephone allowances  
• Entertainment allowances |
| Jamaica       | • Contributory health schemes  
• Transportation allowances |

Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)
deeper ingrained seniority criteria informing promotions. Within the new scheme, individual tasks and organizational priorities should converge. In Barbados, there are pilot projects in selective Ministries working with Performance Review and Development Systems. In turn, this will also require a change in the mental framework of supervisors, who will have to become more directly responsible for their employees’ actions.

Jamaica witnesses the implementation of a Performance Management Assessment System (PMAS). Performance evaluations on the work of Permanent Secretaries are made annually and the system had been implemented in six out of 16 ministries at the time of the assessment. The innovation here is that the evaluations are linked to a pay for the performance system. Still, formal and reliable performance appraisal instruments serving managers to obtain precise measures about employees’ performances are absent. Instead, we observe informal and customary practices for employee monitoring and feedback.

Recurrent obstacles in implementing performance evaluations take place in Belize. The absence of strategic organizational goals produces a “dysfunctional” dynamic: supervisors are not motivated to set work standards for their employees because they do not participate in a strategic planning process, and in turn, the absence of an organizational process of target and standard setting inhibit committed individuals to set criteria for monitoring their employees’ work. By contrast with Jamaica, the performance evaluations planned for the CEOs have not yet been implemented.

In Trinidad and Tobago, there are also recurrent problems in implanting an effective system of performance follow-up and evaluation. There is a “vision” to introduce an integral performance management system throughout the civil service (Isaacs 2004). Yet, there is no formal procedure or informal practice monitoring the work of employees and providing work with feedback that could encourage higher levels of job commitment.

In short, positive incentives upon performance have been difficult to implement, though there are promising changes, particularly for higher level jobs. In Belize, there is some hope that performance evaluation may actually take place in the near future. As Iacoviello (2005) mentions, the Cabinet has put a moratorium on hiring and merit increments until the recent performance appraisal instrument is implemented.

Instead, negative incentives based on poor performance are never put into practice, even though provided for in laws and regulations. Eventually, disciplinary matters can take years to solve. In this point, these four Caribbean countries resemble the rest of the region.

II.4.4. Flexibility

This is the last index within functional capacity. It measures the degree in which policies and practices incorporate guidelines that facilitate: a) the organizational and individual adaptation to external and internal changes, and b) the alignment to flexible tendencies that characterize the current personnel management policies. It is related to 12 critical points measuring human resources planning, work organization, employment, and career development.

In the region, Brazil, Costa Rica and Colombia have the highest scores (52%, 48% and 49%, respectively). Overall, the region shows rigidities in the structure of jobs, in the jobs descriptions (when these exist) and in the mobility opportunities available for employees. The region’s average is 30%, and 10 is the lowest score for flexibility (see Appendix D).

Comparatively, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Belize rank very well in this index, for their values are 50%, 48%, 56% and 52% respectively (See Table 20 below). Therefore, Jamaica shows the highest value in flexibility taking the entire set of Latin America and Caribbean countries. Interestingly, Barbados, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago seem unified by alternative career moves. By contrast, Jamaica’s
Comparing the Civil Service in Four English-Speaking Caribbean Countries: A Quantitative and Qualitative Approach

Flexibility leans on the new competency-based job descriptions.

**Jamaica: A Distinctive Story**
In this country, the recent considerations about competence in the job descriptions pull the index up. As has been mentioned, the Cabinet Office is revising the job descriptions to include learning and behavioral capacities. Yet, the Jamaican civil service lacks an adequate structure of opportunity providing employee with more promotion opportunities and lateral moves. Despite succession plans being designed, these are barely implemented. Additionally, there are no true alternatives such as horizontal careers, except for few cases where employees move from technical to managerial jobs. In essence, flexibility is affected by promotion barriers that are not formal, but rather related to having enough vacancies for a large number of qualified personnel.

**Lateral moves: Barbados, Belize, and Trinidad and Tobago**
In Barbados, there is enough mobility across the whole public sector, thus introducing important alternatives to otherwise rigid career structures. As already mentioned, the current organizational changes will probably produce a structure of mechanisms that will speed up adjustments to the environmental needs. Nonetheless, seniority remains one of the major obstacles for an increased flexibility.

As in Barbados, Belize’s flexibility is accounted for by the fact that it is possible for employees to move between positions and be relocated even in different geographic regions—and employees obtain relocation grants in those cases. Moreover, the support functions (clerical, secretarial, administrative and accounting grades) have horizontal career tracks, for which they are called “horizontal grades.” Countervailing these flexible aspects of the civil service system are the formal job description and classification schemes and the absence of a substantive training plan.

Lastly, in Trinidad and Tobago, flexibility is the highest among the three indices of functional capacity mostly because of the existence of alternative career paths to the hierarchical ones. Indeed, horizontal mobility is possible, albeit within the same segment of the public sector (Draper 2001). If required by the organization, geographic mobility is possible as well. Employees can also “move” from tenured jobs to contract positions, which are better paid and can be renewed (Isaacs 2005).

To summarize the main features of the functional capacity index, we can assert that there are different practices and mechanisms seeking to motivate individual and collective behavior. The four countries have been relatively successful, a fact that is reflected in an index of intermediate development. They have done better in emphasizing competency, and to a lesser extent, in introducing some flexible mechanisms such as lateral and geographic mobility.

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Table 20. Competency Index – Qualitative Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Competency</th>
<th>Index Qualitative Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>• Sector-wide mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>• Lateral and geographic mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>• Competence-based job descriptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>• Alternative career paths</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The possible range of variation for the index is from 0 to 100%.
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)*
as some career routes concerning lateral moves. Nonetheless, a system of well-structured positive and negative incentives, with performance appraisals and evaluations at its core, is a major omission. Current implementation changes may transform this situation: at least there are some efforts for selected job categories (Performance Secretaries in Jamaica) or explicit political will to introduce such a system (as in Belize).

II.5. INTEGRATING CAPACITY

Do organizations have mechanisms that foster employee commitment and a sense of organizational belonging? How do the varying expectations and interests of contending stakeholders get solved? Does the civil service have institutionalized means to do so or only informal practices? By means of nineteen critical points, integrating capacity measures how well the organization develops a sense of belonging and community among its members. Expectedly, most of the critical points refer to the human and social relations management subsystem.

On average, the Latin American region scores 32% on integrating capacity. Argentina and Brazil are the two countries with the highest scores (56%) while very low values are observed for few Central American countries (see Appendix D). In terms of actual dynamics, the low emphasis on mechanisms promoting and measuring organizational climate is striking. Despite this common feature, the quality of industrial and labor relations varies across countries (Longo 2006).

Barbados, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica score relatively well on this index. Indeed, Belize takes a value of 59% on the scale while Jamaica 58%, followed by Barbados with 51% and Trinidad and Tobago with 50% (See Table 21 and Figure 5 below). In comparison to the region, our four cases can be regarded as “model” countries in their integrating capacity. They have an outstanding record of relations with public sector unions, relations which in turn are institutionalized. Actually, several re-
form activities have been carried out jointly with unions. For an accurate interpretation of integrating capacity, we should concentrate on three emerging empirical trends: a) the perceptions of inequality within the workplace, which albeit subjective affect the employees’ sense of belonging, b) the relations between the government and public sector associations, which shows some variation among the four countries, and c) the overall organizational climate and organizational dynamics that despite the mature labor relations seem to be hierarchical.

**Perceptions of Inequity**
Social benefits and pensions seem adequate in the four countries. Possibly, pensions in Trinidad and Tobago are too generous from the perspective of the IMF. Perceptions of inequity within the workplace exist, though. In Trinidad and Tobago, among other issues, this perception relates to the presence of “special hiring regimes” or tenured public officers who have access to contracts that imply higher pays. This causes a feeling of injustice when these contracts remain after the initial motive for them disappears. Also, we should recall the existence of perceptions of racial inequality. Also in Barbados, Jamaica, and Belize, some sense of inequity may persist. In Barbados, public officers perceive that, on average, they are relatively better off than those in the private sector. Despite this, a sense of frustration prevails related to the poor working conditions, to the lack of satisfaction with salaries, and to the fact that many public officers become frustrated because “non-productive employees” and work-to-rule officers do not get penalized. In Belize, there is a sense of frustration arising from the fact that some temporary officers obtain higher salaries than permanent ones.

**Unions and labor relations negotiations with government**
In Trinidad and Tobago, the negotiations with civil service union associations are institutionalized. The Personnel Department is responsible for negotiating and consulting unions on the terms and conditions of employment. These negotiations occur at the national level. Addi-

---

**Table 21. Integrating Capacity Index – Qualitative Assessment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Integrating Capacity</th>
<th>Index Qualitative Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>Employee Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internal Reform Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>Collective Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Union participation in joint bodies concerning HHRR and reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employee Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding recently signed between government and union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Sector Assistance Program (best practice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Institutionalized mechanisms for labor negotiations (national and organizational levels)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Weaknesses**

<p>| |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low work climate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low morale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No regular practices of measuring organizational climate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-smooth communication flows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The possible range of variation for the index is from 0 to 100%.*
*Source: Authors’ compilation based on Isaacs (2004) and Iacoviello (2005)*
tionally, unions have a shop steward within each agency for protecting the collective interests of public officers in their specific workplaces. Despite these in-roads for fostering an institutional infrastructure for negotiating different interests, the reality is that an adversarial climate exists. Indeed, evidence indicates that the selected aspects of the personnel reforms (such as the job classifications) are delayed due to explicit resistance by unions, possibly related to fears of retrenchment and job loss (Bissessar 2000).

In Jamaica, there is an emerging trend towards labor relations characterized by mutual understanding and accommodation rather than low trust, but negotiations are still largely reactive. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has been signed by the unions and the public sector, which is considered a major milestone in the already low conflictive labor relations.

By contrast, Belize has mature labor relations, accounting for the high value of integrating capacity. There are several instances of interaction between management and unions, thus participating in the design of human resources policies (see the table below for more details).

**Organizational climate and communications**

What is the resulting organizational climate? There are problems concerning the quality of communications and there is some degree of discomfort among public officers. Despite this, none of the four countries has incorporated formal instruments for monitoring organizational climate. Instead, there are informal practices intended to obtain information about employee satisfaction. The management of organizational climate ends up depending on specific organizational leadership, if at all, rather than being an organizational initiative. Essentially, better formalized instruments would be welcome.

Let us first consider Trinidad and Tobago. Organizational climate and communications present serious shortcomings, despite the presence of unions. Isaacs (2004) observes that high work morale is an aim often difficult to achieve. Additionally, the decision-making ethos is centralized and communications are top-down (Isaacs 2004). This communication flow leaves little room for employees to present their ideas. To this we should add the social inequities along racial bases mentioned before in this text.

We observe positive developments aiming at maintaining open and effective communication channels between line and higher level public officers. Unfortunately, in Barbados, the Internal Reform Committees originally envisioned as avenues through which employees could participate in organizational changes, have only played limited roles. More hope is currently placed on the Employee Assistance Program (EAP), intended among other goals to provide feedback concerning the work climate.

Similarly, Belize has also established Human Resources Development Committees within each agency as well as an Employee Assistance Program. Yet, the work climate reflects some pitfalls. For illustration purposes, individual promotions and expectations are not taken into account for organizational management in a systematic fashion and individuals’ opinions and initiatives are not integrated into daily organizational operations. Additionally, public officers complain of the service “having no direction, of persistent political victimization, and of poor compensation” (Iacoviello 2005).

In Jamaica, there are expectations placed on the Public Sector Assistance Program, seen as

**Table 22. Belize: A Case of Mature Labor Management Relations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Participation</th>
<th>Joint Staff Council (informal instance)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human Resources Development Committee (formal negotiation space)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Sector Reform Council (monthly meetings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formalized agreements</td>
<td>2003 first Collective Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation framework</td>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation based on Iacoviello (2005)
a best practice. A more traditional civil service culture is leaving room for one less adversarial and with room for more accommodation (Isaacs 2004).

In short, integrating capacity shows inherent contradictions. On the one hand, we see some developments in the labor-government relations. On the other, the daily work climate has problems to the point of low morale, which do not seem easy to overcome in light of centralized decision-making and unilateral top-down communications, and in the absence of formal instruments measuring organizational climate that could serve to correct pitfalls. Recall the paradoxical Belizean case: this is probably the more advanced country in integrating collective actors’ organizations and their claims, but not individuals’ preferences and needs. This mismatch between levels of organizational integration may pose strains on the civil service system as a whole.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The civil service in Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago presents an intermediate level of development relative to the rest of the region. Regarding some selected aspects, mostly related to merit, they reflect upper levels. As observed before, these countries are in a transitional stage, trying to instill more managerially-oriented aspects into the structure and practices of their civil services. Indeed, many of these efforts have been slow, piecemeal, and only partially implemented.

The four cases are outstanding in the Latin American region for the enforcement of merit considerations when selecting public officers. They have solid recruiting bodies that are independent from political pressures, in addition to an emphasis on objective and technical criteria for selecting public officers. We could affirm that the overall civil service presents relatively good development ratings due to the weight of merits, thus reinforcing the idea that formal credentials and universal and open recruiting methods and practices are pivotal for well-developed civil service, even when all else may fail.

Despite important developments in merits and the extensive use of professional criteria in personnel recruitment and selection, we observe some pitfalls in the areas of human resources strategic planning. In particular, the lack of a more articulated human resources planning is a major weakness. This occurs due to a combination of factors. Many of the reform efforts are implemented in isolation rather than in an interrelated and mutually reinforcing fashion, and, in turn, some changes are not sufficiently strategic. In the political realm, some reformers lack integral visions of the transformations promoted, to which we should add existing political apathy and/or lack of consensus on certain areas.

The structural consistency of the civil service is therefore affected by the fact that strategic functions (such as forecasts as to personnel needs, qualitative and quantitative projections, and organizational priorities) are tasks conducted in isolation, many times informally rather than with accurate information and formal procedures, and rarely informing each other. Yet, as observed before, there is a trend towards more formalized, integrated and strategic human resources planning. If anything, the subregion seems quite vital in reform efforts and initiatives. More than reform initiation, the challenge seems to be implementation and consolidation across the whole civil service.

Considering the civil service culture and its effects on the functional and integrating capacity measures, the existing organizational climate remains very traditional and there is little formal concern about improving it. It seems problematic that middle-level managers and public officers do not necessarily perceive benefits from the reforms, thus not committing themselves to their implementation; to some extent, Jamaica is an exception.

Shortcomings in the efficiency of the civil service are a main issue in the four countries, but this is so for different reasons. In Trinidad
and Tobago, the small size of the public sector suggests an insufficient development of a public sector apparatus to attend the needs of the population. Ironically, the uncontrolled increase of the public sector size in Belize also affects efficiency, but for its weight on the wage bill.

Brain-drain to the private sector of skilled and managerial staff occurs in the four countries, due to the more competitive salaries—within a compensation structure that guarantees relative internal equity but is less efficient in retaining highly skilled personnel. This issue of having adequate personnel goes hand in hand with properly designed incentive systems, such as pay for performance at the top levels. Such practice has not been institutionalized yet, and it is a challenge how it will be finally amalgamated to the current equal pay for equal work practices, for it will imply some degree of individual (rather than job) differentiation. In essence, a balanced incentive structure of monetary and non-monetary benefits is a surprising omission.

Along with the absence of a well-defined strategic human resources management is the fact that collective learning and training are barely envisaged in formal plans and established practices. There is some expectation that in the short-run this will change, for training plans are currently priorities in the countries of interest. This will certainly give impetus to more strategic planning in general within organizations, since mapping a skills gap should imply collecting systematic information about job requirements on the one hand, and individuals’ needs and acquired skills, on the other.

Overall, the four countries reveal current processes towards solving the problems highlighted here, for which we have also emphasized, during the comparison exercise, the promising roads taken. We have also stressed the relevance of well-developed formal procedures, such as those concerning merits. The major bottleneck, strategic planning, would require more than “mechanics” (introducing information technologies and disseminating procedures). It will also require important cultural changes such as the furthering of trust between the different management levels and between the reformers and public officers in order for the entire civil service system to embrace the proposed changes.

References


Inter-American Development Bank, IADB (2002). Institutional Assessment of Civil Service


Appendix A. Critical Points Valuation – Comparative table

EVALUATION LEVELS:

5 The context analyzed is entirely or highly consistent with that expressed in the proposal in relation to both content and number of occurrences.

4 The context analyzed is substantially comparable to the proposal, but is not fully equivalent in content or there are exceptions that prevent the analyst from making a generalization of the match detected.

3 The context analyzed is partially coincident with that in the proposal. There are some common elements in content and number of occurrences that enable the analyst to identify a high, though not substantial, degree of coincidence.

2 The context analyzed is significantly different from the proposal. There are some coincidences, but also some deep discrepancies of content and/or differences in number of occurrences.

1 The context analyzed is completely different from that in the proposal. Coincidences of content take place in exceptional cases.

0 The context analyzed is completely different from that expressed in the proposal.
**CRITICAL POINTS VALUATION**

| PLANNING – HR Planning (HRP) enables an organization to evaluate its qualitative and quantitative needs of human resources for the short, medium, and long term, confront identified needs with its existing capacities and identify any actions that need to be undertaken to bridge the gap. |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Existence and Integrity** | **BELIZE** | **JAMAICA** | **BARBADOS** | **TRINIDAD** |
| 1. The processes comprising a Human Resources Planning (HRP) system are adequately developed. | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| **Strategic Coherence** | **BELIZE** | **JAMAICA** | **BARBADOS** | **TRINIDAD** |
| 2. HR planning decisions usually derive from the organization’s strategic priorities and guidelines. | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| There is a close match between them. | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 3. HRP mechanisms in place make personnel practices adaptable to changes in the organization’s strategy. | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| **Basic Information** | **BELIZE** | **JAMAICA** | **BARBADOS** | **TRINIDAD** |
| 4. Personnel information systems provide knowledge on the quantitative and qualitative availability of existing and expected HR in different organizational situations and units. | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 5. The HRP policies and instruments in place favor optimization and facilitate a suitable distribution of resources and workload among the units. | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 6. The organization is neither overstaffed nor understaffed. | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| **Effectiveness** | **BELIZE** | **JAMAICA** | **BARBADOS** | **TRINIDAD** |
| 7. Labor costs in the public sector are within reasonable parameters, compatible with the country’s economy. | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| 8. Staff members are redistributed whenever necessary. | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 9. The technical skills of the staff are in line with the knowledge society. The weight of qualified personnel is significant. | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| **Management** | **BELIZE** | **JAMAICA** | **BARBADOS** | **TRINIDAD** |
| 10. Line managers are acquainted with HRP plans and are involved in their design and follow-up. | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 11. Personnel policies, decisions and practices, in each of the HRM areas, respond to meaningful objectives consciously established in the planning process. | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| **WORK ORGANIZATION** – The subsystem of work organization comprises the HRM policies and practices that define the characteristics of and conditions for performing the tasks concerned, and the requirements to be met by the people hired to carry them out. | | | | |
| **Existence and Integrity** | **BELIZE** | **JAMAICA** | **BARBADOS** | **TRINIDAD** |
| 12. The processes that comprise this Work Organization system are adequately developed. | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| **Technical quality and flexibility of role descriptions** | **BELIZE** | **JAMAICA** | **BARBADOS** | **TRINIDAD** |
| 13. Job designs follow management criteria rather than legal considerations or collective agreements. | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| The legal framework or labor agreements only provide a general frame within which the work is organized and managed according to the needs of the organization. | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| 14. Jobs are described accurately, so that the chain of responsibilities is clear. Employees know what they are accountable for and why their contribution is rewarded. | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| 15. Job descriptions are not as exhaustively detailed as to preclude proper adaptation to changing or unexpected circumstances. | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| 16. Job design tends to enrich or enlarge the jobs both horizontally and vertically in order to produce gains in job quality and encourage employee motivation without serious losses in productivity or coordination (see specialization in glossary). | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| 17. The classification and hierarchy of positions respond to sound criteria and are adjusted to each organization. | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| **Quality of profiles definition** | **BELIZE** | **JAMAICA** | **BARBADOS** | **TRINIDAD** |
| 18. Qualification or skills profiles of job holders go beyond degrees, expertise, or formal merit and identify other competencies (see glossary). | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| 19. Skills profiles are defined prior to the technical studies conducted by experts. | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| 20. Profiles include the competencies deemed key for the successful performance of each job holder. | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 21. Task requirements are generally consistent with the elements that make up the position profiles. | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| **Administration** | **BELIZE** | **JAMAICA** | **BARBADOS** | **TRINIDAD** |
| 22. Job designs and profile definitions are reviewed on a regular basis to adapt them to the evolution of the tasks and their new requirements. | 4 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| 23. Line managers have a crucial role in the job design and profile definitions that concern them. | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 |

(continued on the next page)
CRITICAL POINTS VALUATION (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EMPLOYMENT MANAGEMENT – This subsystem of the HRM involves personnel policies and practices concerned with managing the processes by which people enter, move within and leave the organization. It is a complex subsystem, within which some of the most important areas of HRM have to be analyzed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal opportunity and merit in the hiring process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Recruitment to fill vacant positions is open, both in fact and in law, to all candidates who meet the requirements laid down. These requirements are established on the basis of the candidates’ qualifications, which are technically and not arbitrarily evaluated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. There are procedures and mechanisms throughout the hiring process to avoid arbitrariness, politicization, cronynism or patronage practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Only a reasonably limited number of positions are filled with people appointed as a result of political mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. There are mechanisms in place to guarantee the principles of equality and non-discrimination, intended to eliminate any disadvantage based on sex, race, culture, or origin, to gain access to or be promoted in the public sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. The methods used for the search, communication, and attraction of candidates normally result in an adequate number of eligible applicants for the positions to be filled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Selection is based on the profiles of competencies (see glossary) prepared for the applicants to the vacant positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. The selection instruments used normally suit the previously defined profiles, and their design is based on technically validated effectiveness criteria applicable to the identification of professional skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Selection committees or bodies are formed on the basis of the professionalism and expertise of its members, who select the best candidates using their independent judgment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Hiring decisions are based on technically proven merit and professional skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. There are adequate procedures in place to welcome employees, facilitate their entry into the organization and their first steps in the new position and work environment, and such procedures are correctly implemented. Furthermore, employees are provided with guidelines on the core principles and behavior they must be acquainted with at the time of entry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. There are adequate procedures in place (such as trial periods) to ensure that the selection of candidates is correct and that corrective measures are adopted, if appropriate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Induction quality</td>
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<tr>
<td>35. The functional and geographic mobility mechanisms adopted enable the organization to be flexible enough to respond to staff redistribution needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility</td>
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<tr>
<td>36. Absenteeism indices are, normally, acceptable.</td>
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<tr>
<td>37. The disciplinary actions taken allow the organization to correct employees' behavior in a fast, effective and exemplary manner.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Separation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. There are no dismissals or terminations of professional, non-political positions resulting from change of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Employees can be dismissed due to gross negligence or low performance, founded on objective facts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Employment contracts may be terminated due to technical, economic, or organizational reasons, grounded on objective facts that impose the need for lay-offs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. There is no excessive staff turnover in any department or sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance management – Performance Management is aimed at influencing the workforce performance so that it is in line with the organization’s priorities and kept as high as possible, enhancing the employees’ contribution to the organization’s objectives and facilitating the gathering of information that will help improve the HRM decision-making process in different areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and follow-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Top management usually defines standards of expected performance, consistent with the organization’s priorities and strategy. Consequently, employees are very well aware of what aspects of their contribution will be specifically valued in a given period.</td>
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<tr>
<td>43. Performance objectives are set according to the improvement plans agreed in the performance evaluation of the previous management cycle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Performance objectives are communicated to the employees in a way that their involvement and commitment are encouraged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Performance objectives are set forth within the framework of improvement plans resulting from the previous management cycle.</td>
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<th>BELIZE</th>
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### CRITICAL POINTS VALUATION (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITICAL POINTS</th>
<th>BELIZE</th>
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<th>BARBADOS</th>
<th>TRINIDAD</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>46. People’s performance is evaluated by the organization according to the expected standards.</td>
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<tr>
<td>47. Evaluation criteria and practices enable the organization to efficiently distinguish differences in performance among employees.</td>
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<tr>
<td>48. Performance evaluation criteria are regarded as reliable and objective by those responsible for their implementation.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Administration</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>49. Line managers who are responsible for work units at different hierarchical levels play a leading role in the performance management of the employees under their supervision</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>COMPENSATION MANAGEMENT</strong> – This subsystem entails the management of all types of monetary (i.e. wage or non-wage) and non-monetary benefits offered by the organization to its employees to reward them for their contribution to achieving the organization’s objectives.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Existence of a compensation strategy</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>50. The wage structure and compensation policies derive from a set of priorities and objectives linked to the organization’s strategy rather than to inertial practices or reactive responses to claims and labor conflicts.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Internal and external equity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>51. In general, the people in the organization have the perception that their compensations are consistent with their contribution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>52. People feel that the compensation received by other employees is equitable vis-à-vis their own salaries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>53. Job classifications translated to salary levels contribute to a flexible progression based on performance and training.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>54. The compensation structure is adequate to attract, motivate, and retain skilled employees in the different types of positions required by the organization.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>55. The wage scale is reasonable. Vertical differences in salary respond to the different nature of the positions.</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>56. There is some balance between the staff compensation in the organization and the salaries earned by equivalent employees in different sections and areas of the public service.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>57. Salary costs at every level are not excessively high vis-à-vis those prevailing in the market.</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>58. The compensation policies adopted promote effort, improved individual and group performance, as well as learning and skills development.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Administration</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>59. Decisions on salary administration are adopted in accordance with pre-established criteria and in line with the structural design parameters laid down by the organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>60. No arbitrary practice, rent-seeking, or political patronage is detected in salary decisions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>61. The HR information system has all the updated information on compensation that is required for the correct management of the salary system.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Other benefits</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>62. Non-wage benefits given are cost-effective.</td>
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<tr>
<td>63. The pension plan for public employees meets their social security needs, is financially sound, does not create exclusive privileges vis-à-vis other social groups, and does not represent an excessive burden on the economy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>64. Useful policies and instruments are in place for the non-monetary recognition of achievements.</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT</strong> – The Development Management policies and practices aim at stimulating the professional development of the staff members according to their potential, encouraging learning and defining career paths that should match the organization’s needs with the individual profile.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness of promotion policies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>65. In general, people perceive that their reasonable expectations of promotion are satisfied in the organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>66. There are career and succession plans that harmonize individual expectations with the foreseeable needs of the organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>67. Promotion criteria and mechanisms are based on performance, potential for growth, and skills development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRITICAL POINTS VALUATION (continued)</td>
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<tr>
<td>68. No elements of abuse or political patronage are verifiable in promotion practices.</td>
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<tr>
<td>69. The organization manages the progress made by its human resources with flexibility — i.e. without too many formal barriers or restrictions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>70. There are formulas other than the strictly hierarchical career — e.g. horizontal careers or change of positions — based on the recognition of professional excellence, without necessarily granting more authority to the individual.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Career design quality</td>
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<tr>
<td>71. Employees receive adequate training from the organization to supplement their initial training, adapt them to changing tasks, solve poor performance, and support their professional growth.</td>
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<tr>
<td>72. Training activities support collective learning, thus strengthening advances in the organization’s capacity to deal with problems and respond effectively.</td>
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<tr>
<td>73. Training activities effectively support innovation and cultural change processes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>74. Training is based on a reliable diagnosis of needs.</td>
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<td>75. Investments in training are made through plans resulting from the diagnosis of needs and are designed to support clear organizational priorities.</td>
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<td>76. Training is evaluated in terms of the satisfaction produced on trainees together with the result-cost ratio and its impact on the employees’ performance.</td>
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<td>77. The organization is concerned with evaluating the work environment or climate on a regular basis by resorting to reliable instruments.</td>
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<td>78. Climate evaluations are taken into account at the time of reviewing and improving HRM policies and practices in force.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work climate</td>
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<tr>
<td>79. The organization makes frequent use of different mechanisms to learn about the employees’ initiatives, requests, suggestions, information, and opinions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>80. In general, all-level management decisions as well as all types of relevant information fed by top managers flow easily and fluently in the organization and reach every stakeholder in due time and manner.</td>
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<tr>
<td>81. The organization has specific communication channels to reinforce the staff’s sense of belonging and involvement in the global project.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>82. Each party plays his or her role without stepping beyond it, and these roles are reciprocally recognized by the other party.</td>
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<tr>
<td>83. In general, power is reasonably balanced between management and staff. Negotiations between the parties usually reflect this balance.</td>
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<td>84. Labor relations usually and preferably choose the path of negotiation and consensus rather than confrontation or disrepute.</td>
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<td>85. Intermediated labor relations — i.e. those carried out by representatives — do not exclude direct or personal relations between management and employees where appropriate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labor relations balance and quality</td>
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<tr>
<td>86. Labor conflict management</td>
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<tr>
<td>87. There are effective mechanisms in place to manage and settle labor conflicts.</td>
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<td>88. Occupational health and safety practices are satisfactory.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social policy management</td>
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<tr>
<td>89. There are adequate social security policies and benefits for employees that do not exceed those that are characteristic in the environment in which the organization operates. Furthermore, the benefits are appreciated by staff members.</td>
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(continued on the next page)
**CRITICAL POINTS VALUATION (continued)**

| HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION – The description of each subsystem forming part of the HRM is not complete unless we analyze the mechanisms used for the management of the system, particularly the distribution of personnel decisions among the different responsible parties. |
|---|---|---|---|
| BELIZE | JAMAICA | BARBADOS | TRINIDAD |
| 90. Managers are empowered and autonomous enough to deal with the personnel assigned to the units under their supervision. | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| 91. Managers are suitably trained to perform their tasks. | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| 92. Managers are aware of and assume their responsibilities as human resources managers in relation to the staff members under their scope of formal authority. | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| 93. The central services responsible for the CS system are perceived, by the rest of the organization, as adding value and contributing to the attainment of common goals. | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
## Appendix B.

### Summary of the Institutional Assessments – Comparative table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Belize</th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Trinidad and Tobago</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal framework analysis</strong></td>
<td>The Constitution (1988) establishes CS Commission. PS Regulations (2001) and Government Workers Regulations (1992) make up the basic legal framework for public employment.</td>
<td>The legal framework includes the Constitution (1966), The Service Commissions (Public Service Regulations (1978), The Civil Establishment Act and Orders, the Pensions Act and the Training Act. The enactment of a new Public Service Act is imminent in order to address deficits in terms of the adequacy and consistency of employment management, specifically enforcement of discipline, human and social relations management and work organization practice. The existing General Orders for the Public Service of Barbados (1970) is being integrated into the new Act.</td>
<td>The Constitution (1962), the Public Service Law, Public Service Regulations (1961), The Staff Orders for the Public Service (1976), The Civil Service Establishment Act and the Pensions Act constitute the legal framework for the CSS in Jamaica. This framework does not address the HRM system comprehensively.</td>
<td>The Constitution (1976), PSC Regulations (1966) the Civil Service Act and the Pensions Act are the main building blocks. There is a vision to modernize the legal framework to facilitate decentralization of the HRM function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analysis of the Human Resources Organization function</strong></td>
<td>The Ministry of Public Service, Services Commission, Public Sector Reform Council have responsibilities over HR management in the public sector. There is some degree of overlapping in their roles.</td>
<td>Collectively, the PSC, MCS, Personnel Administration Division and the Training Division have overall responsibility, showing a centralized decision-making process in the CSS in Barbados. Decision-making on aspects of employment management, work organization and</td>
<td>The Cabinet Office, the PSC and the MoFP are main decision makers. Select agencies also have delegated authority for HRM. The central agencies add value in their auditing and monitoring roles.</td>
<td>The Service Commissions Department, the PSC, the Personnel Department, the Ministry of Public Administration and Information and the Ministry of Finance are the main actors. The CSS is epitomized by centralized decision-making. With the exception of the decen-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Functional Analysis of the Civil Service (continued)

### Analyzed quantitative indicators of the CS system

**Factors** | **Belize** | **Barbados** | **Jamaica** | **Trinidad and Tobago**
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Civil service comprises around 12,000 officers. The central government bill accounts for 10% of GDP. There is a reasonable wage compression and civil service incentives. Average salaries are higher for public sector, but less competitive at managerial levels. | professional development management are made at the line agency level. Permanent secretaries make temporary appointments, while line managers identify training needs and write job descriptions. | The staff complement of the civil service is 21,000. Central government wage bill accounts for 13% of the GDP, i.e. it represents a relative burden of public employment on the economy. There is also evidence of tight compression in the compensation structure. Average wage data in both the public and private sectors were not established, thus precluding comparability. | The staff complement of the civil service in Jamaica is 32,067. Central government wage bill accounts for 13.5% of the GDP, evidencing a relative burden on the economy. The compensation structure reflects relative internal equity. Government salaries are at 40% of market. | The civil service staff complement is 30,000. The staff complement is low relative to international comparators and suggests insufficient development of the central government overall. The central government wage bill accounts for 7.8% of GDP. The fiscal weight of central government employment is not a relative burden on the economy. There is evidence of tight compression in the compensation structure.

### Planning

**Factors** | **Belize** | **Barbados** | **Jamaica** | **Trinidad and Tobago**
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Strategic planning at macro level is not layered down. Systems of financial control and accountability of the public service are weak. Salary expenditures represent heavy burden to public accounts. The IT infrastructure is not developed; there are serious limitations to accessing basic information. The HR component of information system is being developed. | The HRMIS production model is established in the MCS and the Personnel Administration Department. This subsystem, which is being ‘rolled out’ to Ministries and Departments, is in transition due to limited access to information for HR planning purposes. | The MOU at the macro level as well as the corporate planning framework at the organizational level provide, to a limited extent, bases for HR Planning. A census of civil servants, a core building block for HR Planning, is imminent. HRMIS is a prototype and not a production model. The formalization of the HR Planning subsystem that incorporates a timely and accurate HRMIS will enhance the structural consistency of the core building blocks of a HRM system, namely: HRP, Performance Management and Work Organization subsystems. | IT infrastructure has been developed in three pilot agencies with HR decision-making function. While the HRIS is a production model in the central agencies and is networked to ministries and departments, this system is not yet formalized into a planning tool and limits access to information and related decision-making by line managers.

(continued on the next page)
### APPENDIX B. SUMMARY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENTS – COMPARATIVE TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
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<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Trinidad and Tobago</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work Organization</td>
<td>Job classification and profile definition processes are rather formal, under an ambitious streamlining initiative. Job descriptions are periodically reviewed by the MPS.</td>
<td>Job evaluation was completed in 2003. Job descriptions include formal educational qualifications/professional requirements and functions and responsibilities. The exclusion of competencies profiles limits rationality, flexibility and accuracy. The potential of this subsystem for providing job satisfaction will be more fully realized when the void in trained job analysts is filled.</td>
<td>Job evaluation has provided a basis for the development of output-oriented job descriptions that included competencies profiles. The exercise of developing appropriate job descriptions has begun in pilot agencies and is in progress.</td>
<td>Job evaluation is being undertaken in the central civil service, after a hiatus of three decades. There is evidence of succession planning at leadership level with the development of the permanent secretary cadre. Job descriptions for this cadre include competencies profiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Management</td>
<td>Meritocratic tradition for recruitment is in process of being partially decentralized from Public Services Commission to MPS and line ministers. Guarantees against arbitrariness are effective, but do not operate for a category of temporary employees (open vote) that comprises around 2,000 jobs. Adequate mechanisms for induction, absenteeism control and mobility. Possibility of separation for bad performance or for economic reasons (infrequently used).</td>
<td>Employment management decisions are based on professional criteria and in general preclude arbitrariness. But these measures are sometimes contested. Expressed difficulties have been encountered in enforcing discipline quickly and effectively in cases of non-performance. This has sometimes led to feelings of frustration and low morale among civil servants with good performance. Mechanisms for reception (induction) and absenteeism controls are inadequate.</td>
<td>While emphasis continues to be placed on insulating those responsible for employment management decisions from political influence, this subsystem evidences gaps in service-wide induction programs, and databases on staff turnover and absenteeism.</td>
<td>Employment decisions generally conform to professional criteria. Merit-based recruitment measures are sometimes contested when one of the two dominant ethnic groups is perceived to be under-represented in the civil service, leading to advocacy for the establishment of monitoring mechanisms. No structured mechanism for induction is in place. Absenteeism indices are not maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Management</td>
<td>Recurrent problems to implement initiatives to improve performance evaluation process. It remains difficult to define performance goals given the flaws in the strategic planning system.</td>
<td>The formalization of the PDRS in five pilot agencies is a positive development. Sustaining this thrust to incorporate other agencies will lead to the strengthening of the interconnections between this subsystem and the Professional Development Management and Compensation subsystems.</td>
<td>The introduction, in pilot agencies, of PMAS—a recent initiative—evidences efforts to provide standards against which to measure performance as well as adequate instruments for appraising performance and developing employees. The formalization of this subsystem service-wide will provide the basis for variable payments and may serve to motivate high performers.</td>
<td>Performance management is formalized for the permanent secretary cadre, an initiative of recent vintage. Implementation of a performance management system introduced service-wide in the 1990s was problematic because of lack of job descriptions, difficulty with standard setting as well as the culture of distrust.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued on the next page)
## Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compensation Management</th>
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<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Trinidad and Tobago</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The salary strategy is dominated by budgetary focus. Reasonable wage compression and internal equity. Higher salaries in average for the public sector, but less competitive at higher levels. Incentives for good performers are established in legislation, but are not effectively used for that purpose. Non-monetary compensation is infrequent.</td>
<td>Wage decisions do not respond to nepotistic practices. There prevails internal equity. Wages are tightly compressed and the wage bill is a burden on the economy. Non-monetary benefits are likely to be institutionalized. While the adequacy of the pension regime was not established, efforts are being made to protect pensions/pensions rights and to ensure their continuity.</td>
<td>The MOU dictates the overarching salary strategy. There is evidence of internal equity. A vision to create external equity is &quot;on hold.&quot; PMAS has been introduced to facilitate merit-based pay. A sharper focus on introducing non-monetary incentives is desirable in an ethos of cost containment.</td>
<td>The compensation strategy tends to be reactive in response to unions’ demands. The salary structure is not competitive at the senior levels. There is evidence of tight compression. Other benefits, including pension and non-monetary benefits, are in place and are adequate.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Professional Development Management | Careers include vertical and horizontal tracks. Advancement is based heavily on seniority and formal credentials. Training efforts are more oriented to individual preferences of public officers than to organizational needs. There is an ongoing initiative to establish a HRD strategy for Belize, including public and private sectors. | Horizontal careers are not the norm. Promotion is based largely on qualifications. Experience, performance and seniority may also be taken into account. Training needs articulated by individuals take precedence in the absence of organizational training needs analyses. A training policy for the civil service of Barbados is expected to come on stream in January 2005. Training needs assessments are yet to be formalized and investment in training to be evaluated. | There is a deficit in career/succession planning. Advancement of individuals in the professional and technical occupational categories is based on professional criteria, with possibilities for horizontal mobility. Qualifications, experience, performance and, when all other factors are equal, seniority are criteria taken into account for other categories. In the absence of organizational training needs assessments, training is based on individual needs. Investment in training is not evaluated. A training policy and plan is being developed. | There is a deficit in career planning. Seniority is an important factor. The existing career planning void influences career design quality, as promotion decisions tend to rely on seniority rather than on the results of training. A training policy will be developed. |

(continued on the next page)
### APPENDIX B. SUMMARY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENTS – COMPARATIVE TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Belize</th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Trinidad and Tobago</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human and Social Relations Management</td>
<td>There are not many initiatives focused on work climate and communication. Several instances of interaction between management and unions, with union representatives taking part in joint bodies that have responsibility in the design of HR policies.</td>
<td>Protocol Four of the Social Partnership (2001-2004) provides a macro framework for the sustained interaction between unions and Government. In the absence of structured instruments for assessing the organizational climate, initiatives such as IRs and EAPs should be used more extensively. Top-down communication within the CSS is apparently an issue to be addressed.</td>
<td>The MOU represents a positive development that signals a labor relations ethos of accommodation rather than confrontation. The formalization of specific instruments to evaluate the organizational climate and sustain “new” relationships with internal and external stakeholders is desirable.</td>
<td>While the Government has had the vision to administer a Public Service Employee Survey in March 2004 in order to assess the organizational climate, the reportedly adversarial labor relations ethos as well as an apparent need to build social capital influences this subsystem adversely. Civil servants’ pension is considered generous. Other benefits include old age pension and the national insurance scheme. One source of disquiet that affects the morale of civil servants is linked to the convention of special hiring regimes that facilitate certain serving civil servants’ extended appointments to projects on contract, and at higher pay than their counterparts in service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS (continued)**
### Appendix C.
Quantitative Indicators – Comparative Table

#### 1. Number of Political Appointments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Belize</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Trinidad and Tobago</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of political appointments</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of positions for the civilian central government</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>3,392</td>
<td>32,067</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political appointments rate</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2. Central Government Wage Bill/Gross Domestic Product

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<th>Belize</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Trinidad and Tobago</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central government wage bill (in million dollars)</td>
<td>329.4</td>
<td>109.17</td>
<td>886.2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (in million dollars)</td>
<td>2,598</td>
<td>1,081.7</td>
<td>6,548.6</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government wage bill/Gross Domestic Product</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3. Vertical Wage Compression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Belize</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Trinidad and Tobago</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Higher salary of civilian central government (in dollars)</td>
<td>50,961</td>
<td>34,082</td>
<td>58,860</td>
<td>1,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Lower salary of civilian central government (in dollars)</td>
<td>9,244</td>
<td>3,476</td>
<td>3,588</td>
<td>344.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/II. Vertical wage compression</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>4.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. All figures expressed in US Dollars. 1Bds = 0.50 US Dollars/1Bzds = 0.51 US Dollars/1JMds = 0.015 US Dollars/1TTD = 0.16 US Dollars (Source: www.xe.com Universal Currency Converter)

2. Sources for these figures and notes about their calculation can be found in the Institutional Assessments by Country (see Section II)
### 4. Average Central Government Wage/Per Capita GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Belize</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Trinidad and Tobago</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Average central government wage (in dollars)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>772.87</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Per capita GDP by month (in dollars)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>114.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average central government wage/Per capita GDP</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
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### 5. Average Central Government Wage/Average Private Sector Wage

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<th>Belize</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Trinidad and Tobago</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Average central government wage (in dollars)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>772.87</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Average private sector wage</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average central government wage/Average private sector wage</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
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### 6. Total Number of Central Government Employees/Total Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Belize</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Trinidad and Tobago</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Total number of central government employees</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>9,923</td>
<td>32,067</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Total population</td>
<td>266,800</td>
<td>282,600</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of central government employees/Total population</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>2.31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7. Central Government Expenditure (excluding pensions and debt service)/Total Number of Central Government Employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Belize</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Trinidad and Tobago</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Central government expenditure (in million dollars)</td>
<td>329.4</td>
<td>224.71</td>
<td>886.2</td>
<td>2,363.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>II. Total number of central government employees</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>9,923</td>
<td>32,507</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Central government expenditure (excluding pensions and debt service)/Total number of central government employees (in dollars)</td>
<td>15,805</td>
<td>44,402</td>
<td>78,794</td>
<td>78,794</td>
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Appendix D.
Civil Service Indices for Latin America and the Caribbean – Summary Table
<table>
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<td>Merit</td>
<td>Strategic Consistency</td>
<td>Directive Consistency</td>
<td>Consistency of Processes</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>and Tobago</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average Latin</td>
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<td>33.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>30.0</td>
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<td>America</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>43.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Indices scale: 0-100 Higher scores imply higher development of the civil service.

Appendix E.
Civil Service Development by Subsystems

<table>
<thead>
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<td>2.4</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
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### REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE IN THE CARIBBEAN

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Scale: 0 to 5. Higher scores imply higher development of the subsystem.